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General Introduction 
 
Motivation 
 
Horizontal inequality and poverty 
Inclusive growth cannot truly be attained if inequality is not tackled. Inequality, a broad concept, 
has been used vastly in different disciplines; searching this word in Google scholar gives us more 
than 3 million results. No one can deny the existence of inequality and the danger of it as a 
barrier to sustainable and inclusive development. Reducing inequality within and between 
countries has been put at heart of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDG10): 
“There is growing consensus that economic growth is not sufficient to reduce poverty if it is not inclusive and if it 
does not involve the three dimensions of sustainable development – economic, social and environmental… To reduce 
inequality, policies should be universal in principle, paying attention to the needs of disadvantaged and 
marginalized populations.” Recently, a growing body of research has focused on horizontal 
inequalities (HIs), which refer to the gap between different groups in a society as categorized for 
example by race, ethnicity, or gender. Horizontal inequality, in many cases, is found to be 
persistent over a long period due to both, unequal access to different types of capital and 
different returns to capital accumulated. The persistence of HIs leads to individuals being stuck 
in poverty traps and obtaining lower outcomes in terms of human development indexes (related 
to for example, health, education, community participation, self-identify), exacerbating inequality 
of opportunities. Furthermore, a high level of HIs is positively correlated with a higher risk of 
conflict, and economic and political instability. Addressing HIs is also needed if the goal is to 
reduce individual or vertical inequality since vertical inequality includes both between and within 
group disparities.  
The role of ethnic inequality as an important form of HIs has recently gained more attention in 
the literature, focusing especially on poverty rates among indigenous people as well as economic 
inequality among and between different ethnic groups. In a comprehensive review of poverty and 
socio-economic indicators among indigenous people, Hall and Patrinos (2012) highlighted 
common features of indigenous people across different countries: they are usually among the 
poorest and face many disadvantages. Another strand of literature has explored the negative 
association between ethnic fragmentation and economic development (Easterly and Levine, 1997; 
La Porta et al., 1999; Alesina et al., 2003). That inverse relationship is also documented in other 
studies considering different measures of ethnic diversity such as group polarization (Montalvo 
and Reynal-Querol, 2005) or ethnic segregation (Alesina and Zhuravskaya, 2011). Furthermore, 
recent work by Alesina et al. (2016) has shown the direct negative relationship between ethnic 
inequality and development. The authors emphasized the fact that is it economic inequality 
between different ethnic groups which is harmful to development rather than ethnic diversity per 
se. Their finding, using data from 173 countries, is in line with few other studies, such as Steward 
(2002) or Chua (2003), which provide further evidence from case-studies. Alesina et al. (2016) 
also highlighted the role of geographic endowments in shaping economic inequality between 
ethnic groups. Focusing on the mechanisms behind this inverse relationship between ethnic 
inequality and development, the literature has found links between ethnic inequality and 
inadequate public good provision (Baldwin and Huber, 2010; Alesina et al., 2014); between ethnic 
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inequality and lower government quality (Kyriacou, 2013); and between ethnic/racial inequality 
and the formation of social capital (Chantarat and Barret, 2011; Tesei, 2014).  
Why Vietnam? 
Vietnam has been one of the most cited success stories of economic growth and poverty 
reduction over the last three decades. This remarkable achievement can be attributed to the ‘Doi 
moi’, a broad set of national economic and political reforms starting in 1986 which have 
transformed Vietnam from one of the poorest countries into a lower middle-income one 
(Pimhidzai, 2018). Besides becoming a lower middle-income country in 2009, Vietnam has also 
achieved most of the Millennium Development Goals. Regarding poverty reduction, the poverty 
headcount plummeted from nearly 60 percent in the early 1990s to only 20.8 percent in 2010 and 
9.8 percent in 2016 (World Bank, 2012; Pimhidzai, 2018). However, economic growth has not 
been fully inclusive. In terms of poverty, vulnerable households just above the poverty line are 
actually more likely to fall into poverty than before and it has become more difficult to reach the 
remaining poor due to a slow-down in poverty reduction and a rise in inequality. One of the 
biggest challenges to inclusive growth is ethnic poverty. In Vietnam, there are 53 ethnic minority 
groups, who represent less than 15 percent of the population but more than 50 percent of the 
poor in 2010 (World Bank, 2012). Furthermore, ethnic minority groups also perform worse on 
other welfare indicators, such as education, health, etc. The Country Social Analysis (CSA) report 
(World Bank, 2009) refers to this situation as a dilemma, given the fact that ethnic inequalities 
persist, despite a great amount of financial resources having been invested to lift up the situation 
of ethnic minority in the remote and mountainous areas and the fact that some ethnic minorities 
are living in parts of the country that are experiencing rapid economic growth. Concerns over 
inequality of opportunities between ethnic groups have also arisen, in particular, the ability to 
access education and health services (World Bank, 2014; Oxfam, 2017). Group-based inequality, 
if not addressed, will reduce not only economic growth but also achievements on other welfare 
indicators and might cause higher risk of instability. Understanding the causes of these persistent 
ethnic gaps and the potential of ethnic minorities is therefore a necessity to turn the country’s fast 
economic growth into truly inclusive growth.  
This introduction provides the reader with the general context of ethnic inequality in Vietnam 
and its evolution over time, emphasizes gaps in the literature on ethnic minority, and offers a 
conceptual framework that guides the research questions in this thesis. I also provide quotes 
extracted from my in-depth interviews with ethnic minorities living in Ha Giang, Ha Noi and Tay 
Ninh provinces, carried out in May, June and July 2015. The interviews provide insights from 
local ethnic minorities about their lives, their struggles and economic opportunities; they 
complement the quantitative data used in my thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
Ethnic minorities in Vietnam: who are they and what do we know? 
Vietnam is a multi-ethnic country, with 54 ethnic groups, including 53 ethnic minority groups. 
The majority group are Kinh people, making up around 85 percent of the country’s population. 
The remaining 53 ethnic groups are considered ethnic minorities in Vietnam. They mainly live in 
the mountainous and highland areas of Vietnam but are spread out from the North to the South 
(except for the Hoa/Chinese group who, together with the Kinh, mainly occupies the delta and 
coastal areas). Population size of the ethnic groups varies considerably. Among the ethnic 
minorities, the largest groups are the Tay, Thai, Muong, Hoa, Khmer, Nung with an average 
population of 1 million each, while other groups such as the Brau, Ro Mam and O Du only 
consist of several hundreds of members. In terms of language, there are five language families 
shared by the different groups. The Kinh language, or Vietnamese, which belongs to the Viet-
Muong language group, is the national language and the second language of ethnic minority 
groups. The past century, with the Vietnam war, migration and government policies, has marked 
a significant change in ethnic minorities’ lives. Minorities used to live in the upland meaning they 
were isolated from the Vietnamese who occupied the lowland and coastal land; today, however, 
the physical distance has been remarkably reduced. Also, due to the migration policies of the 
Government after 1975, Kinh were encouraged to resettle in the mountainous and less populated 
areas. As a result, many areas are now occupied by both Kinh and ethnic minorities.  
The aforementioned ethnic poverty and inequality have been challenges for Vietnam due to the 
persistent and widening gaps in living conditions and poverty rates between the ethnic majority 
and minorities (World Bank, 2012). During the very first decade after the Doi moi reforms, from 
1992 to 1998, the probability of escaping poverty was lower for ethnic minorities than majorities 
(Glewwe, Gragnolati and Zaman, 2002). Then, in the period of 1998 - 2010, per capita 
expenditures have grown at an average annual rate of 9.4 percent for the Kinh group and only 7.4 
percent for ethnic minorities. The disparities are largest in some of the poorest and least 
accessible regions of Vietnam (World Bank, 2012). Even the fastest-growing minority households 
are growing more slowly than the average Kinh households. Between 2010 and 2014, 49 percent 
of ethnic majority that were in the bottom quintile of the income distribution moved to a higher 
income bracket, while the corresponding figure for other ethnic groups is only 19 percent 
(Oxfam, 2017). Using a biannual panel dataset in rural Vietnam from 2006 to 2014, Singhal and 
Beck (2015) also show that there is a significant difference between the Kinh households and the 
remaining ethnic groups and that this gap has not narrowed over time. Figure 1 provides a broad 
view of ethnic distribution in Vietnam and differences in spatial distribution of poverty rates 
between ethnic minorities and the majority.  
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Figure 1. The spatial distribution of poverty rate for ethnic subgroups (extracted from Epprecht 
et al., 2011) 
 
Which factors could explain the ethnic gaps? 
Similar to the common root of ethnic inequality highlighted by Alesina et al. (2016), physical 
remoteness or geographical isolation is one the biggest disadvantages for ethnic minorities in 
Vietnam. The literature has shown the important role of geographical capital in determining 
welfare since it is associated with the quality of land, topography, access to basic infrastructure 
and public services, access to the market economy and to the political and economic centers 
(Epprecht et al., 2009). Spatial poverty traps (Ravallion and Jalan, 1997) indeed are a severe 
problem for the poor as the geographical disadvantages result in poor infrastructure and low 
returns to private endowments, hindering people living in such places from escaping poverty. 
This is the case in Vietnam and it has been one of the key components explaining the gap. 
However, the literature also shows that persistent ethnic inequality is not just attributable to 
physical accessibility (Baulch et al. 2007, 2012; van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001).  
Other key factors driving this persistent gap are the disparities between Kinh and non-Kinh in 
endowments and especially returns to endowments. Ethnic minorities indeed have fewer physical 
assets such as land holdings, access to credit, etc. and also fewer social assets such as education, 
health, and access to social services than Kinh. For instance, in 2006, only 6 percent of the Kinh 
household heads had no education compared to 23 percent of ethnic minority ones (World Bank, 
2009). However, while the gap in physical distance has been addressed through infrastructure 
programs in rural and mountainous areas where ethnic minorities are concentrated, the more 
worrisome factor is that ethnic minorities have lower returns to their endowments. During the 
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period of 1993 – 2004, Baulch et al. (2012) find that half of the per capita expenditure gap by 
ethnicity is explained by ethnic differences in returns to endowments. In 2002, Pham and Reilly 
(2009) also show that returns to endowments explain about two third of the wage gap between 
ethnic minorities and the majority.   
The underlying story of lower returns to endowments is rooted in several potential factors. It 
could be due to the social and cultural distance between the Kinh and non-Kinh or it could be 
explained by current and/or past discrimination (Baulch et al., 2007, 2012; van de Walle and 
Gunewardena, 2001; World Bank, 2009). For instance, provided with the same new technology 
for farming, an ethnic minority farmer might not use it as efficiently as a Kinh because of her 
different knowledge and customs. In the labor market, especially in the informal sector, non-
Kinh could be discriminated against. A wage worker could be paid lower compared to the 
majority; a self-employed could face some discrimination from the demand side, for example, 
from her customers. Thus, the lower returns to endowments could be a consequence of both 
cultural differences and discrimination. Cultural and social distance are due to ethnic differences 
in language, social norms, traditional practices, etc. A recent study by Nguyen et al. (2017) finds 
that language is the main barrier of the ethnic minority’s economic growth, leading to the 
increasing ethnic inequality. Unlike other studies, it shows that there is little evidence about the 
large explaining attribute of differences in returns to endowments. In addition, cultural and social 
distance also hampers social capital, especially in areas in which both Kinh and ethnic minorities 
reside.  
“I got married to a Kinh man. In general, there is no discrimination. My brother in law also 
got married to a Tay like me so sometimes, my parents in law call us “bon dan toc” (you 
guys, ethnic minority) as a joke but it somehow implies a distinction between myself, my 
brother in law’s wife and the rest of the family.”  
(Ms. H, Tay ethnic, Phong Quang commune, Vi Xuyen district, Ha Giang 
province)  
 
“I rarely leave the village; I don’t feel confident; I don’t speak Vietnamese very well…”  
(Ms. E, S’tieng ethnic, Minh Tam commune, Hon Quang district, Tay Ninh 
province) 
 
Discrimination is indeed one disadvantage that ethnic minorities face, but it can come in subtle 
ways making it hard to measure and address. The CSA (World Bank, 2009) findings show that 
the majority still sees ethnic minorities as ‘somewhat less developed’ or even ‘backward’, thus, 
ethnic minorities need to be helped to ‘catch up’ with the Kinh people. As a result, government 
interventions based on the perception that ethnic minorities should be assimilated to the majority 
cannot be effective (further discussion is presented in the next paragraph). Furthermore, this 
long-lasting stereotype also has negative effects on how ethnic minorities feel and think about 
themselves, reducing their levels of confidence and self-esteem. As a consequence, it lowers their 
civic participation and reduces their capacity in having their own voice and power (World Bank, 
2009). Indeed, historical discrimination could also trigger the differences in endowments between 
ethnic minority and majority groups today. The fact that ethnic minority households often have 
worse quality land or live in places with less access to markets is generally due to past (often far 
past) and cumulative discrimination (van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001). 
14 
 
“Ethnic minorities don’t know how to make a living.” – a cadre of the Committee for 
Ethnic Minority Affairs 
“Minorities don’t know how to use credit efficiently” – a Social Policy Bank cadre 
“Minorities don’t have the will to get ahead” – a District People’s Committee 
member 
(extracted from the Country Social Analysis: Ethnicity and Development in 
Vietnam, World Bank 2009) 
 
Lastly, numerous programs sponsored by the government of Vietnam and funded by both 
national and international organizations have been implemented to alleviate poverty and improve 
the welfare of ethnic minorities. However, the effectiveness of those programs has been 
questioned (Dang, 2012) due to limited data on costs and benefits, or proper impact evaluations. 
Some improvements in poverty reduction and income growth have been observed for Tay, 
Nung, Dao, and H’mong groups but less so among others (Nguyen et al., 2013). These unequal 
effects are attributed to the fact that some projects and policies do not match the culture, specific 
needs and conditions of some ethnic minority groups (van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001; 
Nguyen et al., 2013). This issue comes from such interventions being designed based on the 
Kinh’s conditions, behaviors and cultures, which are not necessarily applicable to non-Kinh. 
Besides, as the policies target ethnic minority areas rather than ethnic minority households 
themselves, a problem of elites/Kinh capturing benefits also exists. Given the isolation in living 
areas of ethnic minority, policies designed by the higher level and by people who live far away 
and do not share the same geographical, cultural and economic backgrounds with the policy’s 
beneficiaries, is an issue. In addition, the internal diversity within ethnic minorities in terms of 
geography and culture is a challenge in tailoring the suitable programs. “Indigenous knowledge and 
local practice should be informing the work of scientists and researchers should clearly be taking local knowledge 
into account when designing new technologies to make them locally suitable. Researchers and extension agents also 
need to gather information on whether what they develop and promote actually works or does not work – a 
feedback loop that is currently missing in the management of research and extension. This information would lead 
to improvements in the ‘models’ and make them more suitable for local conditions” (Swinkels and Turk, 2006).  
 
What lacks in the literature? Data and research limitations  
The first and foremost difficulty in studying ethnic inequality is data limitation. In spite of a 
growing number of studies on ethnic minority poverty in Vietnam, most of them can only 
capture the situation of some main ethnic groups due to a lack of data and a limited number of 
observations. Most of the previous quantitative works on ethnic issues in Vietnam have focused 
on the separation between Kinh and Non-Kinh or between Kinh/Hoa and the rest (van de Walle 
and Gunewardena, 2001; Baulch et al., 2007) since the Hoa also reside mainly in the delta areas 
and they are as well-off as the Kinh. More recent papers have considered 8 ethnic groups: Kinh 
& Hoa, Kho-me & Cham, Thai, Tay, Muong and Nung, Other Northern minorities, Central 
Highland minorities, Others (Baulch et al., 2012). Thus, it limits the explaining power of studies 
when different ethnic groups are aggregated as one ethnic minority group or grouped as ‘others’. 
These 53 ethnic minority groups are diverse in terms of assimilation and economic achievements. 
Thus, it is important to disaggregate the ethnic minority groups as much as possible to better 
understand their situation and design relevant policies accordingly. Regarding ethnic 
categorization, the definition of minority and majority need to be re-considered. Across the 
country, Kinh is the ethnic majority but in a given area, one ethnic minority or other ethnic 
minorities are, in fact, the majority. Accordingly, each agent would be expected to act differently 
depending on their relative position. Besides, local context in terms of ethnic diversity is also a 
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key factor affecting development as suggested in the literature but addressed in only few studies 
on ethnic inequality in Vietnam (Nguyen et al., 2017). Another concern about data limitation in 
explaining the ethnic gaps by endowments and returns to endowments is measurement. Quality 
of endowments (land, infrastructure, etc.) is hard to capture, thus, it might lead to some biases in 
estimating the returns to ethnic minority and majority’s characteristics (Nguyen et al., 2017). 
Lastly, by reviewing briefly the literature on ethnic inequality in Vietnam, I find that ethnic gaps 
have been investigated in relation mainly to four types of capital, namely natural, human, financial 
and physical capital but little is known about social capital and social networks. Since language 
has been found as a barrier to ethnic development, Nguyen et al. (2017) also suggest the necessity 
for further studies on the effects of social network and community effects in explaining ethnic 
inequality in Vietnam.          
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Chapter summary and contextualization 
 
This thesis combines three essays on poverty and ethnic inequality in Vietnam. These three 
chapters can be approached independently of each other but also complementarily as they weave 
a coherent and comprehensive picture of the drawbacks in the process of poverty reduction and 
the roots of ethnic gaps underlying horizontal inequalities in Vietnam. Being aware of the 
literature gap, in this thesis, I aim to tackle the gap and overcome some limitations in previous 
studies through three different angles. The first chapter investigates if the community 
participation approach is implemented in poverty reduction programs targeted at mountainous 
areas and ethnic minorities, and evaluates the effect of community participation on households’ 
economic and welfare outcomes. The second chapter examines whether gender and ethnic 
earnings gaps exist in the Vietnamese labor market and how much of these gaps could be 
explained by differences in endowments and returns to endowments. Lastly, the third chapter 
explores the disparities in risk sharing networks between the ethnic minority and majority and 
highlights the importance of cultural and social distance in social network formation. The 
remainder of this introduction provides the summary of each chapter and its context motivating 
the research questions. 
I approach the issue of ethnic inequality in Vietnam through three different mechanisms as 
follows:  
Chapter 1: Poverty reduction programs 
Chapter 2: Labor markets 
Chapter 3: Social networks 
 
Chapter I deals with the question of community participation in a poverty reduction program in 
rural areas where mostly ethnic minorities reside. It gives a broad assessment of project 
implementation with a focus on the participatory approach.  
Since geographic disadvantage is the first and foremost factor considered as explaining ethnic 
inequality, the Government of Vietnam has invested in commune infrastructure as an instrument 
to narrow the gap. Many projects have been carried out, but their impacts are still questioned 
given the fact that ethnic gaps have not been reduced. Thus, the lack or insufficient benefits of 
the projects raises concerns about how these infrastructures are provided and to what extent local 
communities, ethnic minorities in particular, are involved in these projects as they are the targeted 
beneficiaries of these projects.  
Community-Driven Development (CDD) has become a key strategy used by governments and 
development assistance programs. CDD is expected to develop projects and programs that are 
sustainable and responsive to local priorities, to empower local communities to manage and 
govern their own development programs, and more effectively target poor and vulnerable 
groups. However, the empirical evidence of its effectiveness in achieving these objectives is 
mixed. Theoretically, participatory methods can improve outcomes, but under some 
circumstances, participation is not effective. While many CDD initiatives may be promising, their 
impact is often limited (Gillespie, 2004). Vietnam provides an interesting case to test the 
effectiveness of this approach. On the one hand, Vietnam has been one of the highest recipients 
of IDA loans from the World Bank “In 2008, new commitments broke through the one billion dollar 
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mark… Vietnam was now the number one recipient of IDA loans, ahead of India and Bangladesh” (Cling et 
al., 2009). All development initiatives such as CDD and community participation have been 
rapidly adopted as part of the poverty reduction programs in Vietnam, not only to practice 
poverty alleviation effectively but also to attract more development loans. On the other hand, 
Vietnam is a ruled by one Communist Party with a long history of a centralized system and a 
command economy while the civil society does not legally exist (Cling et al., 2009). This might 
not be a setting in which the CDD approach could flourish.     
Despite the strong emphasis on theoretical arguments on the benefits of CDD approach and the 
increasing application of this approach in Vietnam’s development projects, little evidence is 
known about how this CDD approach is actually implemented in the field. Culas et al.’s study 
(2015) is one of the few exceptions. Using both quantitative and anthropological data, they show 
that participation indicators are improved, but remain problematic in practice. In this study, their 
focus is on the governance component of the “Poverty Reduction Program 135” using the 
baseline dataset, only. The authors are thus not able to assess the benefits of household 
participation on welfare outcomes. To fill this gap, my paper aims at providing an assessment of 
the implementation of CDD in the context of Vietnam and examining the effect of household 
participation. The ambition of this chapter is threefold: (i) to examine how CDD has been 
implemented in Vietnam’s poverty reduction program; (ii) to measure the effect of household 
participation on economic and welfare outcomes and (iii) to evaluate if there is any significant 
association between better CDD implementation and communes’ outcomes. 
This chapter takes advantage of a unique panel data between 2007 and 2012 from a survey 
carried out in the most disadvantaged and mountainous areas of Vietnam under the “Poverty 
Reduction Program 135”. It provides an analysis of this participatory approach at both the 
household and commune levels. I assess the effect of household participation on both final 
outcomes including income, productive assets, durables assets as well as a series of other welfare 
indicators or intermediate outcomes. I also examine whether there is any heterogeneity effect of 
participation for the poor and ethnic minorities. Results show that active participation has a large 
effect on income growth. By examining the effect of participation on intermediate outcomes, I 
find that participating households can get access to better resources, in particular, information 
and communication, which could be the channels leading to their better final outcomes. 
Regarding the heterogeneity of participation effect, I find higher benefit for the poor and ethnic 
minorities on intermediate outcomes. At the commune level, there is a positive association 
between CDD implementation and economic outcomes. Evidences from this chapter show that 
active participation could help the poor and ethnic minority to benefit more from development 
projects.    
 
Chapter II provides a comprehensive view on ethnic earnings gaps in Vietnam using the Labor 
Force Survey along with gender earnings gaps as a comparison and supplement.  
A job brings a person an earning, thus, the issue of ethnic poverty should be closely investigated 
from a labor market and employment perspective. Vietnam’s successful story of economic 
growth cannot be achieved without a deep transition from a ‘centrally planned economy’ towards 
a ‘socialist-oriented market economy’. The labor market has been profoundly changed, with 
employment shifting from agriculture to non-agricultural sector, the downsizing of jobs in State-
owned enterprises and remarkably fast development of household business and the informal 
sector. First, this transformation is a challenge for women and ethnic minorities who are more 
dependent on the agricultural sector than men and ethnic majority counterparts. Similar 
disadvantage could arise due to the downsizing of State-owned enterprises. Second, when the 
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economy shifts from the agricultural sector to the non-agricultural sector, the share of wage 
workers increases and it is seen as a structural phenomenon in Vietnam. It has increased by 4 
percent each year between 2002 and 2006 and reduced to 2 percent increase in the period of 2007 
– 2012 (Oudin et al., 2014). Wage workers are considered to be better protected by legal 
regulations, thanks to the establishment of Labor Code, etc. Women receive more privileges at 
work such as fully-paid maternity leave or exemption from unilateral termination of their contract 
during pregnancy. Outside the public sector, however, with the autonomy in recruitment, 
employers could favor men over women to avoid these privileges (Pham and Reilly, 2007). 
Another remarkable change is the emergence of the informal sector. This sector has attracted 
around 25 percent of the total employment or half of the jobs outside agriculture; meanwhile, 
this informal sector is characterized by low earnings and precarious working conditions, which 
are especially detrimental to women (Cling et al., 2014). When the farm and public sector jobs are 
reduced, the informal sector might absorb the surplus of labor supply, in particular women and 
ethnic minority. Thus, these sectoral bring challenges for women and ethnic minorities.       
For ethnic minority groups, the changes in their labor market participation rates are associated 
with a number of government policies aiming at creating more job opportunities for ethnic 
minorities and motivating them to participate in the non-farm sector. With the man-power 
‘quotas’ allocation policy, part of the central planning regime, jobs were guaranteed in the public 
sector for ethnic minority graduates from secondary and tertiary school (Pham and Reilly, 2009). 
Graduates from the majority are encouraged to work in the mountainous areas while minorities 
are provided jobs in the public sector in urban areas. Education for ethnic minorities is also 
promoted with different kinds of support/assistance for ethnic minority students going to public 
colleges and universities. Therefore, thanks to the stronger investment in human capital and 
different policies promoting ethnic minorities’ participation in non-farm jobs, especially in the 
public sector, it is expected that ethnic minorities have more opportunities in labor market. 
“During my bachelor at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities, I did not have to 
pay the tuition fees because I’m Thai ethnic. Besides, I received a support of 700 thousand 
VND per month for living expenses from the Government for being an ethnic minority 
student.”  
(Ms. S., Thai ethnic, Institute of Anthropology) 
 
However, the CSA (World Bank, 2009) also reports constraints for ethnic minorities in the labor 
market due to cultural factors in market interactions, schooling, etc. Their cultural norms make 
them less active in making money out of an economic transaction, for instance, they are less likely 
to charge interest rate from kin or neighbors. Women in ethnic minorities groups face even more 
barriers in work because cultural norms disfavor women and their position in decision making is 
secondary. Thus, in this context, the question is whether ethnic women face more disfavors in 
the labor market in comparison with ethnic men, Kinh women, and Kinh men.  
“The buyer goes to our village to buy rice, so we do not need to move. I’m not sure if the price 
is fair or not.”  
(Mr. K. , S’tieng ethnic, Minh Tam commune, Hon Quang district, Tay Ninh 
province)  
 
“If there is a meeting in the village, my husband goes to the meeting.”  
(Ms. N. , S’tieng ethnic, Minh Tam commune, Hon Quang district, Tay Ninh 
province) 
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This chapter uses the 2007 Labor Force Survey to estimate and analyze the gender and ethnic 
earnings gaps in Vietnam. Previous researches have shed light on the potential for discrimination 
against women and ethnic minorities. Their studies focused mostly on wage employment and 
disregarded the informal sector. However, in Vietnam’s labor market, women’s participation in 
the informal sector is substantial and a majority of ethnic minority workers are engaged in non-
wage occupations. Previous studies were thus severely limited in analyzing the gender and ethnic 
gaps separately; furthermore, they failed to disaggregate the different ethnic groups and consider 
the subgroup of ethnic women, in particular. I overcome these aforementioned issues by 
including the self-employed and agricultural workers in estimating the gender and ethnic earnings 
gaps and investigate further the heterogeneity in the gaps among different ethnic groups.  
This chapter shows that the earnings gap between ethnic groups is larger than the earnings gap by 
gender and results are heterogeneous amongst different ethnic minority groups. After employing 
a multinomial logit model to correct for selection, I find that the gaps depend significantly on the 
sectoral choice. Selection is thus playing a key role in the Vietnamese labor market. Using 
decomposition techniques, I show that differences in sectoral allocation play an important role in 
explaining earnings gaps by ethnicity while gender gaps are observed mainly within sectors. 
Lastly, unexplained earnings gaps still remain for both ethnic and gender gaps, even after 
correcting for selection.  
 
Chapter III focuses on the differences in risk sharing networks between ethnic minorities and 
majority groups and relies on the concept of ethnic homophily in link formation to explain the 
mechanisms leading to those disparities.  
This chapter is motivated by the fact that risk and the necessity to cope with it is a pervasive 
feature of rural economic life, particularly in Vietnam’s mountainous areas, where ethnic 
minorities mostly live. There, the prevalence of risk, and its role in the persistence of poverty, is 
accentuated by climate change, by difficulties to cultivate fragile uplands, and by high transport 
costs, combined with low access to basic infrastructure, public services and formal insurance. In 
this context, risk sharing arrangement, in which households share the risk with others through 
transfers in gift, money and/or labor, is a dominant mean to cope with shocks for the rural poor 
(Rockenbauch and Sakdapolrak, 2017).  
An important question is then with whom people choose to connect and share the risk. Ethnicity 
is potentially an important factor affecting how a risk sharing network is formed (Grimard, 1997). 
If so, ethnic minority groups may differ from the Kinh majority in the characteristics of their risk 
sharing network, and thus in their capacity to mitigate the effect of shocks. This question of risk 
sharing network formation from an ethnicity perspective is particularly relevant in the context of 
Vietnam but it has not been studied yet. As mentioned above, social and cultural distance 
between ethnicities exists.  
This chapter mobilizes various datasets for identification and measures of social networks and 
outcomes. I use the 2008-2016 Vietnamese Access to rural Resources Household Survey 
(VARHS), matched with the Vietnam Census of 2009 to extract information on ethnic 
composition and occupation at the commune level, and with Geo-data to characterize 
households’ environmental contexts. The methodology relies on the estimation of a series of 
models explaining risk sharing network characteristics (size, ethnic similarity, occupational and 
geographical similarities), introducing step by step various sets of covariates that account for 
socio-economic characteristics, geographical environments, demographic and local distribution of 
ethnic groups, and the ethnicity of the household head. 
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I show that ethnic minority groups are embedded in smaller risk sharing networks, which implies 
their lower capacity to pool risks. In addition, their networks are less diversified or, in other 
words, the people within ethnic minority network are more similar in terms of occupation and 
location than within Kinh networks. Being connected with people with the same economic 
activity and living in the same village is expected to be less efficient to cope with covariant 
shocks. Indeed, covariant shocks, by definition, affect people in the same geographical area or 
sector, by contrast with idiosyncratic shocks which are peculiar to an individual. Covariant shocks 
are most prevalent in the rural areas of Vietnam. 
First, I find evidence that the gaps between Kinh and non-Kinh risk sharing networks are at least 
partly driven by the social distance that exist between the Kinh and other ethnic groups. Indeed, 
Kinh households are found to have higher preferences for large networks and for inbreeding 
homophily than other groups and therefore tend to exclude ethnic minorities from their 
networks. I show that this allows Kinh to form networks that are more diverse in terms of 
occupation. Beyond this result, I find that social network dissimilarities also hinge on the 
demographic imbalance between ethnic groups, as well as on differences in wealth, education, 
and in geographic and institutional commune-level characteristics. Ethnic inequality is thus partly 
rooted in the cultural and social distances that exist between ethnic groups in Vietnam.  
This chapter provides evidence from a developing country on the role played by ethnicity in the 
formation of risk sharing networks and distinguishes between various mechanisms at play. Better 
understanding the differences in risk sharing networks between ethnic groups is likely to provide 
valuable information to address the ethnic gap which is one of the most challenging issues in the 
context of Vietnam.     
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Chapter 1  
 
 
Assessing Community-Driven Development 
approach in poverty reduction programs in 
Vietnam 
 
 
 
Abstract  
Community-Driven Development (CDD) has been put forward as one of the key principles in 
the development of public policies over the last 20 years, and it has been adopted in many 
poverty reduction programs at both global and local levels. We assess the implementation of this 
approach in poverty reduction programs in rural Vietnam by using a unique panel data over the 
period of 2007 – 2012. Results show that active participation has a large effect on income 
growth. By examining the effect of participation on intermediate outcomes, we find that 
participating households can get access to better resources, in particular, information and 
communication, which could be the channels leading to their final better outcomes. Regarding 
the heterogeneity of participation effect, we find higher benefit for the poor and ethnic minorities 
on intermediate outcomes. At the commune level, there is a positive association between CDD 
implementation and economic outcomes. Evidences from this chapter show that active 
participation could help the poor and ethnic minority to benefit more from development 
projects.  
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1 Introduction 
Poverty reduction is one of the most important targets in all developing countries. There have 
been many achievements in poverty reduction all over the world. However, there is still scope to 
improve the efficiency of such programs as it is seen that those programs have often bypassed or 
ignored community participation (Chebil and Haque, 2003). To address this limitation, 
international donors like the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
governments of developing countries have been giving priority to poverty reduction strategies 
with a focus on governance, ownership and participatory approaches. Thus, these key principles 
have been proposed in the new international poverty reduction strategies (PRSP initiatives, 
MDG, HIPC, IADM, etc.) with the expectation of contributing to the effectiveness of poverty 
reduction practices (Cling et al., 2003). While there is wide consensus about the importance of 
those principles, the key question is about their effectiveness when being applied in specific 
situations in the field. Is it optimal to put local community and the poor in the driver seat? What 
are the necessary conditions to promote the role of beneficiary population in poverty reduction 
through using these approaches?  
The community-driven development (CDD) has become a key strategy used by governments and 
development assistance programs due to its potential to develop projects and programs that are 
sustainable and responsive to local priorities, to empower local communities to manage and 
govern their own development programs, and more effectively target poor and vulnerable 
groups. However, the empirical evidence of its effectiveness in achieving these objectives is 
mixed. Theoretically, participatory methods can improve outcomes, but under some given 
circumstances, participation is not effective. While many CDD initiatives may be successful, their 
impact is often limited (Gillespie, 2004) and indeed, its benefits are associated strongly with local 
context. 
Vietnam, a successful model of economic reform and poverty alleviation, has adopted the CDD 
approach in its development projects, following the global requirements of community 
participation. Besides, in 1998, a Decree on Grassroots Democracy has established a new 
governance framework for Vietnam. It aims at including all citizens in a more deliberative and 
democratic process of local governance, extending downward accountability, voice and 
empowerment of the citizens and limiting corruption. Despite the strong emphasis in theoretical 
arguments on the benefits of CDD approach, the increasing application of this approach in 
Vietnam as well as the country’s political changes responsive to CDD approach, little evidence is 
known about how this approach is actually implemented in the field. To the best of our 
knowledge, no study deals with the question of its benefit on welfare outcomes. To fill the gap, 
this paper aims at providing an assessment on the implementation of the CDD in the context of 
Vietnam and examining the effect of household participation. The ambition of this chapter is 
threefold: (i) to examine how CDD has been implemented in Vietnam’s poverty reduction 
program; (ii) to measure the effect of household participation on economic and welfare outcomes 
and (iii) to see if there is any significant association between better CDD implementation and 
communes’ outcomes.  
Taking advantage of a panel data covering around 4,000 households in almost 400 communes 
under the Poverty Reduction Program, we provide an analysis of participatory approach at both 
household and commune levels. We assess the effect of household participation on income, 
productive assets, durables assets as well as a series of welfare/intermediate outcomes. We also 
examine whether there is any heterogeneity effect of participation for the poor and ethnic 
minorities. Results show that only active participation has a large effect on income growth. By 
examining the effect of participation on intermediate outcomes, we find that participating 
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households can get access to better resources, information and communication in particular, 
which could be the channels leading to better final outcomes. Regarding the heterogeneity of the 
economic effect, we find no higher effect for the poor or ethnic minorities but some intermediate 
benefits. Regarding the CDD approach at commune level, there is a positive association between 
CDD implementation and commune’s economic outcomes. Nevertheless, our study encounters 
some limitations. The first caveat of this paper is that we are only able to examine the effect of 
participation on household’s outcomes in general and not to attribute the impact to a specific 
project, thus, the channels of the participation effect are not easy to directly interpret. We try to 
overcome this limitation by looking at different intermediate outcomes in order to provide 
plausible channels of the final effects. The second caveat is related to the Vietnam’s history of a 
command economy where communes’ authorities were given quotas and objectives that need to 
be met, thus, the participation indicator would be questioned as it implies an integral part of how 
the State and local authority mobilize and control citizens. This implicit nature of participation in 
Vietnam may bias the effect of participation, thus, we interpret the results with cautions and 
some discussions.   
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents literature review, the context of Vietnam 
and motivation for this paper. Section 3 describes our data and methodology. Section 4 presents 
descriptive statistics. Section 5 details the effect of participation on final and intermediate 
outcomes as well as the effect of CDD approach implementation at commune level. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2 Literature review 
2.1  CDD and participation approach   
By recognizing the limits of traditional approaches as well as the importance of participation in 
development, international aid organizations, multilateral organization and national government  
has shifted their interest into the community participation. It can noticeably be seen in the 
changes of WB/IMFs’ PRSP, moving from a “top-down” to more of a “bottom-up” approach in 
tackling the formulation of national policies and strategies for poverty reduction. Since the 1990s, 
the WB’s Community Driven Development (CDD) initiatives have been spread out and the 
CDD operates on “the principles of local empowerment, participatory governance, demand 
responsiveness, administrative autonomy, greater downward accountability, and enhanced local 
capacity” (Wassenich and Whiteside, 2004). 
CDD is an approach to poverty alleviation, and the provision of infrastructure and services, that 
is rooted in the idea that development often works better when control over decisions and 
resources are handed over to local communities. According to World Bank definitions, 
community driven development depends on building partnerships of different kinds between 
community-based organizations, non-governmental organizations, and public and private sector 
service agencies (Shanks et al., 2003). CDD gives control of decisions and resources to 
community groups and treats the targeted population as partners in the development process, 
building on their institutions and resources (Dongier et al., 2003). The CDD approach is 
expected to involve stakeholders in local development investment and to empower communities 
to manage their own development initiatives. It is thus widely assumed that participation 
improves development outcomes, benefiting citizens more than operations that do not engage 
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citizens. CDD has the potential to make poverty reduction efforts more responsive to demands, 
more inclusive and more effective than centrally led programs (Dongier et al., 2003).  
First, since CDD can make services more responsive to demands, it can enhance sustainability. 
Community-developed facilities such as health centers, schools, and water supply systems tend to 
have higher utilizations rates and are better maintained than when investment decisions are made 
by actors outside the community. Second, community management of development investments 
usually results in lower costs and more productively employed assets. These benefits can be 
shown in different sectors and services such as education, microfinance, and infrastructure. 
Finally, well-designed CDD programs are inclusive of poor and vulnerable groups, build positive 
social capital, and give them greater voice both in their community and with local government 
entities. It can provide voice and empowerment to groups that are typically excluded from the 
development process. It thus promotes transparency and accountability as well as control over 
decisions which give communities the opportunity to build social capital (defined as the ability of 
individuals to secure benefits as a result of membership in social networks) by expanding the 
depth and range of their networks.    
However, despite all its potential benefits mentioned above, CDD also presents risks if not 
appropriately implemented. For this reason, a first branch of literature concerns the 
implementation of the CDD approach in different development projects and assesses its impact 
at the program level. CDD approach has become a strategy used by both government and 
development assistance programs. The impact of these programs has been assessed through 
different studies. General papers examine the overall impact of participation using evidence from 
different countries. Mansuri and Rao (2013) conclude that the poor tend to benefit less from 
participatory processes. “Local participation does not work when it is merely the ad hoc, myopically directed, 
creation of a project. It works when it has teeth, when it builds on organic movements, when it is facilitated by a 
responsive center, when it is adequately and sustainably funded, and when interventions are conditioned by a culture 
of learning by doing.”  
White et al. (2018) synthesize evidence on 23 community-driven development programs to 
examine the impact of these programs. They conclude that CDD programs have made a 
substantial contribution to improving the quantity of small-scale infrastructure, but a weak effect 
on health outcomes and a very significant effect on education and other welfare outcomes. 
Evidence from 8 programs shows WASH community projects have a significant impact on 
improving access to improved water and sanitation. Regarding the impact on social cohesion and 
governance, a meta-analysis of CDD program effects shows that they have had no impact on 
social cohesion, decentralization or governance, which is due to the CDD program design that 
may favor the elite or to the lack of program rules and facilitation to encourage participation.  
Although community participation has been widely promoted in development projects, empirical 
evidence of the effectiveness of CDD, in targeting poor and vulnerable groups and empowering 
local communities, is mixed (Mansuri and Rao, 2013). Khwaja (2004) observes that projects 
managed by communities were more sustainable than those managed by local governments 
because of better maintenance of the assets and infrastructure created by the project. Greater 
community participation in nontechnical decisions is associated with higher project outcomes 
whereas the opposite holds for community participation in technical decisions. 
Arcand and Bassole (2007) observe that access to clean water and health services increased for 
poor families in a CDD project area in Senegal. First, they study the impact of treatment by the 
program on the accessibility of basic services, household expenditures and child anthropometrics, 
using a quasi-experimental approach. Second, using instrumental variable, they estimate the 
impact of completed projects on the household and child response variables, which allows them 
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to assess the magnitude of the impact of ‘treatment on the treated’. Third, they use IV methods 
to estimate the impact of completed projects within geographical units that eventually get treated 
by the program. The results suggest that CDD infrastructure programs can improve the 
nutritional status of children in poor households. CDD would thus improve targeting because 
projects make better use of local knowledge to define and identify the targeted groups. However, 
a different view argues that in heterogeneous communities with high social inequality, the 
performance of CDD projects in targeting can be worse than that of externally managed 
programs. 
Nkonya et al. (2012) use difference-in-difference, and propensity score matching approaches to 
evaluate the impacts of a CDD project, Fadama II, on household income and acquisition of 
productive assets in Nigeria. They find that the project succeeded in targeting the poor and 
women farmers in its productive asset acquisition component. The results show that participation 
in the project increased the income of beneficiaries by about 40-60 percent. 
Narayan (1995) examines how final outcomes were affected by the quality of outcomes at each of 
the stages of a project cycle (design, implementation, construction and maintenance). They test 
the contribution of participation to the effectiveness and capacity building aspects of rural water 
supply projects To explore the path through which beneficiary participation affects outcomes, the 
proximate determinants were divided into two broad categories: institutional outputs (design and 
implementation of a project), and physical outputs (construction and maintenance of water 
systems). They conclude that for maximum benefits, beneficiary participation needs to be viewed 
as a long-term process that necessitates involvement of users from the beginning of a project to 
its end, at all stages of a project cycle, revealing thus the importance of implementing a CDD 
approach and not just the carry-out of certain mechanical tasks by the beneficiaries.  
On the other hand, some evidences from randomized experiments have provided a different 
view. Banerjee et al. (2010) find no effect of giving local committees the tools to evaluate student 
performance and monitor teachers. They argue that providing information on the status of 
education and the institutions of participation alone is not sufficient to encourage beneficiary 
involvement in public schools and that to improve final outcomes, fostering and channelling 
local action may be the most effective.  
Drawing up upon this literature and findings, we can conclude that CDD should be viewed as a 
long-term process beyond the project. The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of CDD 
approach remains mixed, with some papers arguing for the positive impact of CDD on outcomes 
and other papers find no effect on outcomes, highlighting the idea that the results seem to 
depend on the details of the intervention and the local contexts.  
Beneficiary (household) participation  
As a specific component of CDD, household participation is promoted due the benefits that 
household can derive from directly and indirectly. To understand the potential effect of 
household participation, we locate our review of motives for household participation in a broader 
scope than within community participation under CDD or within a specific project. First, 
households participate in community work to enhance local public goods from which they can 
derive direct benefit. Second, household participate in community work when they have incentive 
to create or strengthen social capital, particularly for the new comers in a village. Related to the 
social capital and social network perspective, household may participate in community work in 
order to share information about income generation activities, including the adoption of new 
technologies (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 2009; Munshi, 2004). Literature also 
provides theoretical and empirical evidences about the benefits of risk sharing network in rural 
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areas, thus, it could be another motivation for household participation (Carter and Castillo, 2005; 
Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007; Karlan, 2007). Finally, besides these ‘selfish’ motives, pure altruism 
also can induce active community participation (Andreoni, 1990). Overall, participation may also 
enhance people’s abilities to become more sociable and so, act as a building factor of social 
capital. Extensively, social capital is itself associated with a wide range of outcomes, of which 
helping people gain influence and power as well as developing solidarity among the society 
(Coleman, 1988). Thus, it is expected that household participation will not just bring household 
direct benefits from a specific project, as proposed by CDD but there are also other potentially 
indirect effects based on different motivations mentioned above. 
A number of empirical studies have shown the positive effects of household participation. 
Labonne and Chase (2009) using data from 12000 households participating in a CDD project in 
the Philippines, analyze how communities select their proposals and how resources are allocated 
across villages. The assumption is that richer and better educated individuals, the elites, are more 
likely to have influence over project selection and that poorer villages are more likely to be 
selected for funding. For each household, they construct two dummy variables of whether their 
preferences were heard. The first indicates if the household cited what the village proposed as 
one of the three most pressing problems facing the village. The second dummy indicates if the 
household cited what the village proposed as the most pressing problem. They then conduct a 
probit regression on the probability that the proposal represents the elected village leader’s 
preferences but not the community preferences. They find that the more unequal the village, the 
more likely the village leader is to override the community preferences during the proposal 
selection. But, the greater the proportion of villagers engaged in informal collective action 
activities, the less likely is the elected village leader to override community preferences during 
proposal selection. Controlling for poverty, more unequal villages are more likely to receive 
funding. 
Using data collected from 45 villages in two different water supply projects in India, Prokopy 
(2005) evaluates whether participation in general has a relationship with project outcomes, and if 
higher levels of participation lead to improved outcomes. The lowest level of participation is 
passive participation as monetary contribution, and a higher level consists of more active forms 
of participation such as involvement in decision-making and meeting attendance. The results 
suggest that overall community participation is fundamentally important to project success and 
that the greater the number of households who have contributed towards capital cost in a village, 
the more likely households are to be satisfied and to rate the project as effective.  
Examining the relationship between participatory variables and beneficiary satisfaction with the 
work of the water management committees in Kenya, Ananga (2015) finds a significant 
association. The hypotheses are that community participation will lead to increased beneficiary 
satisfaction with the work of the water management committees. Households participating in 
water meetings and relying on community managed water schemes will tend to practice better 
water handling hygiene than households who do not. There are several participation-related 
factors which may affect the performance of urban-based community operated water schemes. 
The different community participation indicators include participation in decision making, 
informed choice, economic contributions, representation and responsibility. Results from logistic 
regression models indicate that households who were actively participating tended to be more 
satisfied with the work of the water management committees. 
These positive effects, however, can be undermined by different circumstances that can cause 
household participation to be ineffective. Limitations of participatory approach often include 
various forms of ‘elite capture’ by the non-poor or majority groups that can hinder the 
participatory process and the benefits of the program will be captured by the commune 
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authorities. Addressing the issue of elite capture in CDD projects, Beard and Dasgupta (2006) 
examines the vulnerability of community driven poverty alleviation approach to elite capture. 
Participants having asymmetrical social positions and different literacy rates, they enter the 
process form unequal positions of power which renders community governance particularly 
vulnerable to elite capture. They use the case study of an Urban Poverty Project in Indonesia as 
an empirical lens. The findings nuances the often assumed relationship between a community’s 
capacity for collective action and elite capture, Not all elites who had power were corrupt, a 
finding that highlights the important distinction between elite control and elite capture. In fact, 
according to Mansuri and Rao (2013), the poor tend to benefit less from participatory process 
due to the fact that decisions typically reflect the preferences of elite groups. Elite capture tends 
to increase in high-inequality communities and communities which are remote from centers of 
power, have low literacy or have significant caste, race and gender disparities.  
Mansuri and Rao (2013) highlight four general concerns and limitations to participatory 
approach. The first is that inequality tends to worsen efficiency and equity. Second, the transfer 
of management responsibilities to beneficiaries may require the creation of local management 
capacity. In the absence of efforts to create such capacity, investments in infrastructure are largely 
wasted. The third is that decentralization can be more a mechanism for tightening central control 
often because it is a holdover from colonial rules designed to extract resources from local 
communities rather than to benefit them. Finally, in order for communities to benefit from the 
resources they manage, governments or implementing agencies need to sustain engagement to 
build local capacity and to monitor outcomes. As Mosse (2001) argues that several participatory 
projects that had a high level of participation, “was often a construct of the planning context and concealed 
the underlying politics of knowledge production and use”. He raises some arguments about project 
facilitators who shape and direct the participatory processes, the local collusion in planning, 
manipulation in project selections, etc.   
The literature thus highlights that institutional reform to internalize the complexity of beneficiary 
participation as well taking into account the context can help making participatory development 
projects much more effective. To have a comprehensive understanding of the effects of the 
participatory process in our paper, it is thus important to examine how the participation approach 
is applied in the context of Vietnam. 
2.2 CDD and participation approach in Vietnam context  
In Vietnam, participatory approaches emerged at the beginning of the 1990s when the political 
climate became more favorable under the “Doi moi” (renovation) policies initiated by the 
Vietnamese government after the late 1980s (Neef et al., 2013). Participation in Vietnam has 
become a society concern with the promulgation of the 1998 Decree on Grassroots Democracy 
by the Vietnamese Government, aiming at enabling citizens to exercise their rights, be informed 
of government activities that affect them, discuss and contribute to the formulation of certain 
policies, participate in local development activities and to supervise certain government actions. 
In addition, the Government also promoted the principles of participatory process in the 
country’s poverty reduction strategy with the Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs) 
initiatives (Culas et al., 2015). With the country’s strong effort to adopt the rhetoric on “good 
governance”, Vietnam seems to be providing a favorable environment for the implementation of 
CDD in its poverty reduction programs.  
In the field, the implementation of participatory approach is however, still limited and under the 
debate of a civil society concept. In 2006, the UNDP run an exhaustive qualitative study to assess 
the implication of the Decree on Grassroots Democracy and some other PPAs initiatives in 
Vietnam. According to this report, women participation is limited in decision making at the lower 
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level of administration unit and village affairs; people in rural area may be too isolated to 
participate in decision making since they live far from the commune’s center. Also, in rural areas, 
ethnic minorities suffer from social exclusion that can limit their participation to public life, etc. 
In a study on the impact of local democracy legislation on people’s participation in several 
communes (Oxfam GB & Institute of Economics), it is found that there have been positive 
impacts on the quality and capacity of the local administrative and political apparatus: increasing 
information provision and consultation with local communities on plans and decisions, 
establishment of community-based ‘self-management groups’, and a positive impact on the more 
equitable distribution of resources for poverty reduction. The study finds, however, that the 
participation of women, poor households, and ethnic minority households is often still limited.  
Moreover, participation in Vietnam is still dictated by fundamental dimensions of the Vietnamese 
culture: “the history of Confucianism in Vietnam, combined with ideas related to the role of the 
family and elders, has reinforced traditional respect for authority” (UNDP, 2006). The history of 
central planning has made people relying on the role of the officials in decision making. The 
report also emphasizes on the fact that weak local governance could harm participation: “lack of 
clarity of legal instruments, insufficient funding and overlapping roles and responsibilities among 
government institutions and mass organizations remain obstacles to more active engagement of 
citizens in their political institutions” (UNDP, 2006). In Vietnam, participation is highly 
associated with ‘mobilization’, conducted by mass organizations which are under the Vietnam 
Fatherland Front and belonging to the Communist Party. Indeed, this strong mobilization has 
leaded to the common ‘voluntary participation’ in Vietnam, for instance, volunteers for 
‘donations of solidarity’ can be close to 100% (Culas et al., 2015). For CDD approach 
implementation in Vietnam, the question is also raised on the side of local authorities. As 
mentioned above, the history of central planning has affected how local authorities work. They 
are under pressure from the higher authorities and also evaluated by higher level, thus, they need 
to mobilize their community to participate in order to meet the ‘target’ or ‘quotas’.   
In short, Vietnam has widely adopted the CDD principles in its development projects, however, 
the impacts of this approach has not yet investigated on household’s economic and welfare 
outcomes. Given its specific political and economic context, it is important to examine how 
CDD approach is implemented in the field and whether it brings any effect on economic and 
welfare outcomes for participants.  
3 The data and empirical strategy 
3.1 Data source 
This study uses data from the Baseline Survey and Endline Survey of the Program 135-II (P135-
II) in 2007 and 2012, respectively. The Program 135 (P135) is a targeted program for the 
Extremely Poor Communes in the Ethnic Minority and Mountainous Areas of Vietnam. As a 
commune targeted program, the main purpose of P135 is to provide local infrastructure in those 
areas (such village roads, communes roads, irrigation system, schools, etc.) meanwhile as in other 
household targeted programs such as the Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction program 
(HEPR), the main objective is to provide the poor with access to credit, education, health 
services, etc. (Nguyen et al., 2017) The first phase of P135 was conducted in the period of 1998 
to 2005 and the second phase in the period of 2006 – 2010.  
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Success of the first phase (1998 – 2005) created new challenge for the following poverty 
reduction program. Amongst those new challenges, building and applying the principle of 
commune ownership, a key part of the decentralization approach, was an important basis for 
implementation of the Program 135 – phase II as the lack of participation in the first phase of 
the Program resulted in limited impacts on the program outcomes. In this period, commune 
ownership means that the commune authorities were given autonomy in planning and 
implementing projects. Therefore, the project would best meet the need of the community. In 
addition, as ownership also implied direct responsibilities of the community to the projects, we 
expect that the project would be better monitored (Herrera et al., 2008). 
In the second phase of the Program, its objectives were extended to four components, including 
infrastructure, agricultural production, socio-cultural livelihoods and capacity building. Therefore, 
community driven approach was promoted in all phases of planning, managing, supervising and 
operating infrastructure projects in order to improve resource allocation and effective 
implementation of infrastructure projects. This also implies an objective of improvement in 
transparency and accountability in project implementation towards poverty reduction 
sustainability. The Program P135 indeed bears similarities of its principle to community driven 
development approaches to the extent that it adopts a decentralized management and planning, 
as well as promotes active participation of local communities in the selection, supervision and 
management of small-scale infrastructure schemes. High degree of administrative decentralization 
permits transfer of responsibility to the local political echelons in the form of people’s 
committees and councils, which operate at the different administrative levels (province, district 
and commune).  
To evaluate the effectiveness of this program and to enhance the design of future program, the 
Committee for Ethnic Minorities with the support of UNDP implemented a Baseline Survey in 
2007 (BLS) and an Endline Survey in 2012 (ELS). The surveys covered 400 communes1. All 
communes are among the P135 phase I. Then, one village randomly selected from the list of all 
villages in each commune, from which 15 households were selected in each village which 
amounts to almost 6,000 households. The 2012 ELS followed these households and there are 
5,668 households covered in the 2012 ELS since other households migrate and cannot be 
tracked. Data were collected using household and commune questionnaires.  
These data sets are the most complete and comprehensive data sets on ethnic minorities and on 
the poorest communes in Vietnam. Thus, they provide a thorough understanding of ethnic 
minorities’ socioeconomic situations. For the purposes of our study, we focus on the 
Participation component, in which, we obtain information about all infrastructure projects 
implemented in these communes over the 5 year period, from 2007 to 2012. Each household is 
asked about which construction has been done in their commune, then, a series of questions 
about participation is provided, following the requirements of participatory approach, from 
project design to the project construction. From this data component of how infrastructure 
project is implemented over 5 years, we aggregate information on participation at household 
level. For the purpose of examining the effect of participation at household level, we take into 
account three types of treatment: i) if household attends projects’ selection meeting; ii) if 
household expressed their opinions during the projects’ selection meeting and iii) if household 
contributes in cash or in kind/labor to the project. Household considered as being treated if they 
exercise one of the three measure of participation at least once. This information is extracted 
from the 2012 ELS. After excluding missing values, we have a total of 8269 observations in an 
                                                          
1 Details of the sampling survey are in Phung et al. (2012) 
34 
 
unbalanced panel2, with 4013 observations in 2007 and 4701 observations in 2012. Regarding the 
first measure of participation, in 2007, we have 2047 treated observations and 1746 controls; this 
number is 2299 and 2177, respectively in 2012. For the second measure of participation, we have 
835 treated and 2958 control observations in 2007; 921 vs. 3555 observations in 2012. For the 
last measure of participation, we have 1193 treated and 2600 control observations in 2007; the 
corresponding number is 1367 and 3109 in 2012. 
 
3.2 Empirical strategy 
3.2.1 Assessing the effects of household participation 
Measure of household participation 
In poverty reduction programs, participation can be considered as a way to expand the poor’s 
capacities (Narayan, 2000) and empowerment becomes the objective of these projects. However, 
to assess the participatory component, before going to find a feasible measurement of 
participation, the question is whether we consider participation as “an end or a means to an end” 
(Khwaja, 2005). On one hand, if empowerment is seen as an internal part of agent’s utility or 
welfare, evaluation on participation will purely focus on the level of participation and should not 
care about how improved capacities help people to obtain better economic outcomes. On the 
other hand, if empowerment is regarded as a means to increase agent’s utility or welfare, 
empowered agent will be able to get higher incomes, education level or health, etc. Khwaja (2005) 
expresses mathematically the idea as follows: 
Empowerment as an ends:             
Empowerment as a mean to an ends:          and          
Where U is a utility function of individual I, E is level of empowerment and X is a list of factors 
affecting her utility while f(.), g(.) and h(.) are functions. The conditions are 
       and         When empowerment is regarded as a mean to an end, it is needed to establish a link between 
participation measurements to economic outcomes in order to find any causal effects. This 
reflection is complementary and in line with the two dimensions proposed to assess participatory 
component in poverty reduction programs by Culas et al. (2015). They include intrinsic value 
(how far is participation really operating in the field?) and instrumental value (does participation 
make a difference on the economic outcomes?).  
Our next question is how to measure community participation, in particular, household 
participation. The literature on empowerment suggests four types, including: (i) Passive access 
which refers to a person’s presence in any domain at any level; (ii) Active participation which 
refers to an actor’s expression of voice; (iii) Influence which means the capacity to have one's 
voice taken into account and (iv) Control represents a position of ultimate power for a group or 
individual. However, in a similar study like us, Prokopy (2005) considers money contribution as 
the lowest level of participation, and a higher level consists of more active forms of participation 
such as involvement in decision-making and meeting attendance. In our study, due to the specific 
context of Vietnam, we use the three main measures for participation collected in the surveys 
                                                          
22 For an alternative, we run all regressions with a balanced panel and the results are similar. Alternative results are 
upon requests to the author. 
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without categorizing into passive and active forms, including household participation in project 
meetings, expressing opinions in the meetings and contribution to the project. 
Final outcomes and intermediate outcomes  
Regarding outcome measures, our limitation in this study is that we do not have outcome 
information at project level, thus, we are not able to directly test the effect of household 
participation in any specific project’s outcomes. Instead, we evaluate the effect of participation at 
household level as ‘an instrument to meet an ends’. We first examine the effect of participation 
on final outcomes which are economic welfares. Income per capita is the main indicator for this 
measure, given the fact that expenditure data is not collected in this survey. Apart from income, 
ownership of durable goods and assets remains an important indicator of households’ economic 
well-being. Ownership of durables and assets reflects the extent to which their income is 
increased. We use log of per capita net income, assets and durables as the final outcomes in our 
analysis. 
In the second step, we explore different possible channels through which the effects of 
participation could occur. The first set of intermediate outcomes include access to basic 
infrastructure and public goods, namely access to electricity, clean water and sanitary toilet. Then 
we examine a second set of intermediate outcomes associated with better communication, thanks 
to the proper choice of roads, schools, art centers, etc. A road construction in a village, for 
instance, helps to reduce the time of transportation, improve access to several services and open 
more economic activities, especially non-farm work and access to credit. Thus, assessing the 
intermediate outcomes could potentially explain the effects of participation on final outcomes. 
Based on the data availability, we can examine a set of intermediate outcomes including 
acquisition of bike, motorbike, mobile phone, access to agricultural information and access to 
credit. Lastly, we investigate how participation affects households’ self-assessment on their 
difficulties, namely their cash shortage, difficulties in water access, education payment and 
medical payment.   
Difference in Difference with Fixed Effect model 
We start our estimation by a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach to compare the changes in 
outcomes from 2007 to 2012 between those who participate and those who do not. The benefit 
of using a DiD model is that we can get rid of selection bias which must be time-invariant under 
the identification assumption that in the absence of participation, the treatment and control 
group would follow the same trend in outcome growth. We improve the estimation by 
controlling for all time-invariant characteristics, including the unobserved ones, through a fixed 
effect model. We can then control for the fact that initial conditions of explanatory variables may 
have an impact on the subsequent changes in performances or decision to participate. The DiD 
and fixed effect model is:                                          (1) 
where     is the outcome of the household i at time t.     is a dummy variable of participation, 
which captures the possible differences between participants and non-participants in the absence 
of treatment; t is a time dummy, capturing aggregate time factors that could affect outcomes. We 
also use    , a set of control variables (household and commune characteristics) in order to 
increase the precision of our estimates regarding household’s and commune’s time variant 
characteristics. And    here illustrates the household fixed effects that help to address the 
selection bias on the unobserved variables.  
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This is a DID model in an OLS setting and   , the coefficient of the interaction between 
participation and time dummy is our coefficient of interest. The OLS estimate    can be 
expressed as:                                   ) 
where        and        are the average outcome of participants in 2012 and 2007, respectively 
and        and        are the average outcome of non-participants in 2012 and 2007.  
The control factors       are used in order to narrow the omitted variable bias due to time-
variant factors. We add progressively the households’ and then communes’ characteristics in the 
estimations. The household characteristics include age, sex of the head, his/her education level 
(completed grade), occupation (farming or not), ethnicity, language spoken (Vietnamese, ethnic 
language), and household size. The commune characteristics include population of the commune, 
a dummy determining if there is a craft village in the commune, frequency of agriculture 
extension officials, ethnicity (Kinh or non-Kinh) and education of the commune’s leader. 
Regarding the infrastructure of the commune, we add a dummy for each type of project 
constructed (if any kind of road was constructed; school or cultural house, health centre), the 
number of infrastructure projects built in the commune (in log) and lastly the score of how far 
CDD is implemented in these projects (detail of this measure is described in the next section). 
There are two main reasons for including these commune’s control variables. First, by controlling 
for infrastructure availability in the commune, we expect to mitigate the bias due to the effect of 
infrastructure benefit which is correlated with both household’s participation and their economic 
outcomes. The second bias is related to the management ability of the commune officials. If local 
officials manage development projects well, they are likely to be able to motivate people to 
participate and at the same time, affect the economic growth of their community. Adding CDD 
score, ethnicity and education level of the commune’s leader enables us to disentangle the effect 
of household’s participation and commune’s management capacity.    
Finding that households participating in the projects are generally richer and often come from 
Kinh ethnicity, we suspect that self-selection may lead to a heterogeneity of participation effects. 
In order to control for initial positions of the households, we examine whether there is any 
heterogeneity effect of participation for the poor and ethnic minority in order to identify the 
difference in participation impacts between poor and non-poor households, between minority 
and non-minority households, but also between the households who are in a P135-II commune 
and those who are not.   
The test is implemented by adding a dummy variable, denoted “Poor3”, indicating if households 
are categorized as poor in 2007. The following regression is performed:                                                                                                        (2) 
In this specification,    illustrates a triple difference:                                                                                                   
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 Poor household is identified based on the commune’s list of poor household at the baseline survey. This 
classification is based on poverty line and the lack of access to some basic infrastructure and social services. 
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This coefficient means that for a participating household (as compared to non-participating), 
belonging to the poor category has a positive or negative effect on their outcomes (relatively to 
participating households who belong to the non-poor group), i.e on their progress over time. 
Similar regressions are implemented by replacing the “Poor” with “Minority” indicating the 
household belongs to ethnic minority group, then “P135” indicating the household belongs to a 
P135-II commune. From 2007 to 2012, 266 communes from the whole samples of 400 
communes are under the proverty reduction program-P135-II, thus, these communes are 
supposed to receive more infrastructure projects and the CDD approach is one of the P135-II’s 
target. We expect to find higher benefit of participation for participants living in P135-II 
communes. 
Difference in Difference with Matching method 
The DiD estimation with FE is based on the common trend assumption that treated and control 
groups would have followed the same paths in the absence of treatment. However, this 
assumption would be violated if there are some initial differences between the treated and control 
groups that can affect their outcome evolution differently. In order to mitigate this selection bias, 
we use propensity score matching (PSM) technique to balance the samples. We select participants 
and non-participants as similar as possible in terms of observed characteristics that might affect 
both their decision to participate and their outcomes. However, PSM is based on only observable 
characteristics, which would lead to selection bias if indeed the participating households and the 
comparison households are different along unobservable characteristics. Thus, we combine PSM 
and DiD models to overcome this selection bias concern. We use two methods in PSM to rebuild 
the counterfactuals, including reweighting and propensity score matching. First, we match based 
on households’ characteristics, including age, gender, education, ethnicity and occupation of the 
household’s head, then, household size and poverty status. We further use commune 
characteristics for matching such as population of commune, land area, infrastructure projects 
implemented, information about ethnicity and education of commune’s leader. A logit model is 
estimated to calculate the propensity score and we control for initial conditions that might affect 
households’ trajectories. Then, we reweight our observations by the odd-ratios of the score 
estimated and restrict our sample to those we have common support. In the second method of 
matching, we use propensity score matching as a robustness check.       
3.2.2 Assessing the effect of CDD approach at commune level 
In the previous part, we focus on the effect of participation from households’ perspective. In this 
section, we aim at providing a more comprehensive picture about how CDD approach is applied 
in each project in order to provide an aggregate index of CDD implementation at a commune 
level. Then, we expect to test the effect of CDD applied projects on the average outcome 
indicators.  
How is the CDD approach implemented in the field? CDD, as shown in section 2, relates to 
both household’s and commune’s practices. The advantage of our data regarding to CDD is that, 
we have inclusive information about CDD provided by local households about each 
infrastructure project. In this section, we construct an index of CDD for each project and then 
aggregate it at the commune level. This CDD score, is expected to reflect more objectively the 
The first indicator is consultation meeting, whether a meeting is organized to choose the project 
or not. Secondly, we choose the indicator of public bidding, if the commune organizes public 
bidding for the construction. Third, community supervision board is included. The fourth 
component is that if there is any contribution, in cash or in labor, by local community. The last 
indicator is public dissemination of financial information of the project. Those indicators are 
chosen based on the common requirement for CDD projects as mentioned above. Only two 
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requirements are not included in calculating this score is the creation of an operational project 
management unit and operation and maintenance plan since this information is more technical 
and local households are not aware of. Accordingly, these indicators are not asked in the 
households’ questionnaires.  
We use Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) to build a synthetic indicator of CDD 
practices for each project in each year and this proxy for, to what extent; CDD is applied in the 
local context. We then use this score as an explanatory component of economic growth at the 
commune level in the estimation. CDD score for each infrastructure project is thus, computed by 
the weighted sum of its response to each indicator, such that                    
Where      is the CDD score of a project i, Dij is the response of project i to dimension j, and 
Wj the MCA weighted for the first axis applied to indicator j. Statistically, the highest weights 
correspond to the participative behaviors highly correlated with other forms of CDD approach 
but not very common among all project; and inversely for the lowest ones.  
To examine the effect of CDD approach with a purpose of comparison with the household’s 
participation section, we use the same outcomes as before but aggregated at commune level. 
Indeed, in each commune, there are different projects, thus, once we measure the CDD score for 
each project, we take the average score in each commune, indicating how CDD approach is 
implemented in a commune. It is noted that both outcomes and CDD score are standardized 
since they cannot be directly interpreted in levels. Regarding the control variables, we use 
aggregated variables (average) from household’s data such as age, gender of the household’s head, 
education level, household size, farming occupation and if household receives agriculture 
information. We also use additional commune controls taken from the commune data, including 
the commune size, main ethnic group in the commune (categorized into 8 groups), land areas. 
Besides, to control for agriculture extension promotion during the 5 year period, we also add 
information on the frequency of agriculture official visiting local households and whether there is 
a craft village in the commune which is a proxy for job opportunity. Lastly, we include 
information about ethnicity of the commune’ chair or vice chair (a dummy if he or she is Kinh or 
not) and education level of this highest commune head to partly control for differences in local 
authority’s ability in managing projects. It is noticeable that even Kinh as the majority ethnic 
group in a commune accounts for around 18 percent of all communes; Kinh being a commune’s 
top three leaders make up more than 25 percent of the communes. The highest positions in these 
communes are also dominated by man with 94 percent over all three top positions. Other than 
ethnicity, gender and education level, there is no more information about the officials in these 
communes. Once we limit our estimation to commune level estimation, the number of 
communes with all information mentioned above in both 2007 and 2012 is 705 in total, thus, our 
regressions only use district fixed effect rather than commune fixed effect, including a time trend.  
In order to separate the effect of CDD variation from the variation of different infrastructure 
projects built in each commune, we also add a dummy for the main four types of project: roads, 
schools and culture houses, medical projects and other types. Lastly we include a dummy for 
P135-II commune and an interaction between CDD score and treatment communes, since CDD 
is aimed to be strongly promoted in those P135-II communes. Our purpose of estimation at 
commune level is to examine the association between CDD implementation and communes’ 
economic and social outcomes, we do not aim at claiming for causality. 
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4 Descriptive statistics 
4.1 An overview of household participation in infrastructure projects  
In this section, we present a descriptive analysis comparing treated and control groups, along 
three types of participation, namely attending the meetings, expressing opinions in the meeting 
and contributing to projects. Their differences in characteristics and outcome evolutions are the 
core of this analysis. 
i. Who are the ones participating in infrastructure projects? 
Results in Table 1 shows that there are some key characteristics associated with household 
participation, no matter which kind of participation is measured. The participating households 
are usually headed by male, having higher level of education and they can speak Vietnamese. 
Meanwhile, ethnicity does not seem to play a role in determining household participation, we find 
that the proportion of ethnic minority in treated and control groups is somewhat equivalent. 
Except in the case of raising voice; ethnic minority seems to less be willing to raise voice to 
express their demand as there is a significant difference between the treated and control group. 
Similarly, we do not find that the poor participate less than non-poor in terms of attending 
selection meetings and contributing to the project in cash and or labor. They are less likely to 
express their opinions than the non-poor households. The proportion of households who live in 
their commune for a longer period is higher among the participants. Regarding their job, it 
appears that households who are mainly engaged in agricultural activities participate less in 
attending selection meetings and raising voices in the meetings.  
In the context of Vietnam, participation in development project is questioned by the fact that 
households might be ‘mobilized’ or ‘encouraged’ by the local officials to participate due to the 
communes or villages’ strength of management. Thus, we also illustrate the differences between 
households who participate and who do not, by communes’ characteristics. Characteristics of 
commune leaders’ in terms of ethnicity and education level are not strongly associated with 
household participation. Households who participate often live in smaller size communes where 
there are higher number of infrastructure projects and higher frequency of agricultural extension 
official visiting or contacting local farmers. Lastly, the region seems to play a role in household 
participation. In the North and in the South, the proportion of households going to the meetings 
and raising voices is lower. In the Central, people seem to participate more, except for the last 
indicator of contributing to the infrastructure projects. Evidence from this descriptive statistics 
indicates that there are indeed some differences in baseline characteristics between the treated 
and control groups. Households equipped with better human capital like language, education, are 
more likely to participate.      
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Table 1 Baseline characteristics of households (2007) by different measures of participation  
 
 Attending meetings Expressing opinions Contributing to project 
 Treated Control 
P 
value 
Treated Control 
P 
value 
Treated Control 
P 
value 
Observations 2047 1746  835 2958  1193 2600  
Household characteristics        
Age 40.41 39.31 0.001 42.32 39.24 0.00 40.13 39.76 0.289 
Male headed 0.92 0.88 0.00 0.92 0.89 0.008 0.92 0.89 0.004 
School years 4.93 3.73 0.00 5.56 4.03 0.00 4.92 4.10 0.00 
Ethnic minority 0.80 0.80 0.857 0.77 0.81 0.021 0.82 0.79 0.103 
Household size 4.98 5.01 0.525 5.02 4.99 0.636 4.98 5.00 0.806 
Poor household 0.44 0.46 0.253 0.41 0.46 0.005 0.43 0.46 0.05 
Farmer 0.83 0.86 0.004 0.79 0.85 0.00 0.84 0.84 0.856 
Speaking 
Vietnamese 0.36 0.25 0.00 0.43 0.28 0.00 0.34 0.29 0.008 
Years living in 
commune 
11.51 11.36 0.60 12.27 11.23 0.00 12.73 10.88 0.00 
Commune characteristics         
Commune leader is 
Kinh 
0.26 0.26 0.752 0.28 0.25 0.164 0.23 0.27 0.003 
School years of 
leader 
10.33 10.13 0.001 10.32 10.21 0.119 10.31 10.19 0.08 
Number of 
households in 
commune 
715.82 804.05 0.00 700.53 773.68 0.001 706.69 781.36 0.00 
Number of projects 3.2 3.04 0.01 3.36 3.06 0.00 3.2 3.01 0.12 
Agriculture officials 
visits per year 
19.61 17.50 0.07 21.5 17.8 0.01 22.3 16.98 0.00 
Region: North 0.58 0.71 0.00 0.54 0.67 0.00 0.69 0.62 0.00 
Region: Central 0.36 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.25 0.00 0.28 0.28 0.965 
Region: South 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.044 0.02 0.09 0.00 
Source: BLS 2007, ELS 2012, CEMA, UNDP, author’s calculations 
 ii. Outcome evolution  
Poverty reduction programs aim at providing basic infrastructure in order to give local 
community access to better economic opportunities and increase their ability of managing 
economic activities. The final purpose is to increase their economic welfare, thus, poverty 
reduces. Therefore, this descriptive analysis on outcome evolution starts with the final outcomes, 
measured by log of household’s income per capita, durable index and asset index (detail of these 
measurements is presented in Appendix 1). Initially, under the three kinds of participation, 
treated households are generally better off in terms of income per capita, durable and asset 
acquisition (Table 2). From 2007 to 2012, the economic disparities between the two groups still 
hold. For households who attended meetings, they experienced a significantly larger increase in 
income per capita and durable ownership than households who do not go to the meeting. Same 
pattern in income evolution is also observed for the other two types of participation. Both 
groups, regardless of participation types, experience a slight reduction in their asset index. In 
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short, participating households improve their economic performance better than non-
participating households.  
In order to reach the final outcomes, treated households are expected to experience different 
changes in intermediate outcomes and/or other welfare indicators. These outcomes are directly 
associated with the projects that they participate in and the intermediate outcomes (if any) could 
be the channels explaining partly better performance of participating households compared to 
non-participating households. Details of the findings are in Appendix 2. First, participating 
households in terms of meeting attendants and voice expression, had significantly more access to 
basic infrastructure such as electricity, piped or well water or sanitary toilets. The gap reduces 
after 5 years for only water access indicator. For instance, in 2012, 85 percent of household going 
to project selection meeting have access to electricity but the figure is only 77 percent for the 
non-participant group. A different path is, however, observed for the last treatment. Households 
who contribute to the project in cash or labor do not have better access to electricity, water or 
sanitary toilet, etc. and there is no remarkable improvement observed for them after 5 years. 
Participating households also have better means of transportation and communication such as 
motorbike, bike and mobile phone. There is a remarkable change in households’ having mobile 
phone. Only 7 percent of household in treated group had a mobile phone in 2007 but 73 percent 
has one in 2012, the figure is 5.6 percent and 65 percent, respectively for control group (the first 
measure of participation). Additionally, participating households have better access to agricultural 
information and access to credit, compared to non-participating households. The gap between 
two groups is larger in the first two measures of participation than in the case of household’s 
contribution to infrastructure project. 
Lastly, when households are asked to assess their difficulties and shortages in terms of cash, 
water access, payment for children’s education and payment for medical and health care, 
participating households seem to face less problems. However, with self-assessment indicators, 
the differences between two groups are relatively small and not always significant. 
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Table 2 Economic outcomes by three measures of household participation 
 
 Attending project selection meetings Expressing opinions in the meetings Contributing to infrastructure projects 
 2007  2012  2007  2012  2007  2012  
Variable Treated Control P-value Treated Control P-value Treated Control P-value Treated Control P-value Treated Control P-value Treated Control P-value 
Log of net 
income per 
capita 
7.83 7.72 0.00 8.37 8.18 0.00 7.91 7.74 0.00 8.50 8.22 0.00 7.86 7.73 0.00 8.40 8.22 0.00 
 (0.73) (0.68)  (0.89) (0.87)  (0.72) (0.70)  (0.87) (0.88)  (0.68) (0.71)  0.84 0.90  
Log of durable 
index 1.61 1.40 0.00 1.79 1.54 0.00 1.72 1.46 0.00 
1.85 1.62 0.00 1.56 1.49 0.00 1.72 (1.64) 0.00 
 (0.67) (0.68)  (0.58) (0.68)  (0.67) (0.68)  (0.53) (0.66)  (0.69) (0.68)  (0.60) (0.66)  
Log of asset 
index 1.01 1.03 0.35 0.99 0.99 0.83 1.11 0.99 0.00 
1.07 0.98 0.00 1.08 0.99 0.00 1.08 0.96 0.00 
 (0.62) (0.59)  (0.59) (0.60)  (0.63) (0.59)  (0.58) (0.60)  (0.60) (0.60)  (0.59) (0.60)  
Source: BLS 2007, ELS 2012, CEMA, UNDP, author’s calculations
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4.2 Implementation of Community-Driven Development approach at commune level 
Descriptive statistics on the standardized scores by year and types of infrastructure (mean of 
household’s assessment for each project in a commune) are provided in Table 34. This CDD 
standardized score can be interpreted in relative levels. Units with a higher score display a mix of 
more frequent practices of CDD. It is seen that the CDD score is higher in 2012 and among 
village’s road and village’s art center projects. These types of infrastructures are implemented in 
the village, thus, it’s common that they better follow CDD requirements in order to meet the 
local’s needs. On the households’ side, these projects also bring direct benefits for them, thus, it 
would be the case that they participate and remember more about the implementation of these 
infrastructure rather than project constructed at higher level. 
Table 3 CDD score standardized by year and infrastructure types 
  N=1 051 N=2 394 
Construction /Year  2007 2012 
Commune's traffic road -0.205 0.012 
Village's traffic road  0.266 0.348 
Irrigation  0.051 0.124 
Market  -0.422 -0.476 
School  -0.173 0.049 
Village art center  0.386 0.390 
Medical center  -0.189 -0.290 
Clean water  -0.197 -0.050 
Electricity line  -0.324 -0.317 
Local Committee office -0.213 -0.411 
Total  -0.049 -0.001 
Source: BLS 2007, ELS 2012, CEMA, UNDP, author’s calculation 
  
5 Results 
5.1 Effects of household participation on final outcomes 
Effect of household participation by attending project selection meetings 
Result from DID-FE estimations are presented in Table 4A, 4B and 4C. For the first kind of 
treatment - ‘attending projects’ selection meeting’, we find a positive effect on household’s economic 
performance with or without controls for households’ and communes’ characteristics. However, 
once we add controls for number of infrastructure projects implemented and CDD score 
(standardized), the positive effect of household participation is no longer significant. Thus, it 
seems that household participation is highly affected by how commune officials manage their 
infrastructure projects, CDD implementation, in particular.  
                                                          
4 Details of MCA statistics are in Appendix 3 
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We do not find any effect on durables and assets index. Since we do not have information on the 
values of the assets, the index measure could not effectively reflect the changes in income or 
economic welfare of households. When we control for household’s characteristics (results are not 
reported in the table), it is seen that households engaged in agricultural activities and households 
having a big family have disadvantage in economic growth. Meanwhile, household headed by 
male seem to perform better than household headed by woman.  
Effect of household participation by expressing their opinion in the meetings 
As seen in Table 4B, there is a consistent significant effect of household participation on log of 
income per capita growth. The effect ranges between 9.8 percent and 12 percent. We also do not 
find any effect on log of durables or asset index. Regarding households’ and communes’ 
characteristic controls, we find similar effects on household’s income increase as in the previous 
model. It is noticeable that when we add the CDD score, the magnitude of participation effect 
reduces slightly but the coefficient is still significant at 1 percent level.     
We then test the heterogeneity of participation effect for different group, following equation (2). 
The three interactions of participation with poor dummy, ethnic minority dummy and P135-II 
commune dummy do not show any significant effect. Different groups, therefore, benefit 
similarly from participation. However, as the majority of households in our sample are from 
ethnic minority groups, the positive result of participation effect is a good signal for ethnic 
minorities. Number of studies on ethnic minorities in Vietnam has shown that lack of confidence 
and being ‘hesitant’ to leave their village and participate in market place (World Bank, 2009) has 
been a barrier for them to increase voice and self-determination, as the result, preventing them 
from achieving economic progress. Thus, this result shows the importance of raising voice. 
Participation by expressing ones’ opinion would help people to express their idea, the 
infrastructure that they want and they can benefit from. Regarding asset and durables ownership, 
we do not find any significant effect of participation. 
Effect of household participation by contributing to infrastructure projects 
Regarding our last measure of participation - ‘contributing to infrastructure project’ in cash or in 
kind/labor, the significant effect on log of net income per capita only holds before we include 
communes’ controls. Similarly, there is a positive effect of participation on growth of assets, 
however, it is no longer significant when we control for CDD implementation at commune level. 
These findings again confirm the highly positive relationship between household participation 
and commune’s implementation of CDD approach.  
Among three measures of household participation, only the most active form has a significant 
effect. There could be two potential explanations. The first one is that different forms of 
participation would induce different effects. Passive participation might not bring any benefit for 
the participants. Second, the significant role of CDD at commune level makes us question the 
meaning of ‘voluntary participation’ or ‘voluntary contribution’. A concern has been mentioned 
at the beginning of our study is that the high number of households attending meetings or 
contributing to infrastructure project might be affected by the local authorities. If the local 
officials need to attain some objectives of ‘participation’, they would have put pressure on local 
communities to attend the meetings as well as contribute to the projects in order to meet the 
communes’ target.  
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Table 4A Effect of participation on final outcomes (Attending projects’ selection meetings) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
DiD_FE 
 
Controls 
Log 
income 
pc 
Log 
income 
pc 
Log 
income 
pc 
Log 
income 
pc 
Log 
income 
pc 
Log 
income 
pc 
Log 
income 
pc 
Log durable 
index 
Log 
asset 
index 
          
Time 0.517*** 0.549*** 0.579*** 0.597*** 0.628*** 0.539*** 0.522*** 0.126*** -0.000 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.036) (0.036) (0.063) (0.042) (0.051) (0.028) (0.027) 
Participation  0.089*** 0.090*** 0.054* 0.031 0.023 0.076* 0.057 0.022 -0.001 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.030) (0.031) (0.077) (0.042) (0.054) (0.021) (0.022) 
Minority x t     -0.039     
     (0.065)     
Minority x 
Participation     0.011     
     (0.083)     
Poor x t      0.122***    
      (0.045)    
Poor x 
Participation      -0.090    
      (0.060)    
P135-II commune 
x t       0.106**   
       (0.050)   
P135-II x 
Participation       -0.026   
       (0.065)   
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Infrastructure controls          
If road constructed  -0.054* 0.032 0.027 0.029 0.036 0.032 -0.105*** 0.021 
  (0.030) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.030) (0.030) 
If school 
constructed 
 -0.022 0.022 0.016 0.014 0.018 0.020 -0.021 0.080*
** 
  (0.025) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.022) (0.022) 
If medical center 
constructed 
 -0.025 0.002 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.011 0.080*** 0.042* 
  (0.026) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.021) (0.022) 
Number of projects 
(log) 
  -0.052* -0.049 -0.050* -0.053* -0.051* 0.026 -0.042* 
   (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.021) (0.021) 
CDD score 
(standardized) 
   0.044*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.011 0.029*
** 
    (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant 7.661*** 7.724*** 7.507*** 7.543*** 7.522*** 7.567*** 7.599*** 0.555** 0.110 
 (0.283) (0.286) (0.305) (0.306) (0.309) (0.306) (0.305) (0.229) (0.246) 
          
Observations 8922 8922 8269 8269 8269 8269 8269 8269 8269 
R-squared 0.264 0.265 0.276 0.278 0.279 0.280 0.280 0.109 0.036 
Number of id 4596 4596 4573 4573 4573 4573 4573 4573 4573 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Source: BLS 2007, ELS 2012, CEMA, UNDP, author’s calculation. 
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Table 4B Effect of participation on final outcomes (Expressing opinions) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
DiD_FE 
 
Controls 
Log 
income 
pc 
Log 
income 
pc 
Log 
income 
pc 
Log 
income 
pc 
Log 
income 
pc 
Log 
income 
pc 
Log 
income 
pc 
Log 
durable 
index 
Log 
asset 
index 
                    
Time 0.543*** 0.568*** 0.580*** 0.591*** 0.636*** 0.555*** 0.527*** 0.144*** -0.000 
 (0.024) (0.030) (0.033) (0.033) (0.052) (0.037) (0.042) (0.025) (0.026) 
Participation  0.098*** 0.122*** 0.123*** 0.107*** 0.022 0.107** 0.121** -0.037 0.000 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.080) (0.044) (0.057) (0.023) (0.027) 
Minority x t     -0.056     
     (0.050)     
Minority x 
Participation     0.106     
     (0.088)     
Poor x t      0.074**    
      (0.034)    
Poor x 
Participation      0.012    
      (0.068)    
P135-II commune 
x t       0.096**   
       (0.037)   
P135-II x 
Participation       -0.014   
       (0.070)   
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Infrastructure controls          
If road constructed  -0.054* 0.032 0.028 0.030 0.034 0.033 -0.107*** 0.021 
  (0.030) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.030) (0.031) 
If school 
constructed  -0.021 0.019 0.014 0.013 0.015 0.017 -0.021 0.080*** 
  (0.025) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.022) (0.022) 
If medical center 
constructed  -0.023 -0.000 -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 -0.013 0.082*** 0.042* 
  (0.026) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.021) (0.021) 
Number of projects 
(log)   -0.049* -0.048 -0.049 -0.049* -0.049* 0.028 -0.042* 
   (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.021) (0.021) 
CDD score 
(standardized)    0.041*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.015* 0.029*** 
    (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant 7.503*** 7.688*** 7.466*** 7.500*** 7.487*** 7.522*** 7.555*** 0.588** 0.109 
 (0.261) (0.287) (0.306) (0.306) (0.309) (0.306) (0.305) (0.228) (0.247) 
          
Observations 8922 8922 8269 8269 8269 8269 8269 8269 8269 
R-squared 0.260 0.266 0.278 0.280 0.280 0.281 0.282 0.109 0.036 
Number of id 4596 4596 4573 4573 4573 4573 4573 4573 4573 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Source: BLS 2007, ELS 2012, CEMA, UNDP, author’s calculation. 
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Table 4C Effect of participation on final outcomes (Contributing to infrastructure projects) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
DiD_FE 
 
Controls 
Log 
income 
pc 
Log 
income 
pc 
Log 
income 
pc 
Log 
durable 
index 
Log 
durable 
index 
Log 
durable 
index 
Log 
asset 
index 
Log 
asset 
index 
Log 
asset 
index 
          
Time 0.581*** 0.600*** 0.614*** 0.136*** 0.132*** 0.135*** -0.048** -0.016 -0.009 
 (0.030) (0.034) (0.034) (0.022) (0.026) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026) 
Participation 0.041 0.014 -0.004 0.010 0.008 0.004 0.047** 0.039* 0.028 
 (0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) 
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Infrastructure controls          
If road constructed -0.059** 0.030 0.025 -0.068*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.036* 0.023 0.022 
 (0.030) (0.043) (0.043) (0.020) (0.030) (0.030) (0.021) (0.031) (0.030) 
If school 
constructed 
-0.020 0.022 0.016 0.007 -0.019 -0.021 0.046*** 0.084*** 0.080*** 
 (0.025) (0.030) (0.030) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022) 
If medical center 
constructed 
-0.019 0.005 -0.008 0.091*** 0.085*** 0.081*** 0.039** 0.048** 0.040* 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.031) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) 
Number of projects 
(log) 
 -0.049 -0.047  0.027 0.028  -0.044** -0.042** 
  (0.030) (0.030)  (0.021) (0.021)  (0.021) (0.021) 
CDD score 
(standardized) 
  0.047***   0.013   0.027*** 
   (0.013)   (0.009)   (0.009) 
Constant 7.744*** 7.526*** 7.558*** 0.383* 0.555** 0.565** 0.043 0.083 0.103 
 (0.286) (0.305) (0.306) (0.202) (0.228) (0.229) (0.216) (0.247) (0.246) 
          
Observations 8922 8269 8269 8269 8269 8269 8269 8269 8269 
R-squared 0.264 0.276 0.278 0.107 0.108 0.109 0.034 0.034 0.036 
Number of id 4596 4573 4573 4573 4573 4573 4573 4573 4573 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Source: BLS 2007, ELS 2012, CEMA, UNDP, author’s calculation. 
5.2 Effects of household participation on intermediate outcomes 
We find a consistent effect of active participation (through expressing opinions) on income 
growth but the remaining question is that what are the channels bridging household participation 
in infrastructure projects and their final outcomes? And in the case of no effect on final 
outcomes, is there any intermediate outcome effect? To test different possible channels for the 
effect of household participation, we run the same estimation model of DiD with FE. Our 
intermediate outcomes are dummy variables. Using linear probability model for these binary 
variables is often subject to the drawback that predicted probabilities can be less than 0 or higher 
than 1. However, this drawback is not present in the case of DiD estimation.  
Tables 5A, 5B and 5C present the effects of household participation (across three measures) on 
intermediate outcomes. Our results suggest a strong and significant effect of participation, 
regardless of different measures of participation, on households’ access to sanitary toilet and 
mobile phone. There is no effect on the probability of household having motorbikes but a 
negative effect on bikes. This could suggest to some extent the changes in income and the 
changes in local infrastructure. Better commuted roads could motivate local households to buy 
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other modes of transport than bikes. The ones, who participate to choose the projects that meet 
their own demand or contribute to the construction of those projects in cash or in labor, can 
derive higher benefits. A highlighted result is that there is a heterogeneous effect of participation 
for ethnic minority and poor households in access to sanitary toilet, agriculture information and 
also credit access. The initial lower endowments of these disadvantaged groups could be the 
reason for them to benefit more from participation rather than their counterparts.       
Significant effect of participation (all three measures) on access to agricultural information and 
mobile phone is a signal of better communication in local communities. Even we do not directly 
test the effect of community participation on project effectiveness; this finding could suggest 
positive impacts of participation to some extent. Among different types of infrastructure project, 
local roads and villages’ art houses are the ones in which households participate the most. If they 
did choose the most important ones that meet their own needs, once the projects are finished, 
participating households are unquestionably the first beneficiaries. They can rapidly take 
advantages of the road for their transport needs, as well as other demand for communication. 
They are then better connected, as their consumption of mobile phone and their access to 
agricultural information increases. Having better access to information is also an indicator of 
higher level of social capital. This could be a result of social interaction induced from 
participation in community activities (Coleman, 1988). Attending a meeting or expressing opinion 
in community can be seen as a way to build social capital and expand social network.    
Results from our two models of DiD-ME are shown in Table 6. We find consistent results for 
most of the cases. These additional specifications help to confirm the overall effect of 
participation, especially in the positive effect of active participation on income growth and better 
communication through agriculture information access and mobile consumption. 
 
Table 5A Effects of participation on intermediate outcomes (Attending projects’ selection meetings) 
 
DiD_FE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Controls Electricity Toilet Toilet Toilet Water Motor Bike Mobile Agricul. information Credit 
           
Time 0,120*** 0.144*** 0.216*** 0.158*** -0.007 0.292*** -0.107*** 0.632*** 0.056** -0.009 
 -0,015 (0.019) (0.034) (0.022) (0.014) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.026) (0.024) 
Participation -0.030** 0.063*** -0.004 0.038 -0.011 -0.006 -0.078*** 0.052*** 0.120*** 0.027 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.041) (0.023) (0.013) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.022) (0.020) 
Minority x t   -0.091***        
   (0.034)        
Minority x 
Participation   0.085*        
   (0.045)        
Poor x t    -0.029       
    (0.021)       
Poor x 
Participation    0.055*       
    (0.031)       
Number of 
projects (log) -0.002 0.037** 0.035** 0.038** 0.023* -0.005 0.051*** 0.043** 0.146*** 
0.050*
* 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.022) (0.020) 
CDD score 
(standardized) -0.013** 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.002 -0.001 0.007 
-
0.022*** 0.008 
0.029*
** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) 
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Constant 0.418 0.073 0.046 0.072 0.573*** -0.442** -0.455** -0.204 -0.067 -0.103 
 (0.129) (0.157) (0.158) (0.157) (0.122) (0.204) (0.184) (0.180) (0.210) (0.210) 
           
Observations 8381 8381 8381 8381 8381 8381 8381 8381 8381 8381 
R-squared 0.121 0.155 0.157 0.156 0.010 0.214 0.069 0.652 0.090 0.037 
Number of id 4603 4603 4603 4603 4603 4603 4603 4603 4603 4603 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Source: BLS 2007, ELS 2012, CEMA, UNDP, author’s calculation 
 
 
Table 5B Effects of participation on intermediate outcomes (Expressing opinions) 
 
DiD_FE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Controls Electricity Toilet Toilet Water Motor Bike Mobile Agricul. information 
Agricul. 
information Credit 
                  
Time 0.112*** 0.159*** 0.208*** -0.009 0.296*** 
-
0.124*** 0.648*** 0.096*** 0.083*** 0.003 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.029) (0.012) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.025) (0.027) (0.022) 
Participation -0.034** 0.080*** 0.011 -0.017 -0.035 
-
0.104*** 0.045** 0.090*** 0.056 0.006 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.046) (0.014) (0.022) (0.023) (0.020) (0.026) (0.034) (0.023) 
Minority x t   -0.062**        
   (0.026)        
Minority x 
Participation   0.087*     
 
  
   (0.051)        
Poor x t         0.026  
         (0.025)  
Poor x 
Participation        
 
0.088*  
         (0.051)  
Constant 0.424*** 0.057 0.033 0.577*** -0.424** -0.425** -0.209 -0.064 -0.047 -0.095 
 (0.130) (0.158) (0.158) (0.122) (0.204) (0.184) (0.180) (0.209) (0.209) (0.211) 
           
Observations 8381 8381 8381 8381 8022 8022 8022 8381 8381 8381 
R-squared 0.121 0.156 0.157 0.010 0.214 0.070 0.651 0.085 0.087 0.037 
Number of id 4603 4603 4603 4603 4574 4574 4574 4603 4603 4603 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Source: BLS 2007, ELS 2012, CEMA, UNDP, author’s calculation 
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Table 5C Effects of participation on intermediate outcomes (Contributing to infrastructure projects) 
 
DiD_FE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Controls Electricity Toilet Water Motor Bike Mobile Agricul. information Credit Credit 
                 
Time 0.110*** 0.165*** -0.010 0.285*** -0.134*** 0.647*** 0.090*** -0.008 -0.043 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.013) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.025) (0.022) (0.031) 
Participation -0.016 0.033* -0.010 0.011 -0.039* 0.036** 0.083*** 0.044** -0.030 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.023) (0.021) (0.044) 
Minority x t         0.047 
         (0.029) 
Minority x 
Participation         0.089* 
         (0.050) 
Constant 0.409*** 0.094 0.570*** -0.448** -0.478*** -0.191 -0.030 -0.099 -0.046 
 (0.130) (0.158) (0.122) (0.204) (0.184) (0.180) (0.210) (0.210) (0.211) 
          
Observations 8381 8381 8381 8022 8022 8022 8381 8381 8381 
R-squared 0.121 0.153 0.010 0.214 0.065 0.651 0.085 0.038 0.041 
Number of id 4603 4603 4603 4574 4574 4574 4603 4603 4603 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Source: BLS 2007, ELS 2012, CEMA, UNDP, author’s calculation 
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Table 6 Effect of participation on final and intermediate outcomes (comparison with matching methods) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 Log of 
income pc 
Log of 
durable 
Log of asset  Electricity Toilet Water Motor Bike Mobile Agriculture information Credit 
Attending meetings 
DiD-FE 0.031 0.022 -0.001 0.110*** 0.165*** -0.010 0.285*** -0.134*** 0.647*** 0.090*** -0.008 
 (0.031) (0.021) (0.022) (0.014) (0.018) (0.013) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.025) (0.022) 
DiD-ME            
(i) Reweighting 0.0367 0.0286 0.0170 -0.0193 0.042** -0.004 -0.0120 -0.06*** 0.038** 0.118*** 0.030 
 (0.0329) (0.0208) (0.0233) (0.0130) (0.018) (0.013) (0.0195) (0.020) (0.018) (0.023) (0.021) 
(ii) PS matching 0.046* -0.015 0.001 -0.028 0.048** -0.007 -0.029 -0.022 0.037** 0.145*** 0.014 
 (0.024) 0.025 (0.028) (0.019) (0.017) (0.015) (0.024) (0.024) (0.018) (0.027) (0.024) 
            
Expressing opinions         
DiD-FE 0.107*** -0.037 0.000 -0.034** 0.080*** -0.017 -0.035 -0.104*** 0.045** 0.090*** 0.006 
 (0.034) (0.023) (0.027) (0.015) (0.021) (0.014) (0.022) (0.023) (0.020) (0.026) (0.023) 
DiD-ME            
(i) Reweighting 0.109*** -0.026 0.019 -0.022 0.067*** -0.016 -0.033 -0.086*** 0.031 0.080*** 0.008 
 (0.035) (0.023) (0.027) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.022) (0.024) (0.020) (0.027) (0.024) 
(ii) PS matching 0.117** -0.032 -0.012 -0.065** 0.048** -0.010 0.002 -0.106*** 0.066*** 0.083** 0.023 
 (0.049) (0.031) (0.033) (0.032) (0.023) (0.015) (0.034) 0.026 (0.022) 0.029 (0.039) 
Contributing to the projects         
DiD-FE -0.004 0.004 0.039* -0.016 0.033* -0.010 0.011 -0.039* 0.036** 0.083*** 0.044** 
 (0.031) (0.022) (0.023) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.023) (0.021) 
DiD-ME            
(i) Reweighting -0.005 0.007 0.043* -0.006 0.018 -0.006 0.007 -0.008 0.020 0.068*** 0.036 
 (0.032) (0.022) (0.024) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.024) (0.022) 
(ii) PS matching -0.005 0.021 0.058* -0.017 0.024 -0.022 0.004 -0.003 0.034 0.089*** 0.047** 
 (0.057) (0.038) (0.033) (0.032) (0.023) (0.018) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Source: BLS 2007, ELS 2012, CEMA, UNDP, author’s calculation. 
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Self-assessment on difficulties 
We examine the effect of participation on households’ self-assessment. The results in Table 7A, 
7B and 7C show that treated households are less likely to declare difficulties. Households who 
contribute to infrastructure project have lower probability of having cash shortage or difficulties 
in paying for their children education as well as medical and health care fees. Participation in 
terms of attending meetings also decreases the probability of having water shortage. These self-
assessment results corroborate the idea that household participation in infrastructure projects to 
some extent has positive effect on their welfare and living conditions.  
Household participation measured in our study is limited in the scope of infrastructure projects. 
An argument could rely on the fact that a construction like village’s road should benefit all 
citizens living in that village/commune. However, not everyone could benefit as effectively as the 
others. After controlling for the availability of infrastructure projects and management abilities of 
the local authorities, we show that active participation has some given impacts on household’s 
welfare.  
 
Table 7A Effect of participation on self-assessment on difficulties (Attending projects’ selection meetings) 
 
 Water shortage Cash shortage Education payment Medical payment 
DiD-FE     
Household controls -0.042** 0.010 -0.054*** 0.003 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.018) 
     
Commune and household  
controls 
-0.037* 0.009 -0.046** -0.017 
(0.022) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) 
DiD-ME     
(i) Reweighting -0.051** 0.005 -0.036 -0.016 
 (0.023) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) 
(ii) PS matching -0.052** -0.002 -0.028 0.007 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.029) (0.024) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Source: BLS 2007, ELS 2012, CEMA, UNDP, author’s calculation. 
 
 
Table 7B Effect of participation on self-assessment on difficulties (Expressing opinions) 
 
 Water shortage Cash shortage Education payment Medical payment 
DiD-FE     
Household controls 0.022 0.020 0.004 0.027 
 (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) 
     
Commune and household  
controls 
0.036 0.007 -0.006 0.016 
(0.026) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) 
DiD-ME     
(i) Reweighting 0.028 0.005 0.011 0.020 
 (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) 
(ii) PS matching -0.007 0.022 0.015 0.007 
 (0.038) (0.03) (0.028) (0.037) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Source: BLS 2007, ELS 2012, CEMA, UNDP, author’s calculation. 
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Table 7C Effect of participation on self-assessment on difficulties (Contributing to infrastructure projects) 
 
 Water shortage Cash shortage Education payment Medical payment 
DiD-FE     
Household controls -0.025 -0.034* -0.061*** -0.040** 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) 
     
Commune and household -0.014 -0.039** -0.049** -0.044** 
 (0.023) (0.020) (0.023) (0.021) 
DiD-ME     
(i) Reweighting -0.022 -0.045** -0.040* -0.035 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) 
(ii) PS matching -0.021 -0.053** -0.064* -0.043* 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.034) (0.024) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Source: BLS 2007, ELS 2012, CEMA, UNDP, author’s calculation. 
5.3 Effects of CDD implementation at commune level 
Results from DiD-FE and DiD-ME do not only provide evidence about the positive effect of 
household participation but also suggest the key role of CDD implementation at commune level. 
In this section, we assess directly the relationship between CDD implementation and commune’s 
outcomes. Results from the OLS estimations are presented in Tables 8. It is seen that there is a 
positive association between CDD score and economic welfare outcomes such as income per 
capita and asset index. For instance, a standard deviation in CDD score is associated with a 5.7 
percent increase in income per capita (again for purpose interpretation, CDD score and 
dependent variables are standardized). We did also test the association of CDD score and other 
welfare indicators such as access to clean toilet, primary school and secondary school net 
enrolment, but we did not find any significant relationship. In addition, there is no specific effect 
of P135-II communes, thus, we do not report these results here*.  
It is seen that across all regression, the coefficient of average household head’s education level is 
positive and significant and the coefficient of household size is negative and significant. It 
confirms again the important role of education in economic growth and also implies the 
disadvantage of having a big size family, in particularly regarding school enrolment. Even if 
coefficients of different main ethnic group in a commune vary, commune with Kinh majority 
never perform worse than non-Kinh. Then, the result is confirmed when we use only 2 ethnic 
categories: commune with Kinh majority and commune dominated by other ethnic groups than 
Kinh. In these regressions, we find a significant effect of Kinh majority in commune’s average 
outcome. We also test the effect of CDD score by ethnicity; however, we do not find any 
significant effect. Finally, we do not find any significant effect of the commune’s leader ethnicity 
and education level on the performance of his/her commune. These suggestive evidences of the 
positive association between CDD implementation and communes’ outcome should be 
considered with caution. First, it is possible that local households only remember and choose the 
projects that are close to them and from which they benefit. Thus, the positive effect would 
partly capture the effect of household’s subjective assessment on the project rather than the 
CDD implementation by communes’ officials. Secondly, it is possible that their answer is biased 
                                                          
* These results are available upon request to the author. 
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upwards since they would expect to receive other projects in the future, as discussed in the 
literature (Platteau and Gaspart, 2003). 
 
Table 8 Effect of CDD implementation at commune level 
OLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Income 
per capita 
Income 
per capita 
Asset 
index 
Asset 
index 
Durable 
index 
Durable 
index 
High 
school net 
enrolment 
High 
school net 
enrolment 
CDD score 0.057** 0.055** 0.092*** 0.086*** 0.049 0.045 0.089* 0.085* 
 (0.022)  (0.032) (0.033) (0.030) (0.030) (0.047) (0.047) 
Households’ characteristics         
Age of Head 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.013** 0.014** 0.005 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) 
Head is male -0.029 -0.004 0.041 0.207 -0.728** -0.631* 0.016 0.035 
 (0.314) (0.312) (0.385) (0.392) (0.343) (0.339) (0.652) (0.632) 
Year education of head 0.066** 0.063*** 0.053** 0.057** 0.125*** 0.128*** 0.158*** 0.159*** 
 (0.026) (0.023) (0.027) (0.026) (0.021) (0.019) (0.039) (0.036) 
Household size -0.064* -0.058* 0.062 0.084 -0.110*** -0.099*** -0.214*** -0.201*** 
 (0.034) (0.030) (0.048) (0.051) (0.041) (0.038) (0.057) (0.053) 
Head is farmer 0.265 0.214 -0.089 -0.173 -0.835*** -0.901*** -0.071 -0.124 
 (0.381) (0.374) (0.232) (0.225) (0.223) (0.216) (0.400) (0.385) 
Received agricul. 
Information 0.241 0.232 0.437*** 0.449*** 0.113 0.122 0.181 0.188 
 (0.285) (0.275) (0.144) (0.144) (0.109) (0.109) (0.173) (0.171) 
Number of households -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000* 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Main ethnic group          
Kinh  0.179**  0.135  0.036  0.379** 
  (0.090)  (0.121)  (0.103)  (0.192) 
Tay -0.053  -0.229  -0.068  -0.476*  
 (0.101)  (0.164)  (0.107)  (0.273)  
Thai -0.181  0.221  0.128  -0.256  
 (0.160)  (0.212)  (0.165)  (0.278)  
Muong -0.389***  -0.220  -0.042  -0.276  
 (0.136)  (0.203)  (0.195)  (0.301)  
Nung -0.164  -0.169  -0.180  -0.532*  
 (0.125)  (0.259)  (0.165)  (0.283)  
Hmong -0.139  -0.049  -0.027  -0.284  
 (0.115)  (0.256)  (0.159)  (0.251)  
Dao -0.015  0.126  0.248*  -0.063  
 (0.109)  (0.238)  (0.145)  (0.251)  
Others -0.176  -0.030  -0.012  -0.402*  
 (0.113)  (0.184)  (0.142)  (0.214)  
Land area 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001* -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Agriculture official visit 0.000 0.000 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Craft village -0.047 -0.044 0.096 0.113 0.098 0.114* 0.150 0.166 
 (0.045) (0.043) (0.081) (0.082) (0.065) (0.066) (0.104) (0.103) 
Chairman is Kinh -0.140 -0.138 0.024 0.003 0.050 0.036 -0.166 -0.183 
 (0.145) (0.143) (0.107) (0.107) (0.082) (0.081) (0.144) (0.141) 
Education years of 
chairman 0.020 0.020 -0.022 -0.020 -0.020 -0.019 0.016 0.017 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.029) (0.028) 
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If road constructed 0.007 -0.000 0.065 0.063 -0.055 -0.058 -0.031 -0.034 
 (0.065) (0.064) (0.113) (0.113) (0.085) (0.085) (0.146) (0.146) 
If school constructed -0.158 -0.158 0.015 0.006 0.022 0.016 0.044 0.036 
 (0.192) (0.188) (0.075) (0.075) (0.062) (0.061) (0.099) (0.099) 
If medical center 
constructed 0.100 0.097 0.095 0.104 0.142** 0.142** -0.078 -0.074 
 (0.110) (0.107) (0.077) (0.076) (0.063) (0.062) (0.105) (0.103) 
Other project 
constructed 0.029 0.024 -0.125 -0.120 0.049 0.050 -0.063 -0.058 
 (0.075) (0.071) (0.081) (0.082) (0.067) (0.067) (0.109) (0.109) 
Constant -0.588 -0.649 0.318 -0.041 -0.106 -0.257 -0.153 -0.474 
 (0.853) (0.777) (0.824) (0.768) (0.558) (0.519) (1.021) (0.919) 
Observations 705 705 705 705 705 705 705 705 
R-squared 0.395 0.394 0.728 0.723 0.831 0.827 0.557 0.553 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All equation includes time and district 
fixed effects. 
Source: BLS 2007, ELS 2012, CEMA, UNDP, author’s calculation. 
 
 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we assess the implementation of CDD and community participation approach at 
both household and commune level. Using DiD with Fixed effect and DiD matching estimators, 
we find that participation only has significant effect on economic outcome when household 
participate actively in the project, by expressing their opinions in projects’ selection meetings. 
Initial effect of attending projects’ selection meetings on income growth is captured by the good 
performance of CDD at the commune level. We then explore the potential channels that 
participation might affect participants’ final outcomes through different intermediate outcomes. 
Households, who participate, benefit from improved access to sanitary toilet, mobile phone, 
agricultural information and credit access. In particular, ethnic minorities and poor households 
can obtain higher gain from participation regarding these intermediate outcomes. At the 
commune level, CDD is found to be positively associated with higher economic outcomes and 
high school net enrolment.  
Our findings highlight the benefit of active participation in infrastructure projects and one of the 
possible channels for this effect is through getting better information access. Improvement of 
rural roads has significant impacts on the development of local markets in Vietnam (Mu and van 
de Walle, 2011), thus, active participation in infrastructure project (mainly in road construction 
project) could create more opportunities for the participants. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out 
the bias in assessing participation approach in Vietnam given the local context. Is it actually the 
“quotas” imposed by local officials to meet their targets? Did participation approach actually 
happen in the field? Even if we cannot give a definite answer to those questions, our paper, to 
some extent provide suggestive evidence of positive effect of participation, at both household 
and commune level. Promoting active participation is needed, especially for the poor and ethnic 
minority since our finding shows that, having initially lower endowments, they can benefit more 
from participation. This study is limited in evaluating the impact of participation since we do not 
have data on specific project’s outcomes. Future research could explore more the impact of 
participation at project level in Vietnam as well as investigate on political and institutional issues 
at local level to understand under which condition CDD and participation approach works best.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1  
Definition and calculation method of key response variables 
Household asset index:         where      if household has at least 1 asset i, and 0 otherwise 
List of assets is in section 5 of the household questionnaires. They are production fixed assets 
such as rice milling machines, breeding castle, crop garden, etc. 
Household durable index:         where      if household has at least 1 durable i, and 0 
otherwise. 
List of durables is in section 5 of the household questionnaires. They are household durables 
such as cookers, telephones, bikes, furniture, etc. 
 
 
Appendix 2 
 
Table A2 Intermediate outcomes and self-assessment by three measures of household participation 
 
Attending project selection meetings 
 2007  2012  
Observations Participants Non-Participants p-value Participants Non-Participants p-value 
Electricity 0.763 0.652 0.00 0.856 0.774 0.00 
Piped or well water for drinking 0.478 0.427 0.00 0.439 0.425 0.26 
Sanitary toilet 0.159 0.136 0.05 0.386 0.294 0.00 
Mobile phone 0.069 0.056 0.15 0.732 0.658 0.00 
Motorbike 0.525 0.419 0.00 0.756 0.666 0.00 
Bike 0.440 0.314 0.00 0.277 0.225 0.00 
Access to agricultural 
information 
0.434 0.398 0.02 0.655 0.477 0.00 
Access to credit 0.596 0.526 0.00 0.695 0.584 0.00 
Self-assessment       
Cash shortage 0.682 0.735 0.00 0.796 0.838 0.00 
Water access shortage 0.489 0.562 0.00 0.393 0.499 0.00 
Shortage in education payment 0.412 0.340 0.00 0.520 0.515 0.77 
Shortage in medical payment 0.284 0.298 0.32 0.314 0.327 0.35 
 
Expressing opinions in selection meetings 
 2007  2012  
Observations Participants Non-Participants p-value Participants Non-Participants p-value 
Electricity 0.798 0.687 0.00 0.882 0.798 0.00 
Piped or well water for drinking 0.518 0.436 0.00 0.477 0.420 0.26 
Sanitary toilet 0.185 0.138 0.00 0.451 0.313 0.00 
Mobile phone 0.089 0.056 0.00 0.773 0.676 0.00 
Motorbike 0.593 0.443 0.00 0.798 0.690 0.00 
Bike 0.484 0.354 0.00 0.278 0.245 0.04 
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Access to agricultural 
information 
0.477 0.400 0.02 0.701 0.535 0.00 
Access to credit 0.623 0.547 0.00 0.718 0.621 0.00 
Self-assessment       
Cash shortage 0.647 0.723 0.00 0.763 0.830 0.00 
Water access shortage 0.455 0.541 0.00 0.393 0.458 0.00 
Shortage in education payment 0.414 0.369 0.00 0.538 0.512 0.16 
Shortage in medical payment 0.267 0.297 0.08 0.312 0.323 0.53 
 
Contributing to infrastructure projects 
 2007  2012  
Observations Participants Non-Participants p-value Participants Non-Participants p-value 
Electricity 0.728 0.705 0.14 0.817 0.815 0.90 
Piped or well water for drinking 0.422 0.469 0.01 0.390 0.450 0.00 
Sanitary toilet 0.134 0.155 0.10 0.359 0.334 0.11 
Mobile phone 0.052 0.068 0.07 0.714 0.688 0.08 
Motorbike 0.505 0.464 0.03 0.751 0.696 0.00 
Bike 0.426 0.363 0.00 0.270 0.244 0.06 
Access to agricultural 
information 
0.450 0.402 0.01 0.672 0.523 0.00 
Access to credit 0.582 0.555 0.12 0.698 0.616 0.00 
Self-assessment       
Cash shortage 0.719 0.701 0.27 0.803 0.822 0.12 
Water access shortage 0.497 0.534 0.03 0.406 0.462 0.00 
Shortage in education payment 0.447 0.347 0.00 0.543 0.506 0.02 
Shortage in medical payment 0.309 0.282 0.09 0.313 0.324 0.43 
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Appendix 3 
Table A3 MCA statistics of columns – CDD score 
   overall  Dimension_1 
 Categories mass quality %inert coord   sqcorr  contrib 
       
Meeting is organized No 0.047 0.890 0.197 2.075    0.889    0.201 
 Yes 0.153 0.890 0.060 -0.634   0.889   0.062 
Public bidding No 0.118 0.872 0.115 0.988    0.871    0.115 
 Yes 0.082 0.872 0.164 -1.410   0.871    0.164 
Community supervision board  No 0.064 0.841 0.214 1.803    0.840    0.207 
 Yes 0.136 0.841 0.100 -0.840   0.840    0.096 
       
Household contribution  No 0.179 0.951 0.009 0.228    0.919    0.009 
 Yes 0.021 0.951 0.075 -1.939   0.919    0.079 
Project financial information No 0.191 0.914 0.003 0.123    0.866    0.003 
 Yes 0.009 0.914 0.065 -2.739    0.866   0.064 
Types of project      
Commune's traffic road 1 0.141 0.004 1.850 0.136    0.001 
Village's traffic road 2 0.157 0.056 1.821 -0.788    0.047 
Irrigation 3 0.116 0.005 1.852 -0.271    0.004 
Market 4 0.031 0.020 1.840 1.156    0.020 
School 5 0.155 0.002 1.823 0.034    0.000 
Village art center 6 0.087 0.051 1.755 -0.917    0.036 
Medical center 7 0.079 0.013 1.832 0.551    0.011 
Clean water 8 0.102 0.004 1.814 0.280    0.004 
Electricity line 9 0.062 0.017 1.862 0.753    0.016 
Local Committee office 10 0.070 0.021 1.823 0.790    0.021 
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Chapter 2 
 
Heterogeneity in earnings gaps by gender and 
ethnicity:  
Evidence from Vietnam  
 
Co-authored with François Roubaud 
 
 
Abstract 
We assess earnings gaps in Vietnam by gender and ethnicity, using the Labour Force Survey. The 
earnings gap between ethnic groups is larger than the earnings gap by gender and results are 
heterogeneous amongst different ethnic minority groups. We further employ a multinomial logit 
model to correct for selection and find that the gaps depend significantly on the sector choice. 
Selection is thus playing a key role in the Vietnamese labour market. Looking at the distribution 
of the earnings gaps, we find that the gender earnings gap is smallest at the bottom deciles of 
earnings while the ethnic earnings gap is largest at the bottom deciles of the distribution and is 
reducing with an increase in earnings. Using decomposition technique, we show that differences 
in sectoral allocation play an important role in explaining earnings gaps by ethnicity while gender 
gaps are observed mainly within sector. Lastly, unexplained earnings gaps still remain for both 
ethnic and gender gaps after being corrected for selectivity. 
 
Key words: Vietnam, employment, gender earnings gaps, ethnic earnings gaps, discrimination 
JEL classification: J31, J71, O53 
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1 Introduction 
Over the last 20 years, Vietnam has made outstanding progress in fighting poverty; however, 
economic growth has not affected all groups equally and Vietnam is now facing problems of 
“inclusiveness”, i.e. making sure everybody contributes to and benefits from economic growth. 
One of the key obstacles to achieving inclusive growth in Vietnam is horizontal inequality or 
inequality between groups, in particular between men and women and between ethnic minority 
and majority groups. While Vietnam has achieved a notable reduction in gender inequality in 
aspects such as education, health, and female labour force participation, women are still more 
likely to be in vulnerable employment, as evident from their higher participation in the informal 
sector (World Bank, 2011). Moreover, women are over-represented in State owned enterprises 
and are therefore more strongly affected by the downsizing process of these enterprises. In terms 
of ethnic differences, although Vietnam is less diverse than other countries in the region, the 
country is characterized by a significant level of ethnic diversity. According to the last population 
Census (2009), 86 percent of Vietnam’s population is Kinh (the majority group), while the rest of 
the population belongs to one of the 53 remaining ethnic groups officially registered in the 
country. Historically, ethnic minorities are mainly concentrated in mountainous and remote 
areas. While at the aggregate level, Vietnam records one of the best performances in the world in 
terms of economic growth and poverty reduction during the last two decades, ethnic minorities 
seem to have benefitted less than others to this ongoing process. Ethnic minority groups account 
for an increasing share of the poor in Vietnam. In 2010, the poverty rate was 66 percent among 
ethnic minority, compared to around 13 percent among the Kinh majority.  
 
This diverging trend questions the inclusiveness of the growth pattern and its long term viability 
in terms of social cohesion. Persistent horizontal inequality has the potential to trap individuals 
and whole groups in poverty. Potential causes of the divergent growth pattern could be 
differences in economic characteristics between men and women or ethnic minority and majority 
groups; however, given equal productive endowments and location, discrimination could be 
another explanation. However, there is no absolute distinction between endowments and returns 
to endowments which is widely attributed to discrimination. The literature has shown that past 
discrimination could induce differences in current endowments between groups (van de Walle 
and Gunewardena, 2001). The context of past ethnic discrimination in Vietnam provides an 
interesting case to examine the issue. In this study, we look at the earnings gaps by gender and 
ethnicity in Vietnam and examine whether earnings discrimination exists in the labour market. A 
deeper understanding of the divergent growth pattern is crucial for the design of appropriate 
public policies by the Vietnamese government.  
 
Numerous studies have been undertaken in the past years by independent academics or 
commissioned by the authorities, however, prior research only focuses on wage gaps and 
aggregated ethnic minority classification. This lack of research arises from the absence of suitable 
data on ethnicity and earning categories. Thus, our paper will contribute to the literature by 
addressing the earnings gaps by gender and ethnicity, taking advantage of a relatively 
comprehensive data in terms of ethnicity and earning categories, the Labour Force Survey (LFS), 
conducted by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO) in 2007 with technical assistance 
by one of the authors. 
Our paper is organized as follows: section 2 places our paper within the existing literature, 
section 3 describes the data and provides an overview and main stylized facts concerning gender 
and ethnic groups’ participation in the Vietnamese labour market. Then, section 4 describes our 
methodology to estimate different earnings gaps using strategies to tackle self-selection and 
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endogeneity biases. The results from our econometric estimations and robustness checks are 
discussed in section 5 and 6, respectively; section 7 concludes and draws some perspectives for 
further research. 
 
2 Literature review 
A long-standing literature on the economics of discrimination has indicated that two major 
theoretical models of discrimination in the labour market: taste-based discrimination and 
statistical discrimination. The former is initiated by the work of Becker (1971), whose model sees 
discrimination as a personal prejudice, or (dis-)taste, against a particular group or individual. 
There is no productivity-related attribute in the employment process: workers from a less 
favoured group simply have to accept lower wages or perform at higher productivity compared 
to members of the favoured group as a result of employers’ preferences. In the market, taste-
based discrimination can be seen when a customer is willing to buy a good at a relatively higher 
price at a preferred seller compared to purchasing it at cost from a less-preferred seller. The 
second theoretical model of discrimination is proposed by Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973) who 
focus on statistical discrimination. In their models, due to asymmetric information, employers 
cannot identify workers’ quality. Firms or employers then use easily observable characteristics 
such as ethnicity or gender to predict the expected productivity of applicants. In other words, 
based on stereotypes, employers judge a prospective employee by their own imperfectly 
measured ability and performance, as well as by that of their group (group average).  
Empirically, a rich literature exists demonstrating that unequal treatment of women in the labour 
market it is not a country-specific phenomenon. Nopo et al. (2011) use data for sixty-four 
countries, ranging from developed to developing countries (including Vietnam) to provide a 
global picture of the gender earnings gaps. After controlling for observable socio-demographic 
and job characteristics, Nopo et al.’s estimate for the gender earnings gaps range from 8 percent 
to 48 percent of average women’s earnings. Typically, the unexplained part of the earning gaps is 
larger for people having only part time jobs and low education levels. Literature further focuses 
on the determinants of the gender earnings gaps, such as differences in wage structure and 
women’s labour supply (Blau and Kahn, 2003), sectoral allocation (Tzannatos, 1999; Nordman et 
al., 2011), liberalization policies in the labor market and country-specific institutional frameworks 
(Weichselbaumer et al., 2008; Blau and Kahn, 2003 and Tzannatos, 1999). The unexplained parts 
of the earnings gaps could be due to unobservable factors and/or discrimination against women.  
Studies on the gender earnings gaps in Vietnam have been largely focused on changes in 
women’s participation in the labor force and inequality in wages between male and female 
workers. Gallup (2004) uses two rounds of the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey 
(VHLSS) in 1992-93 and 1997-98 and finds that women in Vietnam earn less than men with the 
same observable characteristics, although the differences in wages decrease between 1993 and 
1998. Using the same data, Liu (2004a, 2004b) provides sectoral decompositions and concludes 
that the gender pay gap is highest in the private sector, followed State-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
and lowest in the public sector. By decomposing the gap, she finds that although the gender pay 
gap has narrowed over time, discrimination against women in the labour market remains high 
and is driven by within rather than between sector differences. Pham and Reilly (2007) explore 
three VHLSS rounds (1993, 1998 and 2002) to investigate the gender wage gap through mean 
and quantile regression methods. They observe that the gender wage gap reduces by half over 
the 1993-2002 period and most of the achievement is observed in the 1993 – 1998 period. The 
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gap is found narrowing at the bottom end and most sizeable at the top end of the conditional 
wage distribution.  
Fewer studies have focused on exploring ethnic earnings gaps, likely due to data limitations, and 
results on ethnic earnings gaps across the world have so far been inconclusive. On the one hand, 
Atal et al. (2009) highlight that in Latin American countries, the ethnic wage gap is larger than 
the gender wage gap and differences in human capital and occupational segregation are key 
explanations for the ethnic wage gaps in the region. Examining the structure of wage gaps by 
ethnicity and gender in Bolivia, Ecuado and Guatemala, Canelas and Salazar (2014) also show 
that women are highly discriminated while ethnic gaps are also large but mainly explained by the 
endowment differences. On the other hand, studies on some African countries reveal low and 
mainly insignificant ethnic earning gaps (Roubaud, 1994; Nordman et al., 2011). In the case of 
Vietnam, Pham and Reilly (2009) use the VHLSS 2002 and find that the ethnic wage gap, is 
substantially smaller than the gap observed by other researchers using household living standard 
measures (e.g. Van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001; Baulch et al., 2007). Using quantile 
regression models, Pham and Reilly (2009) reveal a gap of nearly 21 percentage points at the 
bottom decile compared to only four percentage points at the top deciles. The authors attribute 
the ethnic wage gap is mainly to the differentials in returns to endowments. However, the 
authors do not examine the ethnic wage gap for the self-employed and the gap is considered at 
aggregated level between Kinh and Non-Kinh, failing to take into account the heterogeneous 
composition of the Non-Kinh group. Baulch and Vu (2011) focus on expenditures instead of 
earnings. Using the VHLSS 2004 and 2010 to analyze the factors driving the ethnic expenditure 
gap, they show an increase in the ethnic expenditure gap from 58.1 percent in 2004 to 68.1 
percent in 2010. Differences in endowments only explain a small part of the gap (two fifth of the 
gap in 2004 and nearly half in 2010). Again, differences in returns are the more important 
component, accounting for more than half of the expenditure gap, implying that ethnic 
minorities are likely to be discriminated.  
While considerable evidence exists on the earnings gaps by gender and ethnicity in Vietnam, 
these papers exhibit important shortcomings to necessitate the analysis conducted in this paper. 
First, these papers typically only focus on wage employment or household expenditures and 
thereby fail to account for the self-employment and those working in the agricultural sector. 
However, wage employment only account for a small fraction of the labour force in Vietnam 
(approximately 30 percent in 2007, 2009) and previous results should therefore be interpreted 
with caution.  
Second, previous papers have not fully accounted for selection into wage work. Liu (2004a, b) 
focuses on the differences in returns of a wage-worker in one sector from another. She uses the 
traditional Oaxaca and Neumark decomposition and additionally Appleton et al. (1999)’s method 
to correct for the differences attributed to sectoral choice differentials. However, she does not 
correct for the two types of sample selection bias due to the fact that 1) not everyone is working 
and 2) thee selection into wage employment. Liu (2004a, b) then only uses a multinomial logit 
model (Lee, 1983) in the first step to correct for the selectivity between three different types of 
wage employment, which is insufficient. Pham and Reilly (2007, 2009) employ the same method.  
Third, no previous paper has looked at subgroups of the ethnic minorities, instead considering 
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them one homogenous group. It is possible though, that people from one ethnic minority group 
could earn equal or even higher incomes than the majority, which we could not realize when the 
whole 53 ethnic minority groups are aggregated. 
In Vietnam, ethnic minorities are mostly located in rural and remote areas. Given their remote 
location, ethnic minorities are mostly employed in subsistence farming or in self-employed 
activities. Focusing on the wage gap without properly accounting for selection into wage 
employment would thus heavily underestimate the real gap between the ethnic majority and 
minority. Similarly, as women tend to be overrepresented in public sector (Liu, 2004b) which 
traditionally pays lower wages, focusing only on wage gaps would underestimate the gender wage 
gap.  
This study examines the gender and ethnic earnings gaps across different employment sectors, 
by first, taking into account self-employed workers and farmers; second, properly correcting for 
selection bias; and third, providing disaggregated estimates for the 53 different ethnic minority 
groups. We will start with analyzing different earnings gaps: the gender and ethnic earnings gaps, 
non-farm earnings gaps, and wage gaps, and then decomposing these gaps in different 
employment sectors while correcting for selection bias. We will look at ethnic groups both as a 
minority aggregation and disaggregating the group into more detailed ethnic minority groups.  
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3 Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1 The data and ethnic group’s aggregation  
Our study is based on the Vietnam Labour Force Survey 2007 (LFS2007) conducted by the GSO 
in August 2007. The LFS2007 remains the best source of data to address the ethnic earnings gap 
in Vietnam and more broadly issues related to ethnic groups in the labour market. Previously 
conducted every year by the Ministry of Labour Invalids and Social Affairs (MoLISA), the 
Vietnam LFS has been transferred to the GSO in 2007. Taking advantage of this institutional 
transfer, the survey has been integrally revamped (sample design and questionnaire) with the 
technical support of the authors. The number of questions has been increased from around 25 to 
50, allowing for an enlarged coverage of labour market indicators and data quality has been 
substantially improved (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2007; GSO, 2008).  
Three key points of the LFS upgrading makes this survey perfectly suited for this study. First, the 
scope of survey has been enlarged. Initially designed to capture only official unemployment, the 
LFS2007 embraces many other facets of the labour market. In particular, it captures the informal 
sector. In Vietnam, the informal sector is defined as all private unincorporated enterprises that 
produce at least some of their goods and services for sale or barter, are not registered (do not 
have a statistics license which is compulsory for all kinds of businesses) or do not keep book 
accounts. In this paper, we distinguish between four labour market segments: public sector, 
formal private sector, informal sector, and agriculture. It is noted that this sector classification is 
totally based on institutional sector, without taking into account employment status, such as 
wage worker or self-employed. Apart from the formal/informal sector divide, the survey 
dedicated special care to obtain reliable measures of variables for which the informality status 
may lead to sampling and measurement errors. In particular, the questionnaire includes a detailed 
set of questions to capture information on activity status, the classical procedures leading to the 
under-declaration of informal sector workers’ participation for those with the weakest labour 
market attachment.    
Second, the LFS2007 captures a wide range of labour earnings. We compute the labour income 
associated with each remunerated job (in main and secondary occupation). For wage workers, 
the survey captures their current monthly wage, while for self-employed workers earnings 
correspond to the disposable income (before taxation). Measuring non-wage workers’ earnings is 
all complicated by the fact that employees only represent a small fraction of the labor force (see 
below). The LFS2007 is the only survey in Vietnam to gather information on self-employed 
earnings, an issue which has not been considered in later rounds of Vietnamese LFS. Hourly 
earnings used in the econometric analysis are constructed using the total number of hours 
worked per month. In order to account for differences in prices levels by location, we use the 
deflators drawn from the VHLSS2006, to compute earnings in constant 2006 Vietnam Dongs. 
16 sets of prices are distinguished, for each domain of inference of the VHLSS2006: the 8 
official regions by area (urban/rural). Using the LFS2007 thus allows us to investigate the 
earnings gaps in the informal sector and self-employed whereas previous analyses had to be 
confined to wage workers only. 
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Third, the LFS2007 is a unique dataset to investigate labour market issues related to ethnicity in 
two aspects: individual ethnic affiliation and sample size. Vietnam’s official classification of 
ethnic minorities considers 54 different ethnic groups and LFS2007 is the only survey to allow 
individuals to sort themselves into any of the 54 different groups. . More recent rounds of the 
LFS do not contain disaggregated information on ethnic groups but instead only allow a 
disaggregation into the six major ethnic minority groups (Tày, Thái, Muong, Kho-me, Nung, 
Hmông) with remaining individuals being classified as ‘others’.  
According to the LFS2007 (Table 1), 86 percent of the population is ethnically Kinh (the 
majority group) and the remaining 14 percent of the population belongs to ethnic minorities, 
representing 11.2 million individuals. Among the 53 minority ethnic groups, the distribution is 
highly skewed. Some groups account for more than one million individuals (Thái, Tày, Muong, 
Kho-me), others account for almost one million (Nùng, Hoa), smaller ones represent only a few 
thousands (Pu Peo, Bo Y, Co Lao, etc.) or even a few hundred people (Brâu, Si La). Of course, 
as in other countries, the official ethnic classification is partly subjective. Historical and 
anthropological works have shown the determination of ethnic groups is a construct and 
political process in Vietnam (McElwee, 2004). Ethnicity is a social construct and ethnic identity 
is embedded in a political process elaborated in the long run. Notwithstanding these 
reservations, the paper will use the classification obtained in the LFS2007 for the following 
reasons. First, this classification is widely accepted by the population itself: based on self-
declaration, non-response concerns less than 15 observations. Second, many economic and 
social policies have been designed according to this ethnic classification in Vietnam, producing 
effects that could only be assessed when sticking to the same classification.  
Table 1: Sample size by ethnic groups in the LFS2007 
 Population Structure 
 Sample size Number (1,000) Total Without Kinh 
Kinh  561,570 72,585 85.9% - 
Non Kinh 99,710 11,951 14.1% - 
Hoa  7,338 939 1.1% 7.9% 
Thái 13,611 1,989 2.4% 16.6% 
Tày 22,429 1,745 2.1% 14.6% 
Muong 6,722 1,325 1.6% 11.1% 
Kho-me 6,944 1,095 1.3% 9.2% 
Nùng 9,276 946 1.1% 7.9% 
Hmông  8,490 831 1.0% 7.0% 
Dao 4,986 510 0.6% 4.3% 
Ê Đê 2,066 363 0.4% 3.0% 
Gia-rai 2,282 326 0.4% 2.7% 
Ba na 1,909 181 0.2% 1.5% 
Xo-dang 2,228 184 0.2% 1.5% 
Ra-glai 1,551 170 0.2% 1.4% 
Co-ho 977 159 0.2% 1.3% 
Chăm  1,126 145 0.2% 1.2% 
Giáy 1,323 124 0.1% 1.0% 
Other Northern minorities 2,342 365 0.4% 3.1% 
Other Central Highland 3,465 412 0.5% 3.4% 
Others 645 142 0.2% 1.2% 
Total 666,280 84,536 100% 100% 
Source: LFS2007, GSO; authors’ calculations. 
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Ethnic identification in the LFS2007 is recorded at the individual level. Each member of the 
household is supposed to declare her own ethnic affiliation, whereas previous surveys only 
collected data for the head of household, relying on the implicit hypothesis that all households 
are endogamous. This seems to be an erroneous assumption as Census data shows high levels of 
intermarriage for some ethnic groups. Even though within the total population only 2 percent of 
couples belong to different ethnic groups, among ethnic minorities, 15 percent are exogamous 
couples (1 percent for the Kinh). The propensity to exogamy varies greatly with the ethnic 
groups: from only a few percent for the Thái, the Muong, the Gia Rai, the Co-ho, the Chăm, 
etc., to much higher proportions among the Tày (22 percent), the Hmông (25 percent), the Kho-
me (44 percent), and even 100 percent for the Ê Đê in our dataset. As the aim of this paper is to 
look at the individual earnings gap by ethnicity, reliable and detailed data on ethnicity is crucial.  
The final reason for using the LFS2007 concerns its sample size. With 173,000 sampled 
households and 661,000 persons (100,000 individuals belonging to ethnic minorities, out of 
which 55,000 persons have a job), the LFS2007 provides a much higher potential level for ethnic 
groups disaggregation, properly reflecting ethnic heterogeneity in Vietnam. Most of the previous 
quantitative works on ethnic issues in Vietnam have focused on the separation between Kinh 
and Non-Kinh (Van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001; Baulch et al., 2004). More recent papers 
have considered 8 ethnic groups: Kinh & Hoa, Kho-me & Chăm, Thái, Tày, Muong and Nùng, 
Other Northern minorities, Central Highland minorities, Others (Baulch et al., 2007, 2008, and 
20106). Due to the large sample size of the LFS2007, we can increase the number of ethnic 
categories while retaining statistical significance, which is crucial as differences between ethnic 
minority groups may be quite substantial, and in some cases, probably higher than differences 
observed between aggregate categories. In this paper, we group ethnic minorities according to 
sample size. With more than 1,000 observations, 17 ethnic groups form their own groups, while 
the remaining ethnic minorities with less than 1,000 observation in the sample, are grouped 
together into 3 groups aggregated by main location (Other Northern minorities, Other Central 
Highland, Others). In total, our typology distinguishes 20 different ethnic groups. More broadly 
and apart from ethnic disaggregation, thanks to its sample size, the LFS2007 provides more 
precise estimates for all indicators, at a higher level of inference (provincial vs. regional).  
3.2 Gender and Ethnic minorities in the labor market: a descriptive analysis   
The main labour market indicators computed from the LFS2007 offer evidences of strong 
differences between Kinh and ethnic minorities regarding and some difference between males 
and females (Table 2). First, the share of the working age population (equal or over 15 years old) 
is higher for women than men (76 percent vs. 73 percent), but the employment rate is higher for 
men by 8 percent. Women are more likely to have a second job than men, which reflects the 
fact that women might choose to have a temporary job in order to have time for taking care of 
their children and family. In terms of ethnicity, the working age population rate is significantly 
higher for Kinh than non-Kinh (76 percent vs. 69 percent), reflecting higher fertility and 
mortality rates (Friedman et al., 2001), a larger share of children, and a higher dependency ratio 
among ethnic minorities. Hoa are the only ethnic group to have a larger share of working age 
                                                          
1 These papers use the VHLSSs, whose sample size is limited to around 9,000 households.   
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adults than Kinh.7 Conversely, the activity rate is on average almost 10 percentage points higher 
for ethnic minorities (82 percent vs. 71 percent), due to lower school attendance (for the young 
generation) and a higher rate of households’ labour force mobilization in primary sectors. 
Consistently, the rate of unemployment is lower for ethnic minorities (1 percent vs. 2 percent), 
providing evidence for the hypothesis of luxury unemployment on Vietnamese labour market 
stressed in other studies (Razafindrakoto et al., 2011), while the rate of multi-activity (workers 
holding a second job) is higher among non-Kinh than Kinh (23 percent vs. 17 percent), 
reflecting a higher attachment of ethnic minorities to farming activities. Surprisingly, the time 
related underemployment rate8 in the main job does not differ between majority and minorities 
(around 11 percent for both), in spite of fewer working hours for the latter. This feature 
probably results from a lower propensity to declare wanting more jobs within ethnic minorities, 
because of scarce labor market opportunities. Another explanation is that ethnic minorities are 
likely to have more jobs, which means they might want to work more hours in the main job but 
cannot be able to.  
Table 2: Structure of the labor force by gender and ethnicity in 2007 
 
 Working age 
population 
Employment 
rate 
Unemployment 
rate 
Under- 
employment 
rate 
Second job 
 
By gender      
Males 72.9 77.13 2.02 11 17.2 
Females 76.1 69.31 1.9 10.7 19.2 
By ethnicity      
Kinh 75.5 71.2 2.1 10.9 17.4 
Non-Kinh 68.8 82.1 0.9 10.5 23.1 
Hoa  79.8 62.0 4.4 5.6 3.1 
Thái 69.4 86.7 0.4 11.6 25.0 
Tày 74.5 80.3 1.0 9.8 32.3 
Muong 73.2 84.2 0.5 10.7 14.5 
Kho-me 72.2 76.2 1.7 16.9 16.7 
Nùng 68.8 85.2 0.5 9.3 35.9 
Hmông  55.0 92.3 0.1 10.7 35.8 
Dao 64.6 88.0 0.3 3.0 28.5 
Ê Đê 63.9 79.7 0.5 10.9 14.2 
Gia-rai 59.1 90.8 0.4 10.5 21.6 
Ba na 59.6 90.9 0.1 10.6 15.9 
Xo-dang 56.0 91.2 0.2 26.8 37.3 
Ra-glai 56.9 88.1 0.1 6.4 20.9 
Co-ho 60.6 84.6 0.2 12.1 8.9 
Chăm  64.6 81.5 1.4 9.0 7.9 
Giáy 63.3 86.3 0.2 0.2 13.5 
Other Northern  65.7 86.5 0.8 11.1 24.0 
Other Central H. 64.0 79.1 0.8 12.3 22.0 
Others 63.5 87.7 0.0 1.6 7.7 
Total 74.6 73.0 2.0 10.8 18.2 
Source: LFS2007, GSO; authors’ calculations. 
 
                                                          
2 The specificity of the Hoa group (ethnic Chinese), which we will encounter for almost all labor market indicators, 
leads to some authors preferring to consider Kinh and Hoa together and to differentiate between them and other 
ethnic groups. In this paper, we choose to identify Hoa separately, since Hoa are oftentimes better off than the rest 
of the population (including Kinh). As a result, if we were to consider Hoa and Kinh as one group, results for Kinh 
would be systematically overstated.  
8 Time related underemployment is the ratio of the occupied population working less than 35 hours per reference 
week and wanting to work additional hours. 
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For this set of indicators, the situation of Kinhs contrasts sharply with the ethnic minority 
groups (except for Hoa). We can perceive further differences among ethnic minority groups. 
Hmông have the lowest working age population share, 55 percent, but a rate of activity as high 
as 92 percent. The Hoa community, occupying the other end of the minorities’ ladder, presents 
exactly the opposite, with the highest rates of working age population and unemployment (80 
percent and 4 percent respectively), the lowest rates of employment (62 percent), and one of the 
lowest underemployment rate (6 percent).  
 
Table 3: Demographic characteristics of the labor force by gender and ethnicity in 2007 
 
 Rural area 
(%) 
Age 
Year of 
schooling 
Married 
(%) 
Household 
size 
By gender      
Males 74.8 37.8 8.4 75.4 4.6 
Females 75.4 38.3 7.8 73.6 4.5 
By ethnicity      
Kinh 72.6 38.5 8.5 74.8 4.4 
Non-Kinh 89.5 35.1 5.8 72.5 5.3 
Hoa  21.9 38.5 7.5 57.0 4.4 
Thái 97.0 34.3 5.8 75.8 5.3 
Tày 91.3 35.7 8.1 74.3 5.5 
Muong 97.3 35.6 8.0 72.8 4.6 
Kho-me 88.5 36.5 4.1 68.0 4.9 
Nùng 93.5 35.0 6.2 74.9 4.8 
Hmông  98.6 32.9 2.0 77.5 5.0 
Dao 97.3 33.0 3.8 79.0 6.6 
Ê Đê 86.8 34.7 3.9 70.1 5.7 
Gia-rai 94.1 34.7 3.6 69.6 6.1 
Ba na 93.5 33.9 3.2 73.6 5.8 
Xo-dang 96.6 34.9 4.1 69.9 5.5 
Ra-glai 96.3 33.0 2.5 67.5 5.6 
Co-ho 99.6 33.8 4.1 69.9 6.1 
Chăm  89.5 35.0 4.5 72.5 6.4 
Giáy 95.3 32.5 4.8 72.2 5.4 
Other Northern  96.1 33.8 5.8 74.9 5.3 
Other Central H.  93.4 34.6 4.1 70.7 5.6 
Others 95.8 35.3 6.3 73.3 5.5 
Total 75.1 38.0 8.1 74.5 4.5 
Source: LFS2007, GSO; authors’ calculations. 
 
Looking at demographic characteristics of the labour force by gender and ethnic groups (Table 
3), we can seen that women and men are living in urban and rural areas at similar rates and are 
on average the same age. However, women in the labour force have fewer years of schooling 
than men (7.8 vs. 7.4) and proportion of married women is also lower. Ethnic minorities are 
consistently more often located in rural areas than Kinh (90 percent vs. 73 percent), except for 
Hoa who are 78 percent urban. In fact, for most of the ethnic groups, the proportion of rural 
labour force participation exceeds 95 percent, except for Gia-rai (94 percent), Nùng and Other 
Central Highland minorities (93 percent), Tay (92 percent), Kho-me and Chăm (89 percent), 
and Ê Đê (87 percent). Ethnic minorities are younger (35 years old on average vs. 39 for the 
Kinh), and less educated than the majority. Kinh labour force has on average 8.5 years of 
schooling, while ethnic minorities have only 5.8 years. A fourth of Kinh labour force has 
completed higher secondary education compared to only a tenth for ethnic minorities, with 8 
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ethnic groups having less than 5 percent of their labour force with completed secondary 
schooling. Again, Hmông are in the worst situation (with 2 years of schooling on average and 1 
percent of the labour force attended tertiary education). Tày, Muong and to a lesser extent, Hoa 
perform relatively well in this respect (8.1, 8.0 and 7.5 years of schooling each).   
The structure of jobs by institutional sectors gives further insights to job allocation between 
men and women and among ethnic groups (Table 4). Men are more prevalent in the public 
and formal sectors while there is no difference between the share of men and women 
employed in the informal sector. Within the formal sector, women are engaged more than 
men in foreign enterprises but less in domestic enterprises and formal household 
business. Agriculture is the only sector where women are involved more than men. In 
terms of ethnicity, the massive participation of ethnic minorities in agricultural activities leads 
to a systematic underrepresentation in other institutional sectors. Given their 
underrepresentation in the private sector, ethnic minorities are even more underrepresented in 
the nonfarm private sector than in the public sector due to an active inclusion policy in the 
latter. Still, the share of ethnic minorities in public jobs is less than half the share for 
Kinh’s  (5 percent vs. 12 percent). Within the private sector, ethnic minorities are engaged in 
formal household business (3 percent vs. 9 percent for Kinh), followed by the informal 
sector9 (7 percent vs. 26 percent) and domestic enterprises (2 percent vs. 6 percent). In this 
respect, foreign enterprises perform the worst: the relative chance for Kinh to get a job in 
foreign enterprises is more than five times higher than for ethnic minorities (2.2 percent vs. 
0.4 percent), and twelve out of our nineteen ethnic groups have no representation in this 
sector. Foreign enterprises have been the fastest growing sector in the last decade and the 
sector which provides the best jobs in terms of labour conditions. The exclusion of ethnic 
minorities from foreign enterprises is thereby problematic for inclusive growth. It can 
probably be explained by the concentration of FDI to urban centers, (85 percent in Hanoi 
and Ho Chi Minh City surroundings; ADB, 2004; Cling et al., 2009), and limited skills 
availability among ethnic minorities (foreign enterprises tend to recruit mainly semi-skilled 
workers) rather than to explicit discrimination. Going into more details, evidence suggests 
that some ethnic groups seem to be keener to work in specific institutional sectors. This 
seems to be the case for Hoa who are more likely to be engaged in formal household 
businesses (30 percent of the labour force), compared to 8 percent of Kinh and 3 percent of 
other non-Kinh. Kho-me and Chăm seem to prefer the informal sector, while Central 
Highland minorities are globally excluded from the formal private sector. Tày (9 percent) 
and Kinh (12 percent) are best integrated into the public sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 According to GSO, the informal sector comprises all non-registered (no business license), non-farm household 
businesses. Formal household businesses refer to registered businesses. 
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Table 4: Main job structure by institutional sectors, gender and ethnicity 
 
 
Public 
sector 
Formal sector 
Informal 
sector 
Agriculture 
 
Foreign 
enterprise 
Domestic 
Enterprise 
 
Formal 
HBs 
By gender       
Males 11.2 1.5 6.9 8.2 23.8 48.4 
Females 9.9 2.5 4.7 7.4 23.3 52.2 
By ethnicity       
Kinh 11.5 2.3 6.4 8.5 26.4 44.6 
Non-Kinh 4.7 0.4 1.7 3.3 6.5 83.5 
Hoa  6.8 3.4 12.3 30.1 31.2 15.8 
Thái 4.11 0.0 0.8 0.7 2.4 92.0 
Tày 8.9 0.1 1.4 2.1 4.8 82.7 
Muong 5.0 0.2 0.5 1.3 4.7 88.1 
Kho-me 3.5 0.6 2.7 4.0 18.3 70.9 
Nùng 4.8 0.2 0.6 1.4 3.8 89.2 
Hmông  0.9 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 98.5 
Dao 2.2 0.0 0.1 0.3 2.1 95.2 
Ê Đê 2.4 0.0 0.7 1.0 1.2 94.8 
Gia-rai 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 96.3 
Ba na 1.8 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.8 96.7 
Xo-dang 1.9 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 97.3 
Ra-glai 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 2.7 95.8 
Co-ho 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.9 97.2 
Chăm  3.9 0.1 2.7 0.3 9.3 83.8 
Giáy 3.0 0.0 1.1 0.4 3.1 92.3 
Other Northern  4.3 0.0 0.6 1.4 7.6 85.9 
Other Central H. 5.7 0.0 0.2 0.6 1.6 91.9 
Others 3.9 0.0 0.4 1.2 2.5 92.1 
Total 10.5 2.0 5.7 7.7 23.5 50.3 
Source: LFS2007, GSO; authors’ calculations. 
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4 Empirical strategy 
4.1 Earnings determinations 
Mincer earning equations 
In this paper, we estimate classical Mincerian earnings equations with different specifications to 
address potential self-selection and endogeneity biases and conduct several robustness checks of 
the results. We start from our simplest specification which is as follows: 
iii
xw  ln     (1) 
Where      is the natural logarithm of the observed hourly real earnings for individual i,    is a 
vector of observed characteristics for individual i, β is a vector of coefficients and    is a 
disturbance term with an expected value of zero. We calculate real hourly earnings, our 
dependent variable, to account for differences in consumer price levels by location using the 
deflators drawn from the VHLSS2006. The deflators distinguish between 16 different domains, 
namely the 8 official regions subdivided by area (urban/rural). We use a dummy for gender and 
dummies for ethnicity. Independent variables include productivity-related factors such as 
education and market experiences, with squared of those variables. Due to the data’s nature, we 
do not have information about individual’s actual experience but merely potential experience 
which is measured by the time that the individuals have spent in the labor force (calculated as 
individual’s age minus years of education and minus six), without taking into account the 
interrupted experiences. Thus, the first regression is run on a basic Mincerian equation, including 
independent variables of marital status, years of schooling and potential experiences. Our second 
regression includes province fixed effects (64 provinces), to partially tackle endogeneity concerns 
and capture non-price local effects. In the third regression, we keep the province fixed effects 
and add independent variables of the institutional sector and the urban/rural divide. In terms of 
ethnic divide, models are estimated at the usual dichotomous level (majority vs. minorities or 
Kinh vs. Non-Kinh in our case) and then by using the full disaggregation of ethnic minorities 
(same specifications with 20 ethnic groups). 
Our first regressions follow traditional studies on earning gaps in using a simple OLS regression 
for the earnings estimation, considering only actively occupied people. However, if a significant 
part of the population is not working, endogenous sample selection might be an issue if 
unobservable factors in the earnings equation and in the participation equation are correlated. An 
additional selection problem arises from the decision of workers to participate in different 
sectors, which are subject to different standards of pay. Indeed, besides the fact that earnings are 
only observed for people who work, people who choose to engage in the public sector have 
different characteristics than people who engage in the formal, informal, or agricultural sector, 
and those characteristics could affect their earnings gaps. Therefore, we address these two 
potential selection biases by using a multinomial selection model presented in Bourguignon et al. 
(2007, hereafter BFG), relying on a generalized version of the Dubin-McFadden correction 10.  
 
                                                          
10
 See Bourgignon et al. (2007) for a survey of the available methods to obtain consistent estimates of   and   with two-step procedure. 
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Multinomial logit model 
The multinomial selection model is given as:               (2)                (3) 
Where s=1, 2, 3, 4, 5, reflecting the 5 alternatives from which each individual can choose: i) 
public sector employment; ii) formal sector employment; iii) informal sector employment; iv) 
agricultural sector employment and v) not working11. The vector Z represents the maximum set 
of explanatory variables for all alternatives and the vector X contains all determinants of 
earnings;    is the earning corresponding to each employment choice presented by     - a 
discrete-choice variable. As mentioned above, the estimation of    in OLS regression will be 
inconsistent if the unobservable characteristics of individuals affect both their earning and choice 
of employment, thus if error terms    and    are correlated. Following the BFG methodology, 
we will estimate the earnings equation while including correction terms for sectoral choice. The 
correction model is based on the assumption of a linear association between    and    (               The earnings equation corrected for potential bias is formed as follows:                                              (4) 
Where    is the probability that a category s is chosen,    is a residual that is mean-independent 
of the regressors and      =                    The number of bias correction terms is 
equal to the number of alternatives in the multinomial logit (thus 5 in our case).  
In practice, we estimate the model in two stages. In the first stage, a multinomial logit model is 
estimated in which the predicted probabilities of each individual’s participation in sector s are 
used to calculate the correction terms. To identify sectoral participation, we need an instrument 
which affects only the propensity to work and sectoral choices but is not correlated with the 
error term. The literature has suggested using household structure or demographic variables as 
exogenous determinants of sector choices. In line with the previous studies (Appleton et al., 
1999; De Brauw and Rozelle, 2008; Pham and Reilly, 2007), we use relationship to the household 
head, household size and the dependency ratio (number of non-working age individuals divided 
by the total number of individuals in the household) as instruments. In the second stage, we then 
use these predicted correction terms to control for sectoral selection in the earnings equations. 
Having obtained credible estimates for the predictors of earnings, we now focus on the 
decomposition of the earnings gaps.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Hausman-test was conducted to ensure the validity of Independence of Irrelevant Alternative (IIA) 
assumption 
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4.2 Earnings gaps decomposition 
We begin with our decompositions with Oaxaca and Blinder decompositions. We estimate the 
earnings equations (equation 1) separately for Kinh and non-Kinh/ethnic minorities (aggregated 
together) and then use the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition techniques to identify the sources of 
the ethnic earning gaps. In an analogous approach, we can decompose the gender earnings gaps 
by replacing Kinh with men and non-Kinh with women. The decomposition is then given by:                                                   (5) 
where    and    are the average earnings for Kinh (or men) and ethnic minorities (or women), 
respectively;     and     are vectors of average observed characteristics for Kinh (or men) and 
minorities (or women);    and    are the estimated coefficients. The first term on the right side 
of the equation measures the earnings gap due to characteristics (the "explained" part). The 
second one corresponds to differences in returns between the two groups, which may come 
from unobservable characteristics and/or discrimination (the "unexplained" part or residual). 
Oaxaca and Blinder decompositions have recently become contended as the method requires us 
to determine a priori which earnings structure is non discriminatory, resulting in the so-called 
index problem. If we choose the coefficients of the high-earning groups (ethnic majority or 
males) as non-discriminatory, the low-earning groups (ethnic minority or females) are assumed to 
be underpaid or facing discriminated. Meanwhile, if the coefficients of the low-earning group are 
considered as the non-discriminatory benchmark, the other groups are supposed to receive 
patronage.  
We use Neumark’s (1988) approach to obtain a non-discriminatory coefficient. Following 
Neumark’s method, we obtain   , a non-discriminatory coefficient, by estimating the pooled 
sample using the weighted average of the earnings structure of the high earning and low earning 
groups.                                                         ]     (6) 
 
The first term on the right-hand side is the earnings gap attributable to differences in 
characteristics while the second and the third terms represent the earning differential between 
the actual and pooled returns to characteristics for the two groups. While Neumark’s approach 
overcomes the index problem, it is not able to take into account selection problems stemming 
from sectoral choices of the high earning group and low earning. Appleton et al. (1999) then 
proposes a full decomposition method which takes into account differences in sectoral choice 
while following Neumark’s approach to avoid the index problem. The full decomposition starts 
with the idea of considering the ethnic majority’s (or male) and minority’s (or female) earnings as 
the sum of sectoral earnings weighted by the proportion of workers of each group in each sector. 
Let      and      be the sample proportion of Kinh (male) and non-Kinh (female) participating in 
each sector s. Thus, their earnings then can be expressed as: 
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Appleton et al. (1999)’s full decomposition can be written as follows:                                                                            (7) 
Equation 7 builds on the necessary assumption that the sectoral structure would prevail even in 
the absence of ethnic (or gender) earning differences that could impact sectoral choice. Under 
this assumption,     then represents the proportion of individuals in each sector s. The first term 
(                     ) can be decomposed using the Neumark decomposition. The second and 
third terms can also be decomposed further to separate the differences arising from differences 
in observable characteristics and differences attributed to the returns to those characteristics. We 
could derive the average probability for Kinh (male) and non-Kinh (female) employees in 
different sectors by estimating a multinominal logit equation separately for Kinh (male) and non-
Kinh (female):      and     . The multinomial logit equation in this section includes four 
modalities of sectors (s): i) public sector; ii) formal sector; iii) informal sector and iv) agricultural 
sector. After taking into account selectivity of each group in each sector, the equation (7) can be 
expanded into seven terms:                                                                                                                                                                                       
(8)                                     
The first three terms represent Neumark’s decomposition of within sector earnings gaps. The 
fourth and fifth terms capture the earning differences arising from the differences in 
characteristics determining the differences in their sectoral choice structure. The last two terms 
measure the earning differences due to the deviations between predicted and actual sectoral 
compositions of the ethnic majority (men) and ethnic minority (women) not accounted for by 
differences in characteristics. 
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5 Results 
5.1 Earnings determinants 
5.1.1 Mincer equation estimation  
Table 5 presents the estimates of the pooled OLS regression following equation (1). The 
goodness of fit of the model is similar to what is usually obtained in the literature, increasing 
from model 1 to model 3 (adjusted R2 improving from 0.14 to 0.26). Gender and human capital 
are highly significant: women suffer a penalty between -15 percent and -17 percent compared to 
their male counterparts, depending on the specifications. Returns to education are convex as in 
many other studies in developing countries (Normand et al., 2011). Returns to potential 
experience are concave but increasing with the professional cycle as the maximum is achieved 
after more than 30 years of experience. The institutional sectors are ordered according to our 
expectations: from agriculture – the lowest rewarding sector, followed by the informal sector, the 
formal private sector and at the top of the payment ladder, the public sector and foreign 
enterprises. Finally, location matters: province fixed effect are at play, suggesting that local labour 
markets are not fully integrated.  
Regarding ethnicity, in the first sets of models, which consider only the binary partition between 
Kinh and non-Kinh, the coefficient is highly significant, with non-Kinh receiving a wage penalty 
between -35 percent (model 1) and -22 percent (model 3) compared to Kinh. At this stage, two 
provisional conclusions can be drawn: first, it seems that in Vietnam, the ethnic earnings gap 
matters more than the gender gap; second, there is a strong presumption that ethnic minorities 
are suffering from "poor" location (concentration in remote areas) and even more importantly, 
job segregation. Moving from model 1, our simplest model, to model 3 which takes into account 
institutional sectors and location reduces the ethnic earnings gap by 10 percentage points (from -
32 percent to -22 percent).  
Due to the importance of the ethnic earnings gap we next disaggregate the non-Kinh category 
into different ethnic groups to better reflect ethnic diversity. In general, Kinh earn more than 
their fellow citizens as 42 of the 57 estimated earnings coefficients (for 19 different ethnic groups 
and 3 specifications) are significantly negative. In the simple Mincerian equation (model 1), only 
Hoa, Kho-me and Ê Đê have higher earnings, while Ba Na and Chăm gain as much as Kinh do. 
In the full model (model 3), Ê Đê, Ba Na, Kho-me and the residual Other minorities are in line 
with Kinh, Co-ho and Chăm are the only minority to gain more. The range coefficients is 
extremely heterogeneous, suggesting vast differences between ethnic groups. Consistent with 
previous findings, Hmông are the most disadvantaged group. These results confirm the need to 
differentiate between the different ethnic minorities for analytical and policy purposes.        
 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
Table 5: Labor earnings models 
(Log of hourly income; OLS) 
  
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 Coef. SE  Coef. SE  Coef. SE 
Female -0.189*** 0.004  -0.163*** 0.004  -0.173*** 0.004 
Married 0.112*** 0.005  0.145*** 0.005  0.186*** 0.005 
Years of schooling -0.082*** 0.002  -0.051*** 0.002  -0.053*** 0.002 
(Years of schooling)2 0.008*** 0.000  0.007*** 0.000  0.005*** 0.000 
Potential experience 0.043*** 0.000  0.039*** 0.000  0.041*** 0.000 
(Potential experience)2 -0.001*** 0.000  -0.001*** 0.000  -0.001*** 0.000 
Institutional sector          
Foreign enterprise       0.033** 0.014 
Domestic enterprise       -0.055*** 0.009 
Non-farm formal HB       -0.222*** 0.007 
Informal sector       -0.395*** 0.007 
Agriculture       -0.825*** 0.007 
Rural       0.035*** 0.004 
Intercept 0.854*** 0.011  0.625*** 0.017  1.103*** 0.018 
Hoa  0.135*** 0.019  0.001*** 0.019  -0.066*** 0.018 
Thái -0.389*** 0.016  -0.494*** 0.018  -0.299*** 0.018 
Tày -0.507*** 0.011  -0.425*** 0.014  -0.268*** 0.013 
Muong -0.557*** 0.019  -0.520*** 0.022  -0.315*** 0.021 
Kho-me 0.078*** 0.019  -0.051*** 0.019  0.014 0.019 
Nùng -0.598*** 0.017  -0.599*** 0.019  -0.427*** 0.019 
Hmông  -1.430*** 0.023  -1.163*** 0.024  -0.957*** 0.023 
Dao -0.938*** 0.024  -0.822*** 0.024  -0.614*** 0.024 
Ê Đê 0.265*** 0.038  -0.134*** 0.039  -0.009 0.038 
Gia-rai -0.212*** 0.038  -0.484*** 0.037  -0.281*** 0.036 
Ba na 0.025 0.036  -0.228*** 0.039  -0.048 0.038 
Xo-dang -0.476*** 0.037  -0.652*** 0.037  -0.475*** 0.036 
Ra-glai -0.792*** 0.045  -0.706*** 0.044  -0.507*** 0.043 
Co-ho 0.267*** 0.049  0.142*** 0.048  0.281*** 0.046 
Chăm  0.001 0.049  -0.036 0.048  0.102** 0.046 
Giáy -0.685*** 0.044  -0.641*** 0.043  -0.454*** 0.042 
Other Northern  -0.736*** 0.033  -0.595*** 0.032  -0.449*** 0.031 
Other Central Highland -0.593*** 0.028  -0.668*** 0.027  -0.520*** 0.027 
Others -0.204*** 0.065  -0.171*** 0.063  -0.010 0.061 
Non Kinh -0.437*** 0.006  -0.390*** 0.007  -0.255*** 0.007 
Province fixed effect No  Yes  Yes 
No. Observation 310,154  310,154  310,154 
Adjusted R2 0.142  0.217  0.260 
Source: LFS2007, GSO; authors’ calculations. 
Note: ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;*: significant at 10%. Other coefficients in the aggregated ethnicity 
model of Kinh/non Kinh equation are not reported. 
 
To investigate further the gender and ethnic earning gap, we restrict our sample to nonfarm 
labour income (Table 6). Different reasons can be suggested to justify such an option. First, 
agricultural incomes are among the most difficult to capture through a single question, like in 
classical labour force surveys. Second, agriculture labour market is known to be functioning very 
differently from nonfarm sectors one, which implies that earnings functions should be sector 
specific. Third, as we saw that job segregation is probably at play, and ethnic minorities are 
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concentrated in farming activities, it is all the more interesting to focuses on what is happening 
outside agriculture. Finally, with more than 10,000 ethnic minorities observations (whether for 
nonfarm workers or for wage workers), we able to go beyond previous studies which had to 
focus only on rural issues. 
 
Table 6: Non-farm labor earnings models 
(Log of hourly income; OLS) 
  
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 (only wage 
earners) 
 Coef. SE  Coef. SE  Coef. SE 
Female -0.169*** 0.004  -0.169*** 0.004  -0.111*** 0.003 
Married 0.080*** 0.005  0.095*** 0.005  0.047*** 0.004 
Years of schooling -0.057*** 0.002  -0.046*** 0.002  -0.017*** 0.001 
(Years of schooling)2 0.006*** 0.000  0.006*** 0.000  0.004*** 0.000 
Potential experience 0.037*** 0.000  0.039*** 0.000  0.033*** 0.000 
(Potential experience)2 -0.001*** 0.000  -0.001*** 0.000  -0.001*** 0.000 
Intercept 1.112*** 0.012  1.083*** 0.013  1.220*** 0.009 
Hoa  0.006 0.017  -0.038** 0.017  -0.089*** 0.015 
Thái 0.140*** 0.032  -0.006 0.032  0.027 0.021 
Tày 0.119*** 0.014  0.015 0.017  0.052*** 0.012 
Muong -0.029 0.032  -0.026 0.033  -0.083*** 0.021 
Kho-me -0.031 0.024  -0.056** 0.024  -0.053*** 0.014 
Nùng 0.122*** 0.025  -0.041 0.027  -0.025 0.020 
Hmông  -0.109 0.104  -0.273*** 0.102  -0.044 0.062 
Dao 0.106* 0.064  -0.013 0.063  -0.061 0.040 
Ê Đê 0.010 0.096  -0.184* 0.095  0.119*** 0.040 
Gia-rai 0.115 0.118  -0.128 0.116  -0.084** 0.042 
Ba na -0.008 0.111  -0.231** 0.106  -0.126** 0.052 
Xo-dang 0.241 0.158  0.073 0.151  -0.000 0.070 
Ra-glai -0.429*** 0.150  -0.360** 0.147  0.068 0.068 
Co-ho -0.183 0.213  -0.162 0.208  -0.117 0.078 
Chăm  -0.160** 0.080  -0.144* 0.078  0.003 0.045 
Giáy 0.187** 0.087  0.031 0.086  -0.049 0.058 
Other Northern 
minorities 
0.029 0.055  -0.034 0.054  -0.033 0.034 
Othe  C ntral Highland 0.100 0.074  -0.014 0.072  -0.129*** 0.033 
Other 0.250* 0.128  0.200 0.125  0.284*** 0.071 
Non Kinh -0.061*** 0.008  -0.029*** 0.009  -0.028*** 0.006 
Province fixed effect No  Yes  Yes 
No. Observation 200,413  200,413  117,253 
Adjusted R2 0.125  0.217  0.367 
Source: LFS2007, GSO; authors’ calculations. 
Note: ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;*: significant at 10%. Other coefficients in the aggregated ethnicity 
model of Kinh/non Kinh equation are not reported. 
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Obviously, running regressions on nonfarm paid workers raises an issue of selection bias: ethnic 
minorities working outside agriculture is not a random subsample, and the unobserved factors 
that pushed them out of agriculture are probably also impacting positively their earnings. Aware 
of this limitation, as an initial step, we consider nevertheless that our "naive" estimations may be 
informative. Not to add new endogeneity problems to the previous issue, we estimate our 
simplest mincerian model, with and without province fixed effect (model 2 and 1). Model 3 
considers only wage workers as wages are even better measured through the LFS (than profits) 
and as the potential discrimination of employees by their employers is better assessed than for 
non-wage workers, where discrimination can only occurs through the product markets, as they 
are their own employers.  
Findings from Table 6 show that nonfarm ethnic gap is highly reduced. At the aggregate level, 
the gap, though still significant, ranges from -6 percent (model 1) to -3 percent (models 2 and 3). 
Compared to the gender gap, the ethnic gap if negligible: gender gap remains at nearly 16 percent 
against women for nonfarm jobs, and 10.5 percent for female wage workers. Once the ethnic 
groups disaggregated, many of them earns as much or even more than Kinh. Only 13 of the 57 
estimated coefficient are significant at 1 percent level. The highest penalty is suffered by Ra-glai 
(-0.42*** in model 1 and -0.36*** in model 2) for nonfarm jobs, and a few Central Highland 
minorities (Ê Đê, Ba na and Other). 
The interpretation of these results is not straightforward. Taken at face value, our estimates 
suggest that potential earning “discrimination” against ethnic minorities on the labour market is 
very low, once they get out of farm job or when they work as employees. The whole question 
resides in whether those who succeed in this process are selected (or self-selected) according to 
some specific skills outside our human capital indicators (ability, for instance) or not. In 
econometric terms as quoted above, is there any unobservable variable playing on both sectoral 
allocation and labour income? In order to address this selection bias, we will use the multinomial 
logit model to correct for sectoral allocation in the following part. 
5.1.2 Mincer equation estimation with selectivity correction  
In this section, our results are reported in two parts. The first part (Tables 7a, b) depicts marginal 
effects from the multinomial logit model and second part (Tables 8a, b) highlights the results 
from the earnings equations estimation, in which the selection bias is corrected by a multinomial 
logit model. 
The marginal effects from the multinomial logit estimation/ the first stage equations show us the 
determinants of the allocation of people into different sectors. As expected, we observe a 
positive effect of education for public sector, formal, and informal sector employment. The 
effect is strongest in the public sector, convex in formal private sector and concave in informal 
sector while it has negative effect on allocation into agriculture. The convex influence of 
education on selection into formal sector could be explained by the fact that there is a range of 
formal jobs available that does not require high education, such as workers in factories and non-
farm formal household business. As expected, experience also has a positive marginal effect on 
selection into different sectors and a negative effect on being inactive. People coming from 
larger households have a lower probability of working in the public sector, the informal sector, 
and agriculture sector while they have higher probability of working in the formal sector and 
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being inactive. It is also seen that people are less likely to work in public and formal sectors when 
having high dependence ratio. The opposite effect is observed in informal and agriculture sector.  
 
Table 7a: Determinants of the allocation of people to different employment sectors 
(Marginal effect from multinomial logit model on sectoral choice) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Public Formal Informal Agriculture Inactive 
Female 0.0027*** -0.0214*** -0.0195*** -0.0583*** 0.0965*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0022) 
Married 0.0189*** 0.0220*** 0.0343*** 0.0811*** -0.156*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0030) 
Non-Kinh 0.009*** -0.0486*** -0.114*** 0.156*** -0.0025 
 (0.0010) (0.0027) (0.0036) (0.0027) (0.0042) 
Years of schooling 0.0060*** -0.0052*** 0.0107*** -0.0061*** -0.0054*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0011) 
(Years of schooling)2 0.0006*** 0.0010*** -0.0018*** -0.0015*** 0.0016*** 
 (2.30e-05) (3.55e-05) (5.20e-05) (5.20e-05) (6.16e-05) 
Potential experience 0.0052*** 0.0117*** 0.0177*** 0.0116*** -0.0463*** 
 (7.92e-05) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
(Potential experience)2 -0.0001*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** 0.0009*** 
 (1.64e-06) (2.75e-06) (3.24e-06) (2.87e-06) (4.07e-06) 
Rural -0.0116*** -0.0756*** -0.0412*** 0.291*** -0.162*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0023) 
Spouse of the Head -0.0114*** -0.0383*** -0.0440*** -0.0053** 0.0991*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0032) 
Children of the Head -0.0021** -0.0074*** -0.0045 -0.0918*** 0.106*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0045) 
Parents of the Head -0.0152** -0.0377** 0.0063 -0.185*** 0.231*** 
 (0.0068) (0.0158) (0.0121) (0.0097) (0.0128) 
Familiy ties -0.0006 -0.0061** -0.0038 -0.0802*** 0.0907*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0026) (0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0049) 
Non-family ties -0.0020 0.112*** 0.126*** -0.0920*** -0.144*** 
 (0.0056) (0.0097) (0.0160) (0.0243) (0.0238) 
Dependence ratio -0.0153*** -0.0379*** 0.132*** 0.0653*** -0.144*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0036) (0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0067) 
HH size -0.0013*** 0.0027*** -0.0067*** -0.0015*** 0.0067*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) 
Province fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 453667 453667 453667 453667 453667 
Source: LFS2007, GSO; authors’ calculations. 
Note: ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;*: significant at 10%.  
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Table 7b: Determinants of the allocation of people to different employment sectors 
(Marginal effect from multinomial logit model on sectoral choice, disaggregated ethnic groups) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Public Formal Informal Agriculture Not working 
Hoa  -0.0155* 0.0736* -0.000268 -0.0920* 0.0341* 
 (0.00847) (0.0380) (0.00661) (0.0483) (0.0196) 
Thái 0.0154 -0.0906 -0.193 0.214*** 0.0543 
 (0.0122) (0.111) (0.272) (0.0154) (0.164) 
Tày 0.0159*** -0.105 -0.134 0.182*** 0.0410 
 (0.00585) (0.0984) (0.190) (0.0269) (0.112) 
Muong 0.0119 -0.0885 -0.136 0.183*** 0.0296 
 (0.00845) (0.0911) (0.193) (0.0273) (0.121) 
Kho-me 0.00501 -0.0173 -0.0238 0.109** -0.0733 
 (0.00370) (0.0181) (0.0343) (0.0448) (0.0622) 
Nùng 0.00992* -0.106 -0.0930 0.191*** -0.00204 
 (0.00517) (0.0854) (0.132) (0.0520) (0.0940) 
Hmông  0.0412** -0.223 -0.356 0.373*** 0.165 
 (0.0174) (0.235) (0.505) (0.0220) (0.270) 
Dao 0.0165 -0.191 -0.180 0.287*** 0.0671 
 (0.0114) (0.159) (0.254) (0.0586) (0.145) 
Ê Đê 0.0246 -0.106 -0.287 0.229*** 0.139 
 (0.0190) (0.151) (0.406) (0.0305) (0.214) 
Gia-rai 0.0763*** -0.416 -0.284 0.447*** 0.177 
 (0.0143) (0.329) (0.405) (0.0932) (0.202) 
Ba na 0.0195 -0.104 -0.221 0.289*** 0.0163 
 (0.0163) (0.130) (0.313) (0.0418) (0.213) 
Xo-dang 0.197 0.259 -3.076 0.979 1.641 
 (9.558) (30.57) (179.2) (46.83) (92.21) 
Ra-glai 0.0451*** -0.265 -0.234 0.318*** 0.135 
 (0.0139) (0.224) (0.333) (0.0523) (0.169) 
Co-ho 0.0495*** -0.338 -0.273 0.231*** 0.330*** 
 (0.0177) (0.289) (0.392) (0.0406) (0.124) 
Chăm  0.00707 -0.130 -0.0991 0.171*** 0.0508 
 (0.0113) (0.103) (0.142) (0.0425) (0.0786) 
Giáy -0.00277 -0.114 -0.0818 0.183*** 0.0147 
 (0.0129) (0.0899) (0.119) (0.0561) (0.0813) 
OtherNorthern minorities 0.0219* -0.109* -0.0133 0.145** -0.0451 
 (0.0113) (0.0637) (0.0268) (0.0694) (0.0449) 
Other Central Highland 0.0587*** -0.253 -0.374 0.291*** 0.277 
 (0.0100) (0.256) (0.529) (0.0411) (0.230) 
Other 0.0471** -0.0708 -0.388 0.268*** 0.144 
 (0.0189) (0.169) (0.552) (0.0638) (0.315) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 453667 453667 453667 453667 453667 
Source: LFS2007, GSO; authors’ calculations. 
Note: ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;*: significant at 10%.  
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Regarding our variable of interest, women are more likely to work in the public sector but, 
ceteris paribus, face a higher probability than men of not working at all. Ethnic minorities have a 
higher probability of working in the public sector and in agriculture, while they have lower 
probability of working in the formal or informal private sector. Other Central Highland groups 
and other groups have higher probability of working in the public sector compared to Kinh, Tày, 
Nùng, Hmông, Gia Rai, Ra-glai, Co-ho, and other Northern minorities, while Hoa are less likely 
to work in the public sector than Kinh. Regarding formal and informal private sectors, there is 
almost no significant difference in the allocation among different ethnic groups. Lastly, almost all 
ethnic minorities groups have a higher probability of engaging in agriculture than Kinh (except 
for Hoa).      
 
Earning equation estimates 
After correcting for selectivity into the four different sectors, Table 8a and Table 8b present the 
earning equation estimations. It is seen that returns to education are positive and significant in all 
cases but the association is convex in the public sector and concave in the informal and 
agriculture sector. The potential experience and earnings relationship is concave in public and 
informal sector but convex in the other sectors.   
Women have slightly higher earnings than men in the public and agricultural sector after 
accounting for selection, by 1.5 percent and 4.5 percent, respectively. However, all else equal, 
women face an earning gap of 11.5 percent and 18 percent less in the formal and informal 
sectors, compared to men. Women get higher earnings in agriculture than men could be 
explained by two reasons. First, our classification of sector does not take into account 
employment status. Thus, wage work in agriculture could drive the result. Second, it is possible 
that women have more interrupted work periods than men, thus, our estimation could be biased 
in the sense that we overestimate the experience effects for women. However, the LFS does not 
have information on labor market history which could have been used to control for this 
potential bias. Meanwhile, the ethnic earnings gaps vary considerably between different sectors. 
As an ethnic minority, an individual can get an earning premium of up to 2 percent than their 
Kinh counterparts if they work in public sector, however, their earning will be 14 percent and 16 
percent less when they are engaged in formal and informal employment. Moreover, we find a 
large gap in earnings between Kinh and non-Kinh in the agricultural sector, which is 45 percent. 
This result is in line with Baulch and Vu (2011)’s finding that the ethnic expenditure gap in rural 
area is 58.1 percent in 2004 and 68.1 percent in 2010. Even after correcting for selection into 
different sectors, we still find a large gap in agriculture. It is likely that Kinh in agriculture might 
be doing for profit large scale while non-Kinh are engaged in small scale subsistence agriculture, 
which could not be covered in the selection equations.  
To explore the heterogeneity of effects, we interact the dummies of gender and ethnicity for 
each regression. It is seen that in public sector, once the interaction is introduced, the positive 
and significant effect of being a women or being an ethnic minority does not hold. Only women 
in ethnic minority groups benefit higher earning in public sector. In the last column of Table 8a, 
we find that the significant and positive effect of gender dummy was captured by the effect of 
woman in ethnic minority group. There is indeed no significant difference in earning between 
Kinh male and Kinh female workers in agriculture. In short, female ethnic minorities have vastly 
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lower earnings than Kinh or non-Kinh men in all but public and barely in agriculture sectors. 
  
 
Table 8a: Earning equation estimates for different employment sectors 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Public  Formal  Informal  Agriculture  
Female 0.015*** 0.007 -0.124*** -0.127*** -0.202*** -0.205*** 0.0444*** 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.01) (0.012) (0.0066) (0.014) 
Ethnic minority 0.025* -0.020* -0.150*** -0.174*** -0.177*** -0.206*** -0.593*** 
-
0.650*** 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.019) (0.040) (0.027) (0.011) (0.038) (0.045) 
Female x Ethnicity  0.089***  0.054  0.056*  0.128*** 
  (0.015)  (0.057)  (0.030)  (0.008) 
Married -0.003 -0.001 -0.187*** -0.187*** -0.036** -0.036*** -0.089*** -0.083*** 
 (0.005) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.015) (0.005) (0.018) (0.018) 
Years of schooling -0.076*** -0.075*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.061*** 0.064*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
(Years of schooling)2 0.004*** 0.0041*** 0.000 0.000 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 
-
0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Potential experience 0.028*** 0.028*** -0.035*** -0.035*** 0.010*** 0.010*** -0.008*** -0.006* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.0018) (0.003) 
(Potential experience)2 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000** -0.000*** 0.0005*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rural area 0.064*** 0.063*** -0.080*** -0.081*** -0.094*** -0.095*** -0.691*** 
-
0.679*** 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.024) (0.010) (0.016)  (0.0389) (0.042) 
BFG 
Public -0.140*** -0.135*** -0.914*** -0.916*** -0.915*** -0.918*** -1.053*** 
-
1.137*** 
 (0.013) (0.022) (0.077) (0.073) (0.060) (0.065) (0.102) (0.079) 
BFG 
Formal -0.429*** -0.436*** -0.075*** -0.075*** 0.146*** 0.151*** 0.962*** 1.054*** 
 (0.117) (0.149) (0.021) (0.028) (0.0566) (0.027) (0.110) (0.082) 
BFG 
Informal 0.432*** 0.442*** -0.441*** -0.440*** 0.0167 0.017** 0.713*** 0.675*** 
 (0.046) (0.0251) (0.079) (0.083) (0.0116) (0.008) (0.163) (0.135) 
BFG 
Agriculture 0.164*** 0.153** -0.783*** -0.786*** -0.315*** -0.317*** -0.163*** 
-
0.156*** 
 (0.020) (0.0637) (0.088) (0.056) (0.0458) (0.042) (0.013) (0.026) 
BFG 
Inactive 0.104*** 0.0979 1.032*** 1.030*** 0.658*** 0.656*** 2.306*** 2.256*** 
 (0.029) (0.0662) (0.069) (0.062) (0.0670) (0.028) (0.049) (0.104) 
Constant 2.22*** 2.199*** 1.846*** 1.845*** 1.292*** 1.292*** 1.800*** 1.763*** 
 (0.162) (0.177) (0.143) (0.175) (0.0656) (0.059) (0.098) (0.216) 
Source: LFS2007, GSO; authors’ calculations. 
Note: ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;*: significant at 10%. The figures in parentheses are bootstrapped 
standard errors. 
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Table 8b: Earning equation estimates for different employment sectors 
(Disaggregated ethnic groups) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Public Formal Informal Agriculture 
Hoa  -0.0305 0.0444 0.0409 0.246*** 
 (0.0387) (0.0414) (0.0442) (0.0813) 
Thái 0.0618*** -0.132* -0.235*** -0.592*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0728) (0.0205) (0.0456) 
Tày 0.0866*** -0.229*** -0.347*** -0.459*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0710) (0.0452) (0.0542) 
Muong -0.0965* -0.115** -0.113*** -0.614*** 
 (0.0514) (0.0502) (0.0374) (0.0337) 
Kho-me -0.0540 -0.192*** -0.103*** -0.312*** 
 (0.0344) (0.0289) (0.0116) (0.0242) 
Nùng 0.0901** -0.208*** -0.249*** -0.578*** 
 (0.0386) (0.0519) (0.0676) (0.0433) 
Hmông  -0.00738 -0.884 -0.809 -0.972*** 
 (0.0785) (0.696) (0.649) (0.0503) 
Dao 0.0837 -0.0577 -0.131** -0.740*** 
 (0.0750) (0.0899) (0.0633) (0.0746) 
Ê Đê -0.184 -0.00524 -0.442*** -0.581*** 
 (0.165) (0.0455) (0.107) (0.0508) 
Gia-rai -0.0551 -0.488** -0.494*** -1.053*** 
 (0.113) (0.246) (0.0576) (0.0665) 
Ba na -0.156 -0.702** -0.101* -0.611*** 
 (0.130) (0.334) (0.0578) (0.0474) 
Xo-dang 0.0456 0.0514 0 -0.923*** 
 (0.0942) (0.124) (0) (0.0301) 
Ra-glai -0.191* 0.185 -0.614 -1.052*** 
 (0.0997) (0.159) (0.380) (0.109) 
Co-ho 0.0594 -0.278*** -0.467** -0.241*** 
 (0.192) (0.0872) (0.235) (0.0805) 
Chăm  0.110 -0.132 -0.311*** -0.238*** 
 (0.0868) (0.0884) (0.0878) (0.0555) 
Giáy 0.189*** 0.0956 -0.0511 -0.655*** 
 (0.0393) (0.140) (0.0610) (0.123) 
Other Northern minorities 0.0439*** -0.325 -0.170** -0.593*** 
 (0.0112) (0.278) (0.0670) (0.0491) 
Other Central Highland 0.0593 -0.136 -0.722*** -0.887*** 
 (0.0653) (0.0962) (0.257) (0.0910) 
Others 0.255*** -0.176*** -0.289*** -0.361*** 
 (0.0467) (0.0658) (0.0931) (0.130) 
BFG_public -0.139*** -0.935*** -0.900*** -0.644*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0891) (0.0633) (0.0940) 
BFG_Formal -0.432*** -0.0721*** 0.173*** 0.439*** 
 (0.116) (0.0230) (0.0617) (0.137) 
BFG_Informal 0.431*** -0.440*** 0.0157 0.567*** 
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 (0.0474) (0.0860) (0.0107) (0.177) 
BFG_Agriculture 0.170*** -0.786*** -0.295*** -0.105*** 
 (0.0235) (0.0972) (0.0616) (0.0152) 
BFG_Inactive 0.104*** 1.048*** 0.686*** 2.274*** 
 (0.0311) (0.0865) (0.0669) (0.0478) 
Constant 2.230*** 1.859*** 1.334*** 1.378*** 
 (0.147) (0.161) (0.0628) (0.112) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Source: LFS2007, GSO; authors’ calculations. 
Note: ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;*: significant at 10%. The figures in parentheses are bootstrapped 
standard errors. 
   
Estimating the earnings equations with disaggregated ethnic groups depicts once again a very 
heterogeneous coefficient between ethnic minority groups. In public sector, Thái, Tày, Nùng, 
Giáy, other Northern minorities and the other group earn more than Kinh while Muong and Ra-
glai earn less. In the formal sector, the coefficient is negative and significant for almost all ethnic 
minority groups, mostly around -0.2 but in the extreme case, we find a coefficient of -0.7 for Ba 
Na group which is significant at 5 percent level. In the informal sector, we also find very large 
range in the coefficients, from -0.1 (Muong, Kho-me, Ba Na) to -0.7 (Other Central Highland 
minorities). In line with our discussion above, the ethnic earning gap is becoming significantly 
large when people work in agriculture sector and the gap varies from the lowest of -0.2 (Chăm, 
Co-ho) to approximately -1.0 (Hmông, Gia Rai, Ra-glai). Through all different sectors, it is 
notable that Hmông, Gia Rai and Ra-glai are the most disadvantaged ethnic groups. Hoa group, 
on the contrary, has higher earnings ceteris paribus than the majority group, demonstrating again 
that combining Hoa with Kinh as is done in most academic papers hides important differences 
between the two groups.  
The selectivity correction terms further give us information to understand the selectivity pattern 
based on unobserved characteristics. In the public sector earning equation, we find a negative 
selectivity correction term of the formal sector selection equation. This indicates that lower 
earning of individuals in public sector, compared to individuals taken at random, are due to the 
allocation of people with worse unobserved characteristic out of the formal private sector and 
into the public sector. Similarly, we see that the coefficient related to the informal sector 
selection equation is negative and significant in the formal sector earnings equation. This means 
that people who would have performed better in the informal sector, on the basis of their 
unobserved skills, end up working in the formal private sector.   
While the earnings regressions presented so far take into account selection into different sectors, 
they still only provide estimates for earning gaps at the mean of the distribution, thus assuming 
that differences in terms of the impact of the exogenous variables along the conditional 
distribution are unimportant. However, one can well imagine that gender and ethnic earnings 
gaps might vary across the outcome distribution, especially at the lower and higher tails of the 
earning distribution. We thus estimate quantile earnings regression which allows us to quantify 
the influence of the different explanatory variables on conditional earnings at the bottom, 
median and the top of the distribution. Due to the identification issues with running quantile 
regression with multinomial logit in the first step, we use Heckman procedure to partially correct 
for selection bias. We use the same set of instrumental variables as in the multinomial logit 
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model presented in section 4.1 above and estimate the earnings regressions at five points of the 
log earning distribution, namely 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 0.9 quantiles. 
Results from Table 9 show that the gender earnings gaps do not vary much across the different 
quantiles while the ethnic earnings gaps are higher at the lower quantiles of the distribution and 
get narrower at the higher level of the earnings distribution. Besides, the heterogeneity for ethnic 
minorities becomes clear when we estimate the gaps at different points of the earning 
distribution. For instance, Hoa people suffer a penalty of 12.4 percent compared to Kinh for 
participating in a low-paying job (at the 10th quantile), but would enjoy a wage premium of 7.2 
percent for being involved in a high-paying job (90th quantile). Among ethnic groups which 
suffer most in terms of earning gaps, such as Hmông, Gia rai, Ra-glai, Nùng, Central Highland, 
the coefficients are higher at the first two deciles of the distributions which is in line with other 
studies in developing countries where the earning gap is highest at lowest quantiles of the earning 
distribution.  
At this stage, these results confirm our presumption that in Vietnam, the ethnic earning gap and 
especially the earnings gap among heterogeneous ethnic minority matters more than the gender 
earning gap. However, when we look at the earnings gap in non-farm work and for wage earners 
only, the ethnic gap reduces significantly. This motivates us to further decompose the gaps 
according to explained and unexplained variation (the latter being commonly understood as 
discrimination) which is presented in more details in the following section. 
 
Table 9: Labor earnings quantile regression model 
  
 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Female -0.100*** -0.132*** -0.143*** -0.138*** -0.128*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0029) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0038) 
Years of schooling -0.043*** -0.0343*** -0.0242*** -0.0089*** 0.00681*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0018) 
(Years of schooling)2 0.0045*** 0.0040*** 0.0035*** 0.0029*** 0.0022*** 
 (0.0001) (7.80e-05) (6.54e-05) (7.41e-05) (0.0001) 
Potential experience 0.0088*** 0.0091*** 0.0100*** 0.0091*** 0.0063*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0009) 
(Potential experience)2 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -4.78e-05*** 5.50e-05*** 
 (1.81e-05) (1.26e-05) (1.09e-05) (1.24e-05) (1.66e-05) 
Institutional sector      
Foreign enterprise 0.124*** -0.0278** -0.136*** -0.191*** -0.161*** 
 (0.0163) (0.0109) (0.0093) (0.0108) (0.0149) 
Domestic enterprise -0.0181* -0.0953*** -0.151*** -0.158*** -0.103*** 
 (0.0100) (0.0066) (0.0056) (0.0064) (0.0089) 
Non farm formal HB -0.193*** -0.157*** -0.120*** -0.0490*** 0.0548*** 
 (0.0089) (0.0058) (0.0048) (0.0055) (0.0075) 
Informal sector -0.352*** -0.329*** -0.322*** -0.299*** -0.245*** 
 (0.0083) (0.0052) (0.0043) (0.0049) (0.0067) 
Agriculture -0.781*** -0.752*** -0.679*** -0.570*** -0.427*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0055) (0.0045) (0.00516) (0.0072) 
Rural -0.0403*** -0.0141*** -0.0038 0.0007 -0.0069 
 (0.0050) (0.0034) (0.0030) (0.00340) (0.0046) 
Intercept 1.298*** 1.624*** 1.915*** 2.152*** 2.401*** 
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 (0.0255) (0.0173) (0.0147) (0.0165) (0.0221) 
Mills ratio -0.423*** -0.319*** -0.279*** -0.297*** -0.346*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0099) (0.0086) (0.0098) (0.0132) 
Hoa  -0.117*** -0.0580*** -0.0286** 0.0340** 0.0724*** 
 (0.0201) (0.0137) (0.0118) (0.0134) (0.0181) 
Thái -0.192*** -0.289*** -0.311*** -0.317*** -0.292*** 
 (0.0199) (0.0135) (0.0116) (0.0134) (0.0187) 
Tày -0.280*** -0.254*** -0.268*** -0.220*** -0.162*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0099) (0.0087) (0.0101) (0.0135) 
Muong -0.284*** -0.294*** -0.353*** -0.317*** -0.268*** 
 (0.0236) (0.0161) (0.0140) (0.0164) (0.0225) 
Kho-me 0.00614 -0.0085 -0.0232* -0.0422*** -0.0619*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0141) (0.0121) (0.0137) (0.0186) 
Nùng -0.432*** -0.449*** -0.411*** -0.275*** -0.208*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0138) (0.0122) (0.0141) (0.0191) 
Hmông  -0.603*** -0.778*** -0.683*** -0.534*** -0.462*** 
 (0.0254) (0.0172) (0.0151) (0.0177) (0.0246) 
Dao -0.526*** -0.429*** -0.449*** -0.481*** -0.471*** 
 (0.0265) (0.0179) (0.0154) (0.0177) (0.0241) 
Ê Đê -0.179*** 0.0778*** 0.181*** 0.102*** -0.0402 
 (0.0413) (0.0283) (0.0245) (0.0277) (0.0372) 
Gia-rai -0.270*** -0.305*** -0.274*** -0.131*** -0.116*** 
 (0.0400) (0.0270) (0.0234) (0.0265) (0.0357) 
Ba na 0.0520 0.0515* 0.0517** -0.0289 -0.172*** 
 (0.0417) (0.0285) (0.0247) (0.0281) (0.0379) 
Xo-dang -0.220*** -0.206*** -0.345*** -0.421*** -0.518*** 
 (0.0408) (0.0274) (0.0235) (0.0267) (0.0364) 
Ra-glai -0.461*** -0.394*** -0.339*** -0.278*** -0.195*** 
 (0.0479) (0.0321) (0.0277) (0.0319) (0.0437) 
Co-ho 0.148*** 0.0875** 0.266*** 0.285*** 0.513*** 
 (0.0529) (0.0356) (0.0304) (0.0345) (0.0464) 
Chăm  0.128** 0.0707** 0.0775*** 0.140*** 0.0749 
 (0.0509) (0.0347) (0.0300) (0.0341) (0.0457) 
Giáy -0.241*** -0.332*** -0.300*** -0.383*** -0.320*** 
 (0.0468) (0.0316) (0.0274) (0.0313) (0.0427) 
OtherNorthern 
minorities 
-0.388*** -0.380*** -0.323*** -0.248*** -0.230*** 
 (0.0348) (0.0236) (0.0203) (0.0233) (0.0319) 
Other Central Highland -0.524*** -0.344*** -0.310*** -0.292*** -0.231*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0200) (0.0174) (0.0200) (0.0273) 
Other 0.0092 -0.0153 -0.0661* -0.0693 0.0296 
 (0.0663) (0.0459) (0.0395) (0.0449) (0.0600) 
Non-Kinh -0.242*** -0.231*** -0.225*** -0.197*** -0.172*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0052) (0.0095) 
Province fixed effect Yes 
No. Observation 310,154 
Source: LFS2007, GSO; authors’ calculations. 
Note: ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;*: significant at 10%. Other coefficients in the aggregated ethnicity 
model of Kinh/non Kinh equation are not reported. 
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5.2 Gender and ethnic earnings gaps decomposition 
Neumark decomposition of gender and ethnic earnings gaps 
In this section, we decompose the gender and ethic earnings gaps found above using Neumark’s 
approach. Similar to what we have seen in the last section, the raw gender earning gap is 
relatively large (0.224) but not as high as the ethnic earning gap (0.526) (Table 10). When the 
gaps are decomposed, we find that the differences in individual characteristics such as years of 
education, work experience, and geographic variables can explain only 15.6 percent of the gender 
earning gap, while 84.4 percent of the gap are left unexplained. For the ethnic earnings gap, the 
differences in endowments accounts for nearly 61 percent of the gap, which is expected due to 
the huge differences in educational endowment and location of residence between the Kinh and 
non-Kinh groups.  
 
Table 10: Neumark decomposition of gender and ethnic earnings gaps 
 
 Raw earning gap Explained Unexplained % Unexplained  
Gender earnings 
gaps 
0.224*** 0.035 0.188 84.4 
Ethnic earnings gaps 0.526*** 0.320 0.205 39.07 
Source: LFS2007, GSO; authors’ calculations. 
Note: ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;*: significant at 10%. 
 
Regarding ethnic earning gaps, not only do we decompose the gap between Kinh and non-Kinh 
but we also extend our analysis by decomposing the gap between different ethnic minority 
groups. This is motivated by the result above that show that the earning gaps are very 
heterogenous once we disaggregate the ethnic minority groups. It thus suggests that some ethnic 
groups might be more heavily discriminated against than others. We decompose the earning gaps 
by pair, thus each ethnic group along the row (horizontal axis) is compared to another group 
along the column (vertical axis). A positive coefficient in this comparison means that the group 
on the row has higher earnings than the group on the column. Due to the high number of ethnic 
groups but limited observations in smaller sized groups, we restrict the within minority group 
analysis to the 10 largest ethnic minorities and the Kinh majority group.  
Once we disaggregate the ethnic minority groups, the gaps and the proportion of the 
unexplained part vary remarkably as presented in Table 11. Decomposing the earning gaps 
between Kinh and disaggregated ethnic minority groups, shows that Hoa and Ede perform 
better than Kinh and endowments can explain about 62 percent and 40 percent of the gap, 
respectively. For 3 of the other large ethnic minority groups (Tày, Thái, Muong), the gaps 
between them and Kinh are quite similar at around 0.5, half of which can be explained by 
endowments. The earnings gap between Kho-me and Kinh is much narrow, at 0.079, while the 
gap between Kinh and Hmông is significantly larger at 1.5. In fact, Hmông lag behind all other 
groups, partially due to their very low level of (Phung et al., 2014). Meanwhile, Ê Đê has the 
highest earnings among all groups. The matrix illustrates that no common pattern of ethnic 
earnings gaps between each ethnic minority group and the ethnic majority group exists. In 
addition, the unexplained part in the gaps fluctuates from almost zero to 117 percent. Saying that 
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ethnic earnings between the minority and majority groups exists would thus not treat the data 
fairly. Instead, ethnic earnings gaps need to be considered on a case by case basis.  
Table 11: Neumark decomposition of ethnic earning gaps between different ethnic groups 
 
 Kinh Hoa Thái Tày Mường  Khơ-me Nùng Hmong Dao Ê Đê 
Hoa -0.08***          
Unexplained 38.5%          
Thái 0.50*** 0.57***         
Unexplained 52% 0.87%         
Tày 0.50*** 0.57*** 0.003        
Unexplained 46.5% 3.2% 228%        
Mường 0.63*** 0.70*** 0.13*** 0.13***       
Unexplained 50% -1.45% -2.4% 2.17%       
Khơ-me 0.08*** 0.16*** -0.42*** -0.42*** -0.55***      
Unexplained 58.3% 32.8% -0.18% -0.86% -0.12%      
Nùng 0.64*** 0.72*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.02 0.56***     
Unexplained 62.3% 32.8% 3.7% 30.3% 60.6% 1.04%     
Hmong 1.54*** 1.62*** 1.04*** 1.04*** 0.91*** 1.46*** 0.90***    
Unexplained 57.9% 5.4% 0.9% 22.4% 0.97% -0.07% 10.23%    
Dao 1.04*** 1.12*** 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.42*** 0.96*** 0.40*** -0.50***   
Unexplained 72% 9.8% -4.0% 25.7% 2.36% 0.61% 20.5% 21.1%   
Ê Đê -0.15*** - 0.07** -0.64*** -0.64*** -0.77*** -0.23*** -0.79*** -1.69*** -1.19***  
Unexplained 61.1% 9.3% 1.9% 3.9% 2.9% 1.12% 5% 7.7% 0.64%  
Gia Rai 0.35*** 0.42*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.28*** 0.27*** -0.30*** -0.50*** -0.70*** -0.70*** 
Unexplained 117% 5.09% 23% 29% 15.6% 1.65% 24.2% 21.1% -3.4% -3.4% 
Source: LFS2007, GSO; authors’ calculations. 
Note: ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;*: significant at 10%. 
 
When we look at the decomposition by sector (Table 12), we find that the biggest earning gaps 
can be attributed to differences between sectors. In the public sector, both gender and ethnic 
earnings gaps are very small, at 0.02 and -0.07, respectively. It reflects the more structured 
payment frame in the public sector. In which, the salaries for public servants are calculated by 
multiplying a fixed base salary regulated by the Government with a co-efficient that varies from 
person to person, depending on seniority and position. An egalitarian pay structure is applied by 
the Government to ensure the small differential between the lowest and highest paid. We can 
also note that the ethnic earnings gap becomes negative, which means that ethnic minorities 
receive higher earnings than Kinh and only a small part of this gap, 14.6 percent, remains 
unexplained. The ethnic earning gap is very low in the private formal and informal sectors; 
however, it is extremely high in agriculture.  
Regarding the gender earning gaps, they are relatively similar in the private formal, informal, and 
agricultural sectors. The finding of gender gap in private sector is consistent with other previous 
studies on Vietnam labour market (Liu 2004a; Pham and Reilly, 2007). The downsizing of State-
owned enterprises affected women more than men since they were overrepresented in public 
enterprises. The downsizing made them suddenly redundant and more exposed to pay gaps in 
the less protected private sector (Liu, 2004b).  
No other study has explored gender earning gaps in the informal sector of Vietnam so far; 
however, our finding of large gender earning gaps particularly in this sector is in line with studies 
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in African countries (Nordman et al., 2011). Since the differences in observable characteristics 
could not explain much of this gap, other factors might be involved. It is likely that women work 
in a lower paid segment of the informal sector since the higher paid jobs are more physically 
demanding. Indeed, manufacturing and construction accounts for the highest proportion of jobs 
(43 percent) in the informal sector (Cling et al., 2011). Besides, it is possible that women choose 
to work in lower productivity, but more flexible jobs in order to have more free time to take care 
of their children and housework. This also explains the relatively large gender earning gap in 
informal sector: in Vietnam, men in rural areas are better paid than most women because they 
take on different (heavier and more dangerous) tasks (World Bank, 2012). Another possible 
explanation could be the physical capital needed to start one’s business as an informal street 
vendor. Women, who have lower physical capital, could be excluded from this high paying 
informal activity.  
 
Table 12a: Neumark decomposition of gender and ethnic earnings gaps by sector 
 
 Gender    Ethnicity  
 Gap Explained Unexpl. Unexpl.(%) Gap Explained Unexpl. Unexpl.(%) 
Public 0.02*** 0.03 -0.01 -65.8 -0.07*** 0.06 -0.14 184.6 
Private 0.27*** 0.05 0.23 83.5 0.06*** -0.02 0.08 138.9 
Informal 0.26*** 0.02 0.24 93.3 0.06*** -0.01 0.07 116.8 
Agriculture 0.25*** 0.14 0.11 44.1 0.43*** 0.32 0.11 25.3 
Source: LFS2007, GSO; authors’ calculations. 
Note: ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;*: significant at 10%. 
 
 
Table 12b: Neumark decomposition of gender earnings gaps in the private and informal sectors 
 
Private formal sector  Informal sector   
 Gap Explained Unexpl. Unexpl.(%) Gap Explained Unexpl. Unexpl.(%) 
Wage 
earners 
0.24*** 0.04 0.22 84.1 0.45*** 0.06 0.39 87.3 
Self-
employed 
0.31*** 0.04 0.27 88.5 0.21*** 0.034 0.17 83.8 
Source: LFS2007, GSO; authors’ calculations. 
Note: ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;*: significant at 10%. 
 
We further investigate earnings gaps among subgroups of wage earners and non-wage earners 
(including the self-employed and family workers) in the formal and informal sector. The 
decomposition is presented in Table 12b. It is seen that in the formal sector, the gender gap is 
slightly narrower for wage workers (0.24) compared to non-wage workers while in the informal 
sector, the gap for wage worker is twice the size of the gap for non-wage workers. In all cases, 
the unexplained part accounts for more than 80 percent of the gaps. These results reinforce the 
idea that in the informal sector, employers have more wage-setting power, leaving room for 
discrimination. Another explanation could rely on the more competitive product market in the 
informal sector. In the case of Vietnam, construction accounts for one third of the informal 
sector and most of the workers are registered as wage workers in this industry (79 percent of 
workers in construction are wage workers in 2007). Yet, being a wage worker in construction 
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does not have the same meaning as in other sectors because most of them are in fact at the 
frontier between self-employment and wage-labour. They are closer from self-employed by 
hiring their work force at the mercy of private households. 
 
Full decomposition of gender and ethnic earnings gaps 
Following the raw decompositions in the previous section, we now turn to decompositions 
within each of the four segments of the Vietnamese labour market (public, formal, informal and 
agriculture sectors). Those four sectors differ in important characteristics such as job seasonality, 
wage structures, etc., which could potentially affect the earnings gaps.  
Table 13 presents the full decomposition of gender earnings gaps by sectors. Within-sector 
differences in earnings explain 96.3 percent of the gender earnings gap, of which 26.1 percent is 
attributed to differences in characteristics between male and female, including differences in 
educational level, experiences, marital status, and regional differences. The large positive 
differences in  returns to characteristics between men and women imply that men benefit from 
“nepotism” while women face “discrimination” within sectors. Still, differences in sectoral 
allocation between men and women only account for 3.6 percent of the gender earnings gaps; 
most of the differences in earnings are explained by differentials in characteristics. After 
correcting for the sectoral selection, the gender earnings gap decreases noticeably to 0.119, of 
which 93 percent is due to within sector differences and nearly half of this difference is explained 
by differences in characteristics. The remained part is due to differences in returns to 
endowments between men and women. 
 
Table 13: Full decomposition of gender earnings gap 
 
 
Without correcting 
for selectivity 
Correcting for 
selectivity 
Gender earnings gap  
=log(Male group earning) – log(Fem. group earning) 0.224*** % 0.119*** % 
Difference due to within sector differences in earnings attributable to 
Characteristics 0.058 26.1 0.067 56.4 
Deviation in male returns 0.078 34.8 0.023 19.5 
Deviation in female returns 0.079 35.4 0.022 18.2 
Sub-total 0.215 96.3 0.112 94.1 
Difference due to differences between sectoral allocation in earnings attributable to 
Characteristics 0.017 7.8 0.023 19.0 
Deviation in effect of characteristics on male location -0.004 -1.7 -0.010 -8.5 
Deviation in effect of characteristics on female location -0.006 -2.5 -0.005 -4.6 
Sub-total 0.007 3.6 0.07 5.9 
Source: LFS2007, GSO; authors’ calculations. 
Note: ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;*: significant at 10%. 
 
 
A full decomposition of the ethnic earnings gap is presented in Table 14. In contrast to the 
gender earnings gap, most of the ethnic earnings gap (about two thirds) is due to differences in 
sectoral allocation between ethnic majority and minority groups, which can be explained by 
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differences in characteristics. This finding mirrors our previous findings showing that the ethnic 
earnings gaps can be explained almost entirely by the minority’s high participation in the 
agricultural sector. More than half of the ethnic earnings gaps could be reduced if ethnic majority 
and minority groups were allocated equally in the labour market. Within sectors, differences in 
characteristics explain half of the gap; the other main contribution to the within sector gap is the 
difference in actual and neutral returns to ethnic minority characteristics. In the correction 
model, after recalculate the average earning offer within each sector, we find a slightly higher 
ethnic gap and within sector gap, the deviation in ethnic minority returns to characteristics 
accounts for 21 percent Thus, it suggests that returns to endowments of ethnic minority are still 
lower than Kinh counterparts.  
Table 14:  Full decomposition of ethnic earnings gap 
 
 
Without correcting 
for selectivity 
Correcting for 
selectivity 
Ethnic earnings gap  
=log(Maj. group earning) – log(Min. group earning) 0.525*** % 0.595*** % 
Difference due to within sector differences in earnings attributable to 
Characteristics 0.088 16.7 0.136 22.9 
Deviation in majority group returns 0.014 2.8 0.020 3.4 
Deviation in minority groups returns 0.064 12.3 0.125 21.1 
Sub-total 0.167 31.7 0.281 47.5 
Difference due to differences between sectoral allocation in earnings attributable to 
Characteristics 0.271 51.5 0.255 42.9 
Deviation in effect of characteristics on majority group location 0.007 1.2 0.001 0.2 
Deviation in effect of characteristics on minority groups’ 
location 0.081 15.6 0.056 9.4 
Sub-total 0.359 68.3 0.312 52.5 
Source: LFS2007, GSO; authors’ calculations. 
Note: ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;*: significant at 10%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
96 
 
6 Robustness check 
As the results are novel, we conduct robustness checks to demonstrate their validity. As 
mentioned in section 3, LFS2007 is the most suitable dataset to examine our research questions; 
however, the drawback is that we only use data for one year. Thus, an alternative dataset is 
employed and similar analyses are implemented. The most relevant and available dataset for our 
robustness checks is the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS). VHLSS is a 
large-scale and high quality survey of the Vietnamese population implemented every two years. 
Since we use the LFS in 2007, we will employ the VHLSS in 2006 and 2008 as alternative 
samples. Questionnaires about income and employment in VHLSS are limited to random 
subsamples of 39,071 individuals in 2006 and 38,253 individuals in 2008.  
Regarding sector classification, compared to LFS2007, VHLSS is limited in capturing the 
concept of the informal sector. In the VHLSS, information about whether unincorporated 
enterprises register/have a business license is only available for employers/self-employed 
workers. For wage workers, informal employment is captured by information about the social 
security contributions of their job. Thus, we follow the informality proxy construction by 
Nguyen et al., (2013), according to which workers belong to the informal sector if they are self-
employed in an unregistered business or if they are wage-workers without social security. Even 
though the definition of the informal sector is not consistent between the LFS and the VHLSS, 
we find similar sectoral compositions of the labour market (Figure 1). We therefore think that 
the VHLSS can be used confidently for robustness checks.  
Figure 1. Structure of the labor market (proportion of each sector in the labor market) 
 
 
Source: LFS2007, VHLSS2006, VHLSS2008, GSO; authors’ calculations. 
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Neumark decompositions method (Table 15) provide consistent results for the gender earning in 
both 2006 and 2008, of which almost two thirds are left unexplained. Ethnic earning gaps are 
even larger when estimated using the VHLSS but only one fourth of this gap is explained by the 
control variables. We also decompose the earning gaps by sector (Table 16) and apply the full 
decomposition to test within and between sector gaps (Tables 17 & 18). Similar to our results 
using the LFS, the gender earning gap is low in the public sector but similar among the 
remaining sectors; the ethnic earnings gap is highest in agriculture. Full decompositions again 
confirm that differences in sectoral allocation affect the earning gaps: within-sector differences 
are the main drivers of the gender earning gaps, but less significant in explaining the ethnic gap. 
 
Table 15: Neumark decomposition of gender and ethnic earnings gaps using VHLSS 
 
  Raw earning 
gap 
Explained Unexplained % Unexplained  
Gender earnings gaps 2006 0.177*** 0.057 0.120 67.70 
 2008 0.162*** 0.058 0.104 64.00 
Ethnic earnings gaps 2006 0.633*** 0.476 0.157 24.83 
 2008 0.611*** 0.454 0.157 25.8 
Source: VHLSS2006, VHLSS2008, GSO; authors’ calculations. 
Note: ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;*: significant at 10%. 
 
 
 
 
Table 16: Neumark decomposition of gender and ethnic earnings gaps by sector using VHLSS 
 
  Gender 
Gap 
Explain Unexpl. 
Unexpl. 
(%) 
Ethnic 
Gap 
Explain Unexpl. 
Unexpl. 
(%)   
Public 
2006 
0.056* 0.184 0.037 66.8 0.153*** 0.178 -0.0249 -16.3 
 
2008 
-0.014 0.033 -0.046 343 0.215*** 0.166 0.048 22.6 
Private 2006 0.211*** 0.041 0.169 80.3 0.172*** 0.129 0.042 24.49 
 2008 0.290*** 0.078 0.212 73.05 0.342*** 0.266 0.076 22.4 
Informal 2006 0.266*** 0.041 0.225 84.49 0.142*** 0.079 0.623 43.9 
 2008 0.256*** 0.034 0.222 86.7 0.180*** 0.082 0.098 54.2 
Agriculture 2006 0.121*** 0.082 0.039 32.6 0.638*** 0.493 0.145 22.66 
 2008 0.081*** 0.752 0.005 7.07 0.594*** 0.461 0.132 22.3 
Source: VHLSS2006, VHLSS2008, GSO; authors’ calculations. 
Note: ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;*: significant at 10%. 
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Table 17: Full decomposition of gender earnings gap using VHLSS 
 
Source: VHLSS2006, VHLSS2008, GSO; authors’ calculations. 
 Note: ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;*: significant at 10%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gender earnings gap 
=log (Male group earning) – log (Fem. group earning) 2006 0.177*** % 
 2008 0.162***  
Difference due to within sector differences in earnings attributable to 
Characteristics 2006 0.059 33.1 
 2008 0.048 29.4 
Deviation in male returns 2006 0.048 27.0 
 2008 0.044 27.2 
Deviation in female returns 2006 0.050 28.3 
 2008 0.047 29.3 
Sub-total 2006 0.157 88.4 
 2008 0.139 85.9 
Difference due to differences between sectoral allocation in earnings attributable to 
Characteristics 2006 0.016 9.1 
 2008 0.016 9.6 
Deviation in effect of characteristics on male location 2006 0.003 1.5 
 2008 0.005 2.8 
Deviation in effect of characteristics on female location 2006 0.002 0.9 
 2008 0.003 1.7 
Sub-total 2006 0.021 11.5 
 2008 0.024 14.1 
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Table 18: Full decomposition of ethnic earnings gap using VHLSS 
Ethnic earnings gap  
=log(Maj. group earning) – log(Min. group earning) 2006 0.640*** % 
 2008 0.617***  
Difference due to within sector differences in earnings attributable to 
Characteristics 2006 0.292 45.6 
 2008 0.281 45.6 
Deviation in majority group returns 2006 0.032 5.0 
 2008 0.032 5.2 
Deviation in minority group returns 2006 0.098 15.4 
 2008 0.114 18.4 
Sub-total 2006 0.422 66.0 
 2008 0.427 69.2 
Difference due to differences between sectoral allocation in earnings attributable to 
Characteristics 2006 0.164 25.6 
 2008 0.146 23.6 
Deviation in effect of characteristics on majority group location 2006 0.002 0.3 
 2008 0.001 0.2 
Deviation in effect of characteristics on minority group location 2006 0.050 8.0 
 2008 0.041 6.7 
Sub-total 2006 0.216 34 
 2008 0.188 30.8 
Source: VHLSS2006, VHLSS2008, GSO; authors’ calculations. 
Note: ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;*: significant at 10%. 
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7 Conclusion 
This paper uses the 2007 Labour Force Survey to estimate and analyze the gender and ethnic 
earnings gaps in Vietnam. Previous research had brought up the potential for discrimination 
against women and ethnic minorities. Their studies focused mostly on wage employment and 
disregarded the informal sector. However, in Vietnam’s labour market, women’s participation in 
the informal sector is substantial and a majority of ethnic minority workers are engaged in non-
waged occupations. Previous studies were thus severely limited in analyzing the gender and 
ethnic gaps and did further fail to disaggregate the different ethnic groups. We overcome these 
aforementioned issues by including the self-employed and agricultural workers in estimating the 
gender and ethnic earnings gaps and investigate further the heterogeneity in the gaps among 
different ethnic groups.  
We start from Mincerian earnings equation, using a multinomial logit model to correct for 
selection into different labour market sectors. Without correcting for selection bias, ethnic 
minority people earn 22 percent less than Kinh, the majority group, while the gender gap is 16.4 
percent We find a great reduction in the ethnic earnings gap, which reduces 2.6 percent when 
looking at non-farm subsample only. Correcting for selection with our multinomial logit model 
shows that the earning gap between Kinh and ethnic minority group is 48 percentage points in 
the agricultural sector while it is 18 percentage points when they are engaged in non-agricultural 
formal and informal employment. Our results for agriculture and nonfarm occupations further 
suggest that the remaining gap in farming and rural activities is probably more due to subtle 
differences in access to markets and land quality than due to discrimination, whether employers 
or self-driven. However, we cannot eliminate the effect of past discrimination and accumulative 
discrimination on the current disparities in endowments between ethnic minority and majority 
groups. When ethnic minority was discriminated against and pushed into the remote and difficult 
area in the past, they would be trapped in areas with poor endowments and the disparities would 
even increase over time. Moreover, female ethnic minority members have lower earnings than 
Kinh or non-Kinh men in all but the public and agriculture sectors. In all models, the earning 
gap coefficients are extremely heterogeneous. Hmong, the poorest and least assimilated ethnic 
minority in Vietnam, face the largest earnings gap. The heterogeneity in ethnic earnings gaps 
raises the need of targeted public policies rather than a “one size fits all” policy for all ethnic 
minority groups.  
Decomposition results reflect the different pattern observed between gender and ethnic earnings 
gaps. Using a multinomial logit model to correct for selectivity into different employment 
sectors, we find that within-sector differences explain most of the gender earning gaps and 
between-sector differences favour male workers in terms of characteristics. While the gender 
earnings gap is small, the high proportion of the unexplained gap especially in the informal 
sector is noteworthy, where the gap is larger for wage earners with 87 percent of the gap left 
unexplained. Thus, our finding supports the common view that the gender earnings gaps are 
likely to be the result of employer-based discrimination. The ethnic earnings gap, however, is 
explained almost equally by within- and between-sector differences. This corresponds to our 
finding that the ethnic earnings gaps are captured almost entirely by the predominant 
participation of ethnic minorities in the agriculture sector. Besides, in contrast to our gender gap 
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results, we find that differences in characteristics make up about two third of the earnings gap 
between Kinh and non-Kinh. These findings confirm the existence of ethnic earnings gap in 
Vietnam (Pham and Reilly, 2009) and the necessity to strengthen policies to increase educational 
level and opportunities to access non-farm jobs for ethnic minority groups. Our findings are, to 
some extent, similar to what has been found in Latin American countries, namely that the ethnic 
earnings gap is higher than the gender earnings gap and that occupational segregation plays an 
important role (Atal et al., 2009), while it is not the case in some African countries (Nordman et 
al., 2011).  
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Chapter 3  
 
 
Ethnicity and risk sharing network formation 
Evidence from rural Vietnam 
 
Co-authored with Laure Pasquier-Doumer, and Camille Saint-Macary 
 
 
Abstract  
Ethnic gaps remain a persistent challenge for Viet Nam. This paper aims at exploring the 
mechanisms driving to ethnic inequality by analysing the formation of risk sharing networks in 
rural Viet Nam. After first showing important differences in terms of size and similarity 
attributes between the networks of ethnic minority and of Kinh households, we then explore 
homophily in link formation to explain such differences. We disentangle baseline homophily 
which derives from the different local distribution of ethnic groups, from inbreeding homophily 
which results from preferences to form links with similar people, and is associated to cultural and 
social distance between ethnic groups. We thus estimate various models to investigate the 
determinants of risk sharing networks attributes, among which ethnicity, geography, individual 
and household characteristics, as well as ethnic composition. Results show that ethnic minorities 
have smaller and less diversified networks than the majority. Ethnicity plays a direct role on 
network formation through the combination of baseline and inbreeding homophily mechanisms. 
Inbreeding homophily is found to be stronger among the Kinh majority, leading to the exclusion 
of ethnic minorities from Kinh networks, which are supposed to be more efficient to cope with 
covariant risk because they are more diversified in the occupation and location of their members. 
Our evidence suggests that inequalities among ethnic groups in Viet Nam are partly rooted in the 
cultural and social distances between them. 
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1 Introduction 
Accounting for only 15 per cent of the population but 70 per cent of Vietnam’s extreme poor 
(World Bank, 2012), ethnic minorities lag behind the Kinh majority despite Government’s effort 
to narrow the ethnic gap through numerous poverty alleviation programmes.  Poverty of ethnic 
minorities remains a persistent challenge for the country.  
The reasons for the existence and the persistence of this gap—despite the fast economic growth 
and high pace of poverty reduction experienced in Vietnam over the last decade—have been 
explored in the literature. Research highlights the existence of inequalities in the endowments 
between ethnic groups with a strong emphasis on geographical factor, but also shows differences 
in the returns to these endowments between Kinh and non Kinh, mainly regarding education, 
land holding, and access to credit (Baulch et al. 2007, 2012; Imai et al., 2015; Van de Walle and 
Gunewardena, 2001). In a recent example, Singhal and Beck (2015) show that the welfare gap 
between Kinh and non Kinh is explained by disparities in agricultural land quality, in the 
ownership of certificates, by lower diversification of non-farm jobs, and limited credit access, 
etc., even when the location factor is controlled for. In addition, this study also provides some 
descriptive evidence about ethnic segmentation in social networks.  
In this paper, we investigate the question of the ethnic inequality using the angle of risk sharing 
and social networks formation. We are motivated by the fact that risk, and the necessity to cope 
with it, is a pervasive feature of rural economic life, particularly in Vietnam’s mountainous areas, 
where ethnic minorities mostly live. There, the prevalence of risk is accentuated by climate 
change, by difficulties to cultivate fragile uplands, and by high transport costs, and is combined 
with low access to basic infrastructure, public services, and formal insurance (Van de Walle and 
Gunewardena, 2001; Imai et al., 2011; Tran, 2015). In this context of missing or failing market, 
the literature demonstrates the importance of the prevalence of bad shocks to explain the 
persistence of poverty (Morduch, 1994), and highlights risk sharing networks as a dominant 
means to cope with shocks for rural poor (Rockenbauch and Sakdapolrak, 2017).  
Ethnic minorities in Vietam mostly live in mountainous areas while the Kinh majority is present 
all over the country, but more concentrated in the lowland areas. This spatial segregation leads to 
important differences in endowments between ethnic groups, as well as in occupations, and in 
risk sharing networks. Yet, we expect that in addition to these important factors, ethnicity also 
plays a direct role in the formation of social networks  (Grimard, 1997) that leads to further 
dissimilarities that  may affect the ability of ethnic minority and majority groups to cope with 
shocks.  
Literature on homophily in link formation suggests that having similar characteristics like 
ethnicity is a strong predictor of two individuals being connected. Assortativity patterns could be 
a main mechanism of ethnic segregation (Jackson et al., 2016; Currarini et al., 2009; McPherson 
et al., 2001). Segregation can occur because of a lack of opportunities and/or low preferences to 
interact with people from different ethnic group. The opportunities for a group to interact with 
another group, defined as baseline homophily, depends on the size of the ethnic groups. Because 
the Kinh majority group constitutes 85% of the population while the 53 other ethnic groups 
account for the remaining part, opportunities to exchange with people from different ethnic 
group may differ a great deal across majority and minority ethnic groups. Opportunities to form 
a link also depend on the local distribution of ethnic groups. Preference to interact with people 
from the same ethnic group is called inbreeding homophily in the literature. Prejudice and 
stereotypes regarding ethnic minority people are prevalent in Vietnam, suggesting the existence 
of social and cultural distance across ethnic groups and differentiated preferences to interethnic 
interactions. It could lead to higher exclusion of non-Kinh people from Kinh risk sharing 
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network than predicted by their demography and local distribution. Thus, local distribution of 
ethnic groups and social distance across ethnic groups may explain differences in similarity 
patterns across ethnic group social networks.  
In this paper, we first describe various attributes of the risk sharing networks of households 
from the majority ethnic group and from minority ethnic groups and their differences. Ethnic 
minority groups are embedded in smaller risk sharing networks, which may imply a lower 
capacity to pool the risks. In addition, their network is characterized by higher similarity patterns 
in terms of occupation and location. Being connected with people with the same economic 
activity and living in the same village is expected to be less efficient when coping with covariant 
shocks. Indeed, covariant shocks, by definition, similarly affect people having the same activity 
and residing in the same geographical area. Starting from these observations, this paper aims at 
understanding which mechanisms are driving to theses observed differences, other than 
differences in geography and in socio-economic conditions that we control through fixed effects 
and other control variables. Here, we focus on homophily as a main mechanism of 
differentiation, and disentangle baseline homophily that is explained by differences in the local 
distribution of ethnic groups, from inbreeding homophily that results from preferences, and 
from cultural and social distance between ethnic groups. Providing empirical evidence on the 
impact of ethnicity on network formation is challenging since it requires identifying exogenous 
variations in ethnic composition at the local level. Our approach is to provide an in-depth 
descriptive assessment on the formation of risk sharing networks by characterizing the 
differences in network’s structure between the ethnic minority and majority groups, and by 
analysing multivariate correlations between ethnic composition within communes, geography, 
and risk sharing network features.  
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, it provides evidence in a developing country on 
the role played by ethnicity in the formation of risk sharing networks, and distinguishes various 
mechanisms through which it acts. The literature on this issue is up to now scarce. Yet, better 
understanding the differences in risk sharing networks between ethnic groups is likely to provide 
valuable information to address the ethnic gap which is a challenging issue in the context of 
Vietnam. Second, it provides a representative picture of the risk sharing formation process on a 
large scale (at least provincial level), going beyond most of studies on risk sharing network, that 
limit the validity of their results to some unrepresentative villages in a country. In addition, link 
formation outside the village is taken into consideration. This is all the more important since 
several studies have shown that the village is not the relevant risk sharing unit (Grimard, 1997, 
Jaramillo et al., 2015). Finally, by combining census and spatial data, along with household survey 
data, it links information on ethnicity composition and geographical environment at a very 
detailed level that is the commune. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time it has been 
done for Vietnam.12  
The rest of our paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the conceptual background of 
the paper; the dataset and definitions are shown in section 3. Section 4 then provides our 
descriptive analysis. We present our estimation strategy and results in section 5 and briefly 
conclude in section 6. 
 
                                                          
12 In Nguyen et al. (2017) for example, ethnic composition at the commune level is obtained from VHLSS 
household survey sample, which is not representative at such geographical level. In addition, the measurement of 
ethnic composition is oversimplified through a dummy variable taking the value 1 if at least two people have 
different ethnic group in the commune. The commune is thus defined as mixed commune but nothing is known 
about the distribution of ethnic groups in the commune. 
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2 Conceptual background 
2.1 Importance of risk sharing network in the strategies to cope with risk 
It is widely known that risks are highly prevalent in rural areas of developing countries and risk is 
considered a cause of poverty and its persistence. Indeed, people in rural and remote areas face 
high incidence of diseases, environmental hazards, and business risk due to self-employment 
activities (Fafchamps et al., 1998, Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006). As 
a consequence, shocks, and the risks that they occur, are central to people’s lives in rural areas. 
On the other hand, they do not have sufficient wealth to absorb the negative shocks while the 
formal mechanisms and institutions to deal with risks are limited in those areas.  
The adverse impacts of high exposure to shocks, however, could be compensated or mitigated 
by households’ strategy to reduce their impact. Literature has well documented the set of these 
strategies (Dercon, 2002), particularly risk sharing arrangements, where households share the risk 
with others through transfers in gift, money and/or labour.  
Risk sharing has been investigated theoretically and empirically in a vast literature, suggesting 
various forms of risk sharing networks. The theoretical works are based on a Pareto optimal 
model of risk pooling, conditional on the enforceability of risk sharing agreements/contracts 
(Coate and Ravallion, 1993; Townsend, 1994; Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007). Different 
motivations lead households to engage in risk sharing arrangements with other households. 
While risk-aversion is the main driver of risk sharing network formation, they can be sustained 
only if informal mechanisms of enforcement are at play, in contexts where reliance on the court 
system is not possible. Repeated game theory is one kind of possible enforcement mechanism in 
informal arrangements (Fafchamps, 2011). In the absence of altruism, long-term strategic 
interactions with expectation for mutual help and reciprocity may be sufficient to guarantee 
sustainable risk sharing arrangements. It is less true when shocks are persistent. Emotions such 
as altruism, guilt or shame which are usually embedded in redistributive social norms constitute 
another enforcement mechanism.   
2.2 Homophily as central pattern of risk sharing network formation  
Another strand of the literature on risk sharing networks investigates the formation of links. In 
this literature, to which this paper aims at contributing, the question is not why people form links 
with others, but with whom they choose to connect. One of the most pervasive patterns of link 
formation is homophily: having similar characteristics is generally a strong and significant 
predictor of two individuals being connected (McPherson et al., 2001). Although the benefit 
from sharing income risk is the largest when people have uncorrelated or negatively correlated 
incomes, and therefore when they have different characteristics, it is widely observed that links 
are more likely to be formed when social and geographical distance is the lowest. Indeed, 
distance also raises the cost of establishing and maintaining interpersonal links, and weakens 
enforcement mechanisms. Numerous empirical studies illustrate this pattern, like Fafchamps and 
Gubert (2007), who find that informal arrangements in rural Philippines are based on social and 
geographical proximity.  
Homophily may impact risk sharing efficiency through three channels. First, it could make the 
size of the network smaller than the optimal size as individuals connect mostly with close or 
similar individuals. Based on the hypothesis of single-person deviation alone, theoretical  models 
predict that larger groups allow for more diversification of shocks, leading to higher gains from 
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sharing risk (Genicot and Ray, 2003).13 Second, social and geographical proximity may impede 
the risk pooling group to diversify their risk, especially when covariant risks are predominant. 
Neighbours are more likely to face simultaneously a covariant shock like flood or pest making 
risk sharing arrangements unsustainable. Households sharing the same activity in the same area 
will be similarly impacted by crop or input price changes. Due to a limited resource endowment, 
risk sharing networks of a poor ethnic minority community have less capacity to smoothen 
income variation within this community. Studying income diversification in rural Kerala, Johny 
et al. (2017) show that caste based homophily negatively affects the risk management strategy:  
networks with strong intra-caste connections associate with less diversification of income 
sources. Third, homophily reversely helps to cope with idiosyncratic shocks by lowering 
transaction costs or information asymmetries, and by strengthening mutual enforcement. Using 
randomized experiments across 34 Indian villages, Chandrasekhar et al. (2014) demonstrate that 
socially close individuals maintain high levels of cooperation even when contract enforcement is 
removed, while more distant individuals do not. Attanasio et al. (2012) observe from an 
experiment conducted in 70 Colombian communities that close individuals are more likely to 
join the same risk pooling group and they group assortatively on risk attitudes, while socially 
distant participants group less and rarely assort. They conclude that social homophily is a 
necessary condition to benefit from advantages to grouping assortatively on risk attitudes.  
2.3 Baseline and inbreeding homophily to explain ethnic segregation in the networks 
Yet, the role of ethnic-based homophily in risk sharing network formation has been poorly 
documented, especially in developing countries. Existing studies on ethnic-based homophily 
mostly deal with friendship network formation in developed countries. Notably, Currarini et al. 
(2009) examine friendship patterns in US high schools. Their theoretical model and empirical 
estimation show that larger ethnic groups form significantly more friendships per capita. In 
addition, larger ethnic groups tend to form more ties with people from the same ethnic group 
and fewer from other ethnic groups than small ethnic groups. McPherson et al. (2001) or 
Jackson et al. (2016) review other empirical studies demonstrating similar results. 
Sociologists have decomposed ethnic based homophily into two mechanisms: the first one, 
called baseline homophily, relies on ethnic composition and demographic of ethnic groups; the 
second one, called inbreeding homophily, on preferences. According to baseline homophily, link 
formation across ethnic groups depends on their relative size. The demography conditions the 
potential tie pool, i.e the opportunities of a group to interact with another group. The more 
numerous an ethnic group, the more likely is one of its member to meet and thus to interact with 
someone from the same ethnic group. As for inbreeding homophily, it refers to a selection 
process within the set of opportunities to interact, or in other words the preference of interacting 
with someone from the same ethnic group. As a result, the propensity for ethnic groups to form 
links with co-ethnic people exceeds their relative fractions in the population. Various reasons for 
inbreeding homophily can be found in the literature: shared cultural traits and other co-ethnic 
related factors like language would help people to interact more effectively and on a longer term, 
to be better able to judge their co-ethnic’s characteristics, to use information or rules to maintain 
the effective cooperation (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005) or to apply social sanctioning (Khwaja, 
                                                          
13 However, with coalitional deviations hypothesis, the relationship between risk sharing network size and efficiency 
becomes unclear, as larger groups can be destabilised by smaller sub-groups that can renege on the informal 
arrangement, and thant are large enough to provide significant levels of risk sharing (Genicot and Ray, 2003). The 
empirical literature testing the relationship between size and efficiency is scarce. To our knowledge, only Fitzsimons 
et al. (2018) analyses this relationship in the context of family risk-sharing networks in Malawi. They find  that 
households where the wife has many brothers achieve worse risk-sharing relative to households where she has fewer 
brothers. 
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2009; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005). Other-regarding preferences  may be another reason as far as 
people tend to care more about the welfare of their co-ethnic people than the one of non co-
ethnic people (Habyarimana et al., 2007). 
2.4 Contribution of the paper to risk sharing network literature 
From literature on homophily in link formation, mostly relating to developed countries, one 
might expect that ethnic groups have different risk sharing network structures in terms of size 
and similarity, which in turn could affect the efficiency of these networks to cope with covariant 
and idiosyncratic risks. To the best of our knowledge, no study investigates the difference among 
ethnic groups in terms of the risk sharing networks in developing countries, although this may 
explain why some ethnic groups are more vulnerable to shocks than others. One exception is 
Arcand and Jaimovich (2014). Relying on the census of almost complete networks in 59 villages 
in The Gambia, they investigate whether ethnic diversity within villages affects the structure of 
networks where land, labour, inputs, and credit are exchanged. In particular, they test if ethnic 
fragmentation and polarization explain features of the exchange network, which are its density, 
its compactness, and its clustering, or affect the probability of forming a link with individuals 
from the same ethnic group. The authors find no evidence of any effects of ethnic diversity on 
the network architecture or on the probability to form a link. In addition, they find that 
households belonging to ethnic minorities do not have less economic interactions on average. 
However, as acknowledged by the authors, this study has been conducted in a very specific 
context where religion and culture are common to most villagers despite ethnic heterogeneity. 
This leads the authors to call for other evidence about the effect of ethnic diversity on social 
networks in context where social distance between ethnic groups is observed. In addition, 
exchange networks may substantively differ from risk sharing networks as they include effective 
exchanges and not the potential ones.  
This paper aims at contributing to the literature on the risk sharing formation by investigating 
whether and why ethnic minority groups in Vietnam differ in the structure of their network 
compared to the ethnic majority group. Structure is approached here by the size and the 
similarity patterns of the network. The idea is to scrutinize two mechanisms that are baseline 
homophily and inbreeding homophily. In other words, we try to disentangle the effects of 
demography of ethnic groups and their local distribution from the effect of social distance 
between ethnic groups. While doing so, we take into account the heterogeneity of geographical 
environment explaining differences in the cost of forming and maintaining links.  
2.5 Relevance and evidence in the context of Vietnam 
This question is particularly relevant in the context of Vietnam, as it provides new insights on the 
persistence of the ethnic gap. Although ethnic gap remains one important challenge of the 
political agenda, inequalities in risk sharing networks across ethnic groups have not yet been 
examined, even less their underlying mechanisms. However, scattered and circumstantial 
evidence suggests that ethnic-based difference in risk sharing networks is an issue in Vietnam. 
Zylberberg (2010) finds that households from ethnic minorities participate significantly less in 
risk-pooling in the aftermath of a typhoon than Kinh do. Tran (2015) finds that the Kinh have 
larger risk sharing networks than households from ethnic minority groups.  
In addition, recent migration patterns make the local distribution of ethnic groups of great 
interest as it presents a large spectrum of situation. Oversimplifying, Kinh people mainly 
occupied the delta and the coastal areas, while ethnic minorities lived in the highland areas, 
especially in Northern and Central Vietnam. Until the Independence, mixed communes with 
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Kinh and ethnic minority people were rare (Déry, 2003).14 From the Independence but especially 
after the reunification in 1975, voluntarist resettlement policy has been conducted by the 
government. Numerous Kinh households have moved to the mountainous areas and lived with 
the ethnic minorities for the purpose, among others, of integrating ethnic minorities in the 
country’s political path and building national unity (Mc Elwee, 2004; Saint-Macary, 2014). 
According to the Marxist theory of nationalities, the minorities must, in contact with Kinh 
majority, change their habits and adopt new practices (Hardy and Nguyen, 2004). Policies of 
sedentarization of ethnic minority communities practicing slash-and-burn agriculture started to 
be implemented in the same period (Nguyen et al., 2017). In addition, existence of settlements 
due to government programmes gave rise to networks and spontaneous migration (Hardy, 2003). 
It is estimated that between 1976 and the late 90s, up to six million people resettled in the whole 
country (UNDP, 1998). As a result, the ethnic composition of mountainous areas has completely 
changed, and communes mixing Kinh with ethnic minority people are a relatively recent 
phenomenon. Compared to ethnic minority groups, Kinh people benefit from demographic 
preponderance but also from being spread in the whole territory. As such, their potential tie pool 
is much larger and more widely spread. According to baseline homophily, one should expect 
larger risk sharing networks with more co-ethnics and less geographical and occupational 
similarity. 
Finally, sociologists and anthropologists have demonstrated the existence of social distance 
between Kinh and ethnic minority people in various contexts of Vietnam. The sociologist Vu 
Hong Phong (2013) conducted field work on interethnic relationship in Muong Khen, a rural 
town in northwest mountainous Vietnam where Muong, native to the area, and Kinh, internal 
migrants, are living together. It shows complex interethnic relations resulting from inflow of 
Kinh migrants from lowland provinces, the settlement of Kinh families in Muong villages, the 
establishment of multiethnic rural cooperatives, the Vietnam War, and the economic reform 
(Đổi mới) which dismantled the rural cooperatives and urged many Kinh families to leave 
Muong villages. Although cooperation between Kinh and Muong people can be found, a lot of 
tensions remain due to competition over resources and stereotypes. According to the author, 
many Kinh still ascribe ‘drinking heavily’, ‘nepotism’ (cục bộ) and ‘backwardness’ (lạc hậu) to the 
Muong; meanwhile, many Muong still think that the Kinh ‘look down’ at them, and attribute 
‘lacking in sentiments’ and ‘cunning’ to the Kinh. Some interviews of Kinh people illustrate this 
social distance:  ‘When the Kinh came here, they always married Kinh and never married Muong. They 
considered the Muong mọi [savage], therefore, they did not marry them! I knew they did not marry them because 
they were proud of themselves. The Muong did not think like that. Only the Kinh thought like that…’ (Kinh 
man, 80 years old, Case 9)” (Vu Hong Phong, 2013, p.179), or ‘though some people in the Muong village 
are just like us, many are keeping up with their customs. The thing is that I do not want to follow their customs. 
They are complicated! They are not as simple as ours are. I was tired of following their customs. If I had sworn 
brotherhood with a Kinh, it would have been easier.’ (Kinh man, 36 years old, Case 34) , (Vu Hong Phong, 
2013, p.175). Looking at the prevalence of interethnic relationships which is higher among 
Muong than that among Kinh, the author concludes that social distance between Muong and 
Kinh seems to be bigger for Kinh than for Muong. Similar results are found by the 
anthropologist Dương Bích Hạnh (2008) in the context of Sa Pa in the Northern highlands 
between Hmong and Kinh, or by McElwee (2008) between Kinh and several minority groups, 
including Vân Kiju, Pa Cô, Pa Hy, and Ka Tu in the mountains of the central coast where 
cultural stereotypes held by both sides, Kinh migrants and minorities, continue to shape social 
relations. Thus, prejudice and stereotypes regarding ethnic minority people are prevalent, and the 
                                                          
14 However, communes composed of a single ethnic group were an exception as different ethnic minority groups 
were living next to one another (Vasavakul, 2003). 
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media contributes to spread them, as shown by ISEE (2011) in a review of 500 articles from the 
four most popular newspapers.  
Social distance between ethnic minorities and the majority, which may not be symmetric, could 
lead to the segregation of ethnic minority people from Kinh network, through inbreeding 
homophily process. Studying the Hmong in northern Vietnam, the anthropologist Jean Michaud 
(2008) shows that in Sa Pa and Bac Hà, despite the local ethnic composition where Hmong 
constitute the majority, not only political entities like Popular Committee are dominated by Kinh 
people, but also they favour Kinh entrepreneurs at least by cultural inclinations. Consequently, 
Hmong are excluded from Kinh economic networks.   
 
3 The data and definition 
3.1 Data source 
This study uses the Vietnam Access to  Resources Household Survey (VARHS).15 The VARHS 
includes both commune and household questionnaires. The commune questionnaire contains 
demographic information on the commune, shocks, infrastructure, access to services, and 
development programmes. The household questionnaire covers the household roster, general 
characteristics of its members and housing; a module on land and crop agriculture; employment; 
food expenditure, savings and credit; shocks and risk coping; migration; political connections 
and social capital. Initially, around 2,000 rural households sampled for the 2002 and 2004 
Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS)’s income and expenditure components 
were surveyed in the VARHS. In 2006, 126 randomly chosen households were supplemented to 
the sample in order to constitute a representative sample for rural population of 12 provinces 
(Brandt and Tarp, 2017). Those provinces include one province in the Red River Delta, four 
provinces in the North; three in the Central Coast, three in Central Highlands and one on 
Mekong River Delta. The data is representative at provincial level. The survey has been then 
implemented every two years from 2008 to 2016 in 467 rural communes; with more than 2,200 
households each year and a balanced panel of 2,131 households.  
We explore the modules on social network as well as the module on shocks and risk coping. We 
also match the VARHS with the Vietnam Census of 200916 to extract information on ethnic 
composition and occupation at the commune level. We are able to calculate the share of each 
ethnic group in the commune and construct an index of ethnic heterogeneity and occupational 
diversity at the commune level. Then, we investigate to which extent social networks differ 
between ethnic minorities and the Kinh majority in Vietnam’s rural areas; explore how much of 
these differences is due to communes’ ethnic compositions and to environmental contexts. For 
the last purpose, we acquire information from GeoQuery17 to characterize households’ 
                                                          
15 This survey has been collected under the long-term collaboration between the Development Economics Research 
Group (DERG), University of Copenhagen and different Vietnamese institutes, namely Central Institute for 
Economic Management (CIEM), the Institute of Labour Science and Social Affairs (ILSSA), and the Institute of 
Policy and Strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development (IPSARD). 
16 This is the latest Population and Housing Census in Vietnam, conducted in 2009 by General Statistics Office with 
technical and financial support from the UNFPA. The census covered all Vietnamese citizens usually residing in 
Vietnam as of the census date and Vietnamese persons who had been permitted to go overseas within an authorized 
period. The 15 per cent sample of the Census is used in our study. 
17 GeoQuery is an open source providing access to custom subsets of spatial data. Data requests are available at 
http://geo.aiddata.org/query. 
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environment contexts, including physical elevation, travel distance, and night time light density. 
We match the Census, Geo-data and VARHS by name of communes. Due to the matching gap, 
we are able to match 428 communes out of 467 communes. Our study is then based on a sample 
of 11,180  observations in 428 communes.   
3.2 Risk sharing networks measures 
We use the name generator approach to measure risk sharing network; this approach has been 
widely employed in social network literature (Bidart and Charbonneau, 2012). In VARHS, the 
name generator tool is used to ask each household head to name the three most important 
contacts that he/she would ask for help in case of cash emergency;18 then, a series of questions 
are raised to get detailed information on ethnicity, occupation or living area of those contacts.  
The advantage of using name generator approach in social network studies is that we are able to 
capture broadly rich data about one household’s network (ego-centered network) composition. 
However, we use a censored measure of social network , which could lead to bias our results: 
since we only have information about the three most important contacts, it is likely that the 
household head would think first about the ones who are easily remembered, likely the closer of 
his/her contacts, such as relatives or co-ethnic people. Burt (1986) identified it in network data 
as the kinship bias . In other words, risk sharing network based on this censored information 
could be more homophile in general; the bridging tie or heterogeneity in their network would be 
underestimated accordingly. As a result, the difference in risk sharing network between Kinh and 
non-Kinh, due to the higher heterogeneity in Kinh’s network, could be underestimated. We will 
take this potential bias into account in interpreting our results. Detailed discussion of the 
censored network bias is in Appendix (Table D). We show that the uncensored network size is 
indeed bigger than the censored one, by 1.8 contacts on average. The gap is positively correlated 
with male-headed households, households with higher educated heads, better off households, 
and Kinh households.   
Corresponding to the research questions and hypothesis we raise, risk sharing network of the 
households are investigated by size and by similarity feature. Firstly, size of the household’s 
network is measured by the total number of people that the households could reach for if they 
need help. This measure does not rely on the name generators but on a general question on how 
many people can be asked for help in case of cash emergency. Therefore, the size of the network 
is not censored.  
Secondly, based on the name generators, we calculate the same ethnic ties proportion within the 
risk sharing network of each household in order to examine whether the likelihood of Kinh to 
link up with another Kinh is higher than their relative share in the commune. In fact, this co-
ethnic share in their network is not limited within Kinh and non-Kinh  but corresponds to the 
ethnicity of the household. For instance, if the household head is Thai, we can calculate the 
proportion of Thai in his/her network.     
Given our hypotheses that the risk sharing network of non-Kinh are more homogenous than 
Kinh, we measure the network’s similarity by: i) the proportion of same occupation ties19; and ii) 
                                                          
18 More specifically, the question asked is: If you were in need of money in case of an emergency, who outside of 
your household could you turn to; who would be willing to provide this assistance?  This question is widely used in 
the literature to capture risk-sharing networks.  
19 For each contact named, the household head is asked: Does [NAME] have the same occupation like yours? . The 
proportion of same occupation ties is the ratio between the number of contacts for whom the household head 
answered yes to this question, and the total number of contacts. 
114 
 
the proportion of within-village contacts in their risk sharing network.20 The underlying reason 
for our indicator selection is that depending on the type of shocks, these characteristics of 
household’s risk sharing network will play a different role. To cope with a covariant shock that 
happened at the village scale, knowing someone from another village could benefit the 
household (Bramouillé and Kranton, 2007); and to cope with a covariant shock which is related 
to household’s business and occurs on a large scale, knowing someone who has a different 
occupation will be an advantage (Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007).  
3.3 Ethnic groups: definition, distribution and heterogeneity 
In this study, we consider a household as ethnic minority if the head of the household belongs to 
any other ethnic groups than Kinh majority. Ethnic identification is one of the main concerns in 
studies on ethnic minorities since it is considered as ‘multidimensional, fluid and contextual’ 
(Pasquier-Doumer and Brandon, 2015). Thus, the literature provides two approaches to identify 
ethnicity, which are self-identification and objective ethnic markers, in which language is the 
most common measure used in the later concept. In Vietnam, however, official classification 
exists and it is widely accepted by the population. According to this official category, Kinh ethnic 
group which accounts for 85 per cent of the population is considered as the ethnic majority 
while 53 other ethnic groups are defined as ethnic minority groups in Vietnam. Thus, self-
assessment is employed to identify ethnicity in administration data and surveys like the 2009 
Census and VARHS. Although the Hoa/Chinese group is often combined with Kinh as the 
majority in several studies due to the well-off status of the Hoa (van de Walle and Gunewardena, 
2000), we consider them as an ethnic minority since there are only four Hoa households in 
VARHS data.  
We are aware of the fact that ethnic minority is not a ʻhomogenous’ group and it would be ideal 
to distinguish each group. However, due to the small number of observations of each ethnic 
minority group, our study mainly focuses on aggregating all ethnic minority groups as one group 
in order to compare with Kinh majority. In an extension, we decompose the ethnic minority 
groups into Thai, Tay, Hmong and others. The choice is based on the fact that these groups are 
among the four largest ethnic minority groups in Vietnam, and thus account for a non-negligible  
share in our sample of ethnic minorities. Another limitation is that we are not able to take into 
account interethnic marriage of the heads of household that may affect the composition of their 
network. Unfortunately, we do not have information on ethnicity of any other household member 
than the household head, so we are not able to control for this effect. However, interethnic 
marriage are rare in Vietnam. According to our own calculation with the 2009 Census, So, the figure 
of inter-ethnic marriage in Vietnam (according to the Census 2009), only 4 per cent of married 
people have a spouse from another ethnic group.
21
 The more detailed analysis of Dang and Nguyen 
(2015) confirms the low prevalence of inter-ethnic marriage in Vietnam, which suggests that the 
underestimation of the similarity in the ethnic composition of the network may be of little concern. 
To explore the local patterns of ethnicity distribution, we map the data from the 2009 Census to 
display the geographic distribution of the Kinh, and other ethnic groups at the commune level, 
as presented in Figures 1 and 2. Aforementioned, Vietnam is an ethnically diverse country 
(Figure 1). The Kinh live almost everywhere in Vietnam but mainly occupy the delta and the 
coastal areas while ethnic minorities mostly live in the highland areas, especially in central and 
                                                          
20 For each contact named, the household head is asked: Does [NAME]  live in this village? . The proportion of 
within-village contacts is the ratio between the number of contacts for whom the household head answered yes to 
this question, and the total number of contacts. 
21 For the Kinh, this proportion is 2 per cent only. It is 12.3 per cent for non-Kinh people. 
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northern Vietnam (Figure 2). These maps highlight the spatial segregation between ethnic groups 
in Vietnams’ rural areas. Ethnic minorities tend to live in areas where barriers to the expansion 
of social networks can be important: high ethnic diversity, greater remoteness and large transport 
costs. Besides, as discussed above, thanks to various migration waves of the Kinh into ethnic 
minority areas, more than 70 per cent of the communes are mixed, and Kinh are present in 
almost all, but represent a minority in those mountainous and heterogeneous communes.  
Figure 1. Ethnic polarization in Vietnam Figure 2. Kinh distribution in Vietnam 
Source : 2009 Census and GeoQuery, based on authors’ calculations. 
In addition to ethnic distribution, we build a measure of ethnic diversity at the commune level, 
based on 2009 Census data. In the literature on ethnic heterogeneity studies, the two most 
common measures of ethnic diversity are ethnic fragmentation and ethnic polarization (Esteban 
and Ray, 2011). In this paper, we focus on the ethnic heterogeneity that is expected to strengthen 
inter-ethnic group social distance and thus ethnic inbreeding within groups. The ethnic 
polarization index is relevant for this purpose:  theoretical and empirical studies have shown a 
close link between ethnic polarization and ethnic tension or conflict (Moltano and Reynal-
Querol, 2005, Esteban and Ray, 2011). The main idea is that ethnic tension is higher in a 
situation where an ethnic majority group faces a large ethnic minority group (Horowitz, 1985), 
meaning ethnic conflict might occur more under the condition of a few relatively large-sized 
ethnic groups rather than in the case of one group facing several small-sized groups. If the ethnic 
tension is higher in a more polarized commune, the inter-ethnic connection between different 
groups would be lower, leading to a higher ethnic segregation in risk sharing network.   
We use the polarization index that is originally proposed by Moltano and Reynal-Querol (2005) 
under the form of: 
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Where     is the share of ethnic group i in commune c. The Reynal-Querol polarization index 
(RQ index) can be interpreted as how far the distribution of ethnic groups in commune c is from 
the bimodal distribution. In other words, this index is at the highest value when there are only 
two groups in a commune with the same size. Figure 1 with the ethnic heterogeneity in Vietnam 
is based on this polarization index calculation. 
3.4 Geographical environment/ cost of physical distance 
Our objective is to understand the determinants of network formation between the ethnic 
majority and minorities, thus, we need to disentangle the differences in households’ responses 
not only to their households’ characteristics, particularly ethnicity factor, but also to communes’ 
features. In Vietnam, ethnic minorities often live in geographically difficult environments (i.e. 
mountainous). A recurrent question in  studies on ethnic gap in Vietnam is  whether ethnic gap 
is mostly determined by unobserved differences in living areas between ethnic groups, in 
particular remoteness  (Baulch et al., 2007, Epprecht et al., 2009, van de Walle and 
Gunewardena, 200). At the same time, according to the risk sharing network literature, physical 
distance is one barrier in forming the network. Indeed, literature on risk sharing arrangements 
highlights the importance of transaction costs in forming a connection, especially in developing 
countries because of the limitations in financial systems and infrastructure (Jack and Suri, 2014). 
Aida (2015) shows that due to the strong association between transaction costs embedded in 
monitoring or enforcement efforts and physical distance, we can use physical distance as a proxy 
for this type of cost in the formation of risk sharing network. Empirical results (De Weerdt, 
2004; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007) have reassured the negative role of physical distance.    
Thus, controlling for the geographical disparity among ethnic groups would help us to 
understand not only the role of ethnic homophily but also the role of geographical remoteness in 
risk sharing formation.  
In our study, we use four different measures of physical distance or remoteness. First, we use 
elevation measure, indicating the mountainous areas. Second, we calculate the difference 
between the minimum and maximum of elevation in each commune; this measure would help us 
to identify the variation of the terrain height, within each commune. Indeed, given the same 
mean of elevation, living in a flat surface would be easier for people to travel rather than in a 
high, sloped terrain. Our third measure is the average travel time between a commune and the 
nearest city of at least 50,000 people. Our argument for this measure of distance is that the 
shorter the time in commuting, the less costly for people to reach out for a relatively further 
connection. Traveling time also overcomes the limitation of using distance in kilometres since we 
cannot control for the quality of roads. Besides, easy accessibility to a relatively big town 
provides higher opportunities for people to get access to bigger market for agricultural products, 
non-farm jobs, public services such as healthcare and education (Epprecht et al., 2009), and 
other social-cultural activities; as a consequence, people can have more chance to diversify their 
network. Lastly, we use the night time light density from 1996 to 2000 as a proxy for the 
differences in development of each area. As recently discussed in the literature, nighttime light 
intensity is considered as a good proxy for economic activity and development (Henderson et al., 
2012, Hodler and Raschky, 2014). In turn, travel cost are supposed be negatively associated with 
economic activity and development. We use all geographical data for the year 2000 and before to 
mitigate any reverse causality biases. 
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4 Descriptive statistics 
We start our analysis with a comparison between ethnic groups of the households’ 
characteristics, including their shock exposure, the characteristics of the risk sharing network of 
their head, and their geographical environment. In addition, we aim at providing a broad view of 
the socio-economic differences between Kinh and non-Kinh,whether they live in ethnic mixed 
communes or in non-mixed communes. We consider a commune as mixed if there are at least 
two ethnic groups living in the commune, then, there are 119 non mixed communes and 309 
mixed communes. Since we are interested in the differences in network formation between Kinh 
and non-Kinh, we only consider mixed communes in which Kinh households are present, 
excluding three mixed communes without Kinh in our descriptive analysis. 
Table 1 presents the differences in welfare characteristics between Kinh and non-Kinh 
households. It is seen that Kinh households are always better off than ethnic minorities in terms 
of monthly food consumption or annual income per capita; they have higher savings and also 
better access to formal and informal loans. Even though Kinh households are less likely to 
receive public transfers, the amount of their transfers is still higher than those of non-Kinh 
households. This result seems to support the possibility that in Vietnam, policies targeting ethnic 
minority are designed based on the geographical area but not directly minority households, thus, 
the benefits of those policies would be captured better by the Kinh living in those areas than 
ethnic minorities (Van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001). It is also noticeable that across all 
indicators, the welfare gaps are widened in mixed communes.  
Table 1. Household’s characteristics by ethnicity and commune’s ethnic heterogeneity 
 Kinh 
(n=8,858) 
Non-Kinh 
(n=2,317) 
Difference 
(T-test) 
 Kinh 
(n=5,819) 
Non-Kinh 
(=2,159) 
Difference 
(T-test) 
 In all 428 communes 
 
 In 306 mixed communes with Kinh 
 
Per capita food consumption (monthly) 465.19 247.58 217.61*** 
 
476.04 249.81 226.24*** 
Per capita income (annual) 24,938.69 13,136.48 11,802.21*** 
 
25,803.62 13,354.95 12,448.68*** 
Irrigated land area owned 3,689.64 4,582.92 -893.28*** 
 
3,308.10 4,669.33 -1,361.23*** 
Value of durables 68,758.28 19,532.35 49,225.93 
 
84,222.94 19,857.34 64,365.59 
Savings 40,645.36 12,999.56 27,645.80*** 
 
45,027.79 13,350.08 31,677.71*** 
Total loans 29,384.51 12,039.47 17,345.03*** 
 
32,725.43 12,297.28 20,428.16*** 
Formal loans 21,455.01 8,972.24 12,482.77*** 
 
24,430.30 9,130.55 15,299.75*** 
Informal loans 5,924.50 2,044.58 3,879.91*** 
 
6,062.83 2,086.69 3,976.14*** 
Private transfer 6,956.57 3,032.85 3,923.72*** 
 
7,005.85 3,114.05 3,891.80*** 
Public transfer 5,900.75 4,595.08 1,305.67*** 
 
6,133.95 4,686.89 1,447.06*** 
Private transfer dummy 0.55 0.46 0.09*** 
 
0.55 0.46 0.09*** 
Public transfer dummy 0.39 0.75 -0.36*** 
 
0.37 0.74 -0.37*** 
Note: Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2008-2016 VARHS. 
Table 2 presents the differences in shock exposure between ethnic minorities and majority. The 
VARHS data allows us to examine different types of shocks, including covariant shocks and 
idiosyncratic shocks. Within covariant shocks, it is also possible to distinguish between natural 
shocks such as floods, typhoons or pest infestation, and economic shocks such as crop price 
changes or input price changes. Idiosyncratic shocks include health shocks or death of the 
household’s members, crime or theft, divorce or family dispute. In general, covariant shocks are 
much more prevalent than idiosyncratic shocks. In addition, ethnic minority households are 
more likely to be exposed to shocks than Kinh households, and this difference is driven by their 
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higher likelihood of facing natural shocks. Meanwhile, Kinh households reveal that they face 
more idiosyncratic shocks compared to ethnic minorities. In fact, health shock is the main driven 
factor of idiosyncratic shocks, and the higher health shocks answered by Kinh could be likely 
due to subjective perception of illness. It is well known that illness perception is positively 
correlated by wealth, which may explain that Kinh could be more likely to declare health issue 
even if their illness incidence is not higher than for non-Kinh. 
Table 2. Household’s shock exposure by ethnicity and commune’s ethnic heterogeneity 
 Kinh (n=8,858) 
Non-Kinh 
(n=2,317) 
Difference 
(T-test) 
 Kinh 
(n=5,819) 
Non-Kinh 
(=2,159) 
Difference 
(T-test) 
 In all 428  communes  In 306 mixed communes with Kinh 
Covariant shock 0.26 0.56 -0.30***  0.26 0.44 -0.30*** 
Natural shock dummy 0.24 0.54 -0.30***  0.24 0.54 -0.31*** 
Pest shock 0.15 0.41 -0.26***  0.15 0.41 -0.26*** 
Economic shock dummy (covariate) 0.04 0.05 -0.01**  0.04 0.05 -0.010* 
Idiosyncratic shock  0.14 0.11 0.03***  0.14 0.11 0.03*** 
Illness shock 0.12 0.08 0.03***  0.11 0.08 0.03*** 
Note: Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2008-2016 VARHS. 
So, descriptive statistics show that non-Kinh are worse off than Kinh and at the same time, they 
are more exposed to covariant shocks. These findings motivate us to continue examining 
another but closely related concept that is vulnerability. 22 Results are presented in Appendix 2. 
Two main conclusions can be driven from this vulnerability analysis: (i) vulnerability is high23 but 
especially for non-Kinh households that are more severely affected by shocks, (ii) covariant 
shocks are a more important source of vulnerability than idiosyncratic shocks24, knowing from 
Table 2 that covariant are more prevalent than idiosyncratic shocks, and that non-Kinh 
experience more often covariant shocks than Kinh. This justifies why we are interested in 
analysing differences in risk sharing networks between the two groups in terms of size and 
similarities among alters. 
Differences in risk sharing networks of Kinh and non-Kinh are first explored in Table 3. 
Regarding the size of their networks, Kinh are more likely to have larger networks. Kinh 
households have on average 4 contacts in their network while the size is only 3.3 for non-Kinh 
households. Difference in network size holds true whatever mixed or non-mixed communes are 
considered. Then, regarding the structure of their network, we find that proportion of the same 
ethnic ties in household’s risk sharing network is significantly higher for Kinh than for non-
Kinh. This result is in line with our inbreeding homophily hypothesis according to which non-
Kinh would be segregated from Kinh’s network since Kinh are more likely to link with another 
Kinh. We can explore the similarity among contacts in the networks in terms of occupation and 
location. As expected, the network of Kinh is more diverse while the network of ethnic minority 
groups is more homophile. The proportion of contacts having the same occupation is higher for 
ethnic minority households: 79 per cent of ethnic minorities’ risk sharing network is people 
                                                          
22 We use the measure of vulnerability as expected utility (Ligon and Schechter, 2003). Vulnerability is defined as the 
difference between household’s utility obtained from some certainty equivalent consumption and the expected 
utility of consumption.  
23 The estimated vulnerability in terms of food consumption is 0.785, which means on average, utility of a household 
is 78.5% less than the utility in a riskless situation without any inequality across all households and time periods 
(consumption and utility will be equal to one if the household is not vulnerable).  
24 By decomposition, we see that one third of the vulnerability is due to poverty; aggregate shock accounts for 4%, 
idiosyncratic shocks make up a small proportion while the unexplained shock accounts for half of the vulnerability. 
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doing the same jobs while the proportion is only around 50 per cent for Kinh. Regarding the 
location, the network is more limited within the village for ethnic minorities than for the Kinh 
majority. In other word, Kinh households are more likely to ask for help across villages.  
Table 3. Household’s risk sharing network by ethnicity 
 Kinh Non-Kinh Difference (T-test) N 
 Kinh Non-Kinh Difference (T-test) N 
 In all 428  communes  In 306 mixed communes with Kinh 
Total contacts 3.95 3.30 0.64*** 11,175  3.93 3.33 0.60*** 7,978 
Same ethnic tie proportion 
0.98 0.91 0.07*** 
 
10,487 
 
0.98 0.91 0.07*** 
 
7,466 
Relative contact proportion 0.72 0.66 0.06*** 
 
10,487 
 
0.73 0.66 0.07*** 
 
7,466 
Same occupation proportion 0.51 0.79 -0.28*** 
 
10,487 
 
0.50 0.79 -0.28*** 
 
7,466 
Within village contact proportion 
0.70 0.83 -0.12*** 
 
10,487 
 
0.70 0.82 -0.12*** 
 
7,466 
Note: Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2008-2016 VARHS. 
Given our interest in the role of social distance and remoteness, we explore how social and 
geographical environment’s factors vary between non-mixed and mixed communes in Table 4. 
All indicators show that geographic distances are worse in mixed communes where ethnic 
minority mostly live than in non-mixed communes: mixed-communes are characterized not only 
by high altitude mountainous areas but also by a large variance of elevation/uneven terrain, high 
travel time to the nearest 50,000 population city and low level of night time light. Accordingly, 
ethnic minority groups living in ethnically heterogeneous environment have more constraints to 
build a diverse network because transportation cost inside the commune is higher suggesting 
higher transaction cost with people out of the village. These geographical differences come along 
with less occupation diversity in mixed-communes as shown by the higher share of farming 
activities in these communes or the lower value of the index of occupational diversity.25 This 
reflects lower opportunities in mixed-communes to form diverse risk sharing network in terms 
of occupation than in non-mixed communes. 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of communes 
 
All 
communes 
(n=428) 
119 non mixed 
communes 
306 mixed 
communes 
Differenc
e 
(T-test) 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)  
Ethnic composition variables        
Share of Kinh 0.76 0.37 0.97 0.18 0.68 0.39 0.29*** 
Share of Tay 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.10 -0.02** 
Share of Thai 0.06 0.20 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.23 -0.08*** 
Share of Hmong 0.05 0.18 0.03 0.16 0.06 0.19 -0.04* 
Ethnic polarization index 0.20 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.33 -0.28*** 
Geographic variables 
Elevation 286.30 
374.2
3 69.75 199.93 365.23 391.24 
-
295.48*** 
Difference between min and max of elevation 
411.6
1 
557.4
7 174.07 317.54 499.45 602.92 
-
325.39*** 
Distance (travelling minutes) to the nearest city in 
2000 
175.1
7 
155.3
3 
112.95 95.93 198.16 167.42 -85.20*** 
                                                          
25 See section 3.3 for a presentation of this index.  
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Mean of night time light from 1996 to 2000 3.42 4.42 4.70 4.67 2.96 4.24 1.74*** 
Number of villages 10.93 8.04 9.48 9.94 11.50 7.14 -2.02** 
Occupation variables 
Occupational diversity index 0.45 0.26 0.53 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.10*** 
Farming (agriculture, forestry and fishing) 0.69 0.24 0.65 0.21 0.71 0.24 -0.06** 
Note: Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2008-2016 VARHS. 
There is, even though not new, a striking difference between Kinh and non-Kinh’s welfare and 
shock experience. Ethnic minority people are also found to be more vulnerable due to aggregate 
shocks, meanwhile their risk sharing networks are characterized by higher similarity, which 
would prevent them from coping with those shocks, according to the literature. The gaps 
between them stay unchanged or even larger in some indicators when we look at those who live 
in mixed areas. Lastly, ethnic minorities live in more diverse communities and remote areas, 
which are supposed to be highly correlated with low level of network diversity.   
 
5 Econometric analysis 
5.1 Empirical strategy  
Section 4 revealed important and significant differences among Kinh and non-Kinh risk sharing 
networks, the first ones being larger, more homogenous in terms of ethnicity, but more diverse 
regarding other characteristics (occupation and geographic locations). Kinh households in the 
sample appear therefore to be better protected, thanks to their networks, against covariant risks 
as compared to non-Kinh.  
Yet, the drivers of these differences remain to be identified. Indeed, they could result from 
various factors and mechanisms, which are either linked directly to ethnicity, or only indirectly. 
Understanding the nature of the links, and thus source of inequality, is important, in order to 
design appropriate policy measures.  
For instance, the observed gap may be due to differences in environment that result from the 
spatial segregation in rural areas between Kinh, and ethnic minority populations. Rural Kinh 
households tend to live mostly in lowland areas, closer to urban centres, while ethnic minorities 
are historically settled in upland areas, which are more remote and less accessible. Different 
migration waves in the past decades have increased ethnic mix in both upland and lowland areas, 
yet, as Figure 2 shows, segregation is still strong. Infrastructures are also less developed in upland 
areas, partly because they are more costly, and these are also less populated areas, making it more 
difficult for anyone to interact with another outside his or her village. Different environment 
could result in different network characteristics.   
Moreover, education and wealth being two important predictors of the size and the quality of 
networks (Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007), the Kinh, who have better access to education, and 
tend to occupy more often elite positions (in the political or economic sphere) than other ethnic 
groups, are likely to have ‘better networks’.  
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The objective of this paper is to shed light, beyond these factors, on the other mechanisms at 
play directly linked to ethnicity and that drive these differences. Homophily is a well described 
and important mechanism in risk sharing network formation (see section 2). Individuals 
minimize the costs of establishing and maintaining relations by connecting with other individuals 
sharing the same characteristics, ethnicity for instance. As detailed in the literature review, one 
can consider two types of homophily. The first one is baseline homophily, and is linked to 
demography (or to the relative size of groups of certain characteristics) and to the opportunities 
to network with individuals sharing the same characteristics. The other type is inbreeding 
homophily and is linked to preferences to form a link with individuals sharing the same 
characteristics. Both mechanisms result in differentiated networks between different ethnic 
groups. In the first case, differences between Kinh and non-Kinh networks are explained by the 
fact that the first are more numerous. In the second case, individuals tend to select themselves in 
order to remain in homogenous networks, even when they live in highly heterogeneous 
environments. Disentangling these two mechanisms is important, as indeed, inequalities when 
the second mechanism is at play are particularly difficult to address, as they are based on some 
type of discrimination.   
To uncover the prevalence of these factors and mechanism, we estimate a series of models 
explaining risk sharing network characteristics, introducing step by step various sets of covariates 
that account for different factors.  
We start with a model of risk sharing network size that strictly accounts for household 
characteristics, ethnicity, as well as time and spatial fixed effects: 
                                        
 
Where       is the log of number of helpers a household i, from commune j at time t could rely 
on in case of a cash need.      is a set of household characteristics, that includes age, sex of the 
head, his/her education level, occupation, and whether he/she is native of the village he/she 
lives in.     is a variable indicating the ethnicity of the head. In the basic form of the model, it 
simply indicates whether the head is Kinh or not.    are year dummies26,    are district fixed 
effects, and      the interaction of both.       is the error term, and is constituted a commune-
level and an household component that can be written as follow: 
               
 
    , the ethnic variable, captures the difference in network characteristics between ethnic groups 
that is not captured by other variables. Our aim is to understand what explains this difference, 
simply by adding successively various sets of household or commune level variables,  that are 
likely to further explain risk sharing networks, and are correlated with the ethnic dummy. This 
way, we get a grasp of what triggers differences in risk sharing networks, between wealth, 
                                                          
26 We pool data from all years. This allows us to use a larger set of data, to increase precision in our estimates and 
also to smooth measurement errors. Standard errors are clustered at both household and commune levels to 
account for autocorrelation. We include time and district fixed effects, but do not explore the dynamic feature of 
social network formation.  
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geography and demography. Additionally, this enables us to disentangle the mechanisms of 
baseline and inbreeding homophily.  
We first add in the model a variable capturing household wealth (     , that is, the log of the 
total value of assets possessed by the household at time t. This variable is expected to capture 
households’ permanent income, and to be less volatile than other conventional measures based 
on income or expenditure. We anticipate that household wealth is strongly correlated with both 
risk sharing network and ethnicity and thus that it captures part of the difference between ethnic 
groups. If the ethnic variable becomes insignificant, this is a sign that observed gap mostly hinges 
on wealth differences, or in other word, this would mean that if ethnic minorities were able to 
reach the same level of wealth than the Kinh, their risk sharing network would not differ 
significantly.  
In the next model, we add commune covariates capturing the geographic context at the 
commune level (   ). In all models, district fixed effects already control to some extent for 
geographic conditions. Yet, the situation may vary quite strongly within districts, in terms of 
accessibility notably, and thus we add commune level controls (see section 3). Lagged data are 
used when available in order to limit risks of endogeneity, coming from the fact that social 
cohesion within a commune could be an unobservable omitted variable explaining both some 
features of risk sharing networks, and the quality of public goods or economic growth.  
The following models introduce successively variables describing ethnic demography within 
communes. We start with a variable that measures the share of household heads’ co-ethnics in 
the commune’s population. The data is taken from the 2009 census, and is invariant in time. The 
introduction of this variable enables a direct test of baseline ethnic homophily, as indeed, if 
characteristics of the networks – namely the size or the share of co-ethnics within risk sharing 
networks – evolve along with the relative size of ethnic groups within communes, we can 
conclude that baseline homophily drives risk sharing network formation. Furthermore, if after 
introducing the variable, the ethnic one is no longer significant, then baseline homophily is the 
main mechanism at play, and inbreeding homophily is absent. But if both the share and the 
ethnic variables are significant, then inbreeding mechanisms may be at work.  
Next, we test whether these mechanisms vary when ethnic groups are a minority or a majority 
within the commune, by interacting the ethnic variable with the share of co-ethnics.27 Indeed, 
there is evidence from the literature that social distance between ethnic groups may strongly vary 
according to the relative size of each group.28 The Kinh for instance may form different 
networks whether they constitute a minority in the commune’s population, or whether they are 
the major group. And the same could be for other ethnic groups. We also test whether the 
number of ethnic groups in the commune and their distribution matter in the way households 
form risk sharing networks. Indeed, the literature on ethnic diversity and ethnic polarization 
suggests that not only does one’s own relative size matter in the interaction between groups, but 
also the distribution of other groups (see Arcand and Jamovich, 2014). We introduce as 
explanatory variable the polarization index described in section 3.3 to capture this effect.  
                                                          
27 In the basic form of the model, we test whether mechanisms vary when Kinh people are a minority or a majority 
in the commune by interacting the dummy of being Kinh with the share of co-ethnics of the head. In the more 
sophisticated model, we test it by considering four ethnic groups, Kinh, Thai, Tay and Hmong.  
28 See for instance Posner (2004) who studies the social relations between two ethnic groups that are adversaries in 
Malawi but allies in Tanzania. He shows that this can largely be explained by the relative size of each group within 
both countries’ population where they are two of the main groups in the first countries, and minorities in the 
second.  
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In all of the above models, the dichotomization of the ethnic (i.e. Kinh vs. non Kinh) may 
appear too simplistic, especially considering that Vietnam counts 54 different ethnic groups, and 
that there is considerable heterogeneity between the different ethnic groups in how socially 
distant they are from the Kinh. We thus estimate the same model as above, but this time, the 
ethnic variable distinguishes five groups: the Kinh, the Thai, the Tay, the Hmong, and the rest of 
ethnic groups (see section 3). The first category is used as reference in all regressions. We also 
interact this categorical variable with the share of co-ethnics in order to see whether the different 
ethnic groups react similarly to Kinh when they are a minority in a commune or a majority. 
The objective of this empirical strategy is to detect mechanisms at play in the formation of risk 
sharing networks, and in particular the existence of inbreeding homophily. We detect this last 
one by controlling for all possible factors that can capture variation between ethnic groups, the 
remaining effect in the ethnic variable is interpreted as inbreeding homophily, i.e. as ethnically 
based preference. Yet, if an omitted factor, which is not preference but is correlated with both 
risk sharing network characteristics and ethnicity, remain in the error term, the coefficient of the 
ethnic variable is likely to be biased. We thus estimate the model adding commune-level fixed 
effects, and removing all commune-level variables, to check whether our results can be explained 
by such omitted factors.   
We estimate similar models to explain four characteristics of risk sharing networks described in 
section 4. The first is network size, models are estimated using log-linear regressions. The second 
is the share of co-ethnics within risk sharing networks, estimated through tobit regressions, then 
come models of geographic similarity, measured by the share of network members living in the 
same village as the head, and then models of occupational similarity, i.e. the share of network 
members having the same occupation as the head.  
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5.2 Results 
5.2.1 Determinants of household network size 
Results from the OLS estimates are shown in Table 5.29 As expected, we observe that male and 
more educated household heads have larger networks.30 We also find a positive and significant 
effect of the Kinh dummy. The larger size of Kinh’s network is observed when controlling for 
the characteristics of the head (sex, age, education, farm activity, place of birth), the size of the 
household, the time of the survey, and the time-invariant unobserved characteristics of the 
district (column (1)). However, the Kinh dummy becomes insignificant as far as the wealth of 
household is controlled for (columns (2)-(6)), indicating some collinearity between both 
variables. Thus, the Kinh’s ‘advantage’ in network size is fully captured by wealth.  
In addition, we find that remoteness and the network size are positively associated, reflecting the 
barrier of physical distance in forming risk sharing network. However, there is no effect of ethnic 
composition on network size. This result remains stable over various specifications of the 
composition variables: the network size is not associated with the relative size of the ethnic 
group of the household head (column (4)), with the ethnic dummy (column (5)), and it does not 
depend on how ethnic groups are distributed within the commune (column 6)).  
The results thus indicate that Kinh households have larger risk sharing networks, mostly because 
they tend to be richer than other groups within their districts, and not because they are more 
numerous. This result generalizes Fischer et al. (2010)’s findings. Their study analyses the social 
network of 33 ethnic minority individuals living in the uplands of Northern Vietnam. It shows 
that household’s level of wealth is an influential factor with regard to the formation and size of 
the network, mostly because of the cost of maintaining relationships. Poorer households 
purposely refrain from asking for help from their sparse networks because they fear being unable 
to reciprocate later.  
However, once we use the commune fixed effect in the last model (column (7)), we again find a 
significant effect of Kinh dummy. This result indicates a higher preference for large networks 
among the Kinh. This result could be due to the fact that some unobservable characteristics of 
communes that we do not capture well with explanatory variables, are highly correlated with 
Kinh. We could think about customs or quality of institutions of the communes supporting 
connections between households that are more present in some areas where Kinh households 
live. Therefore, those unobserved characteristics of the communes lead to the difference in our 
commune fixed effect and district fixed effect models.  
  
                                                          
29 Results from the Poisson regressions are available upon request from the authors. 
30 We consider the network described in the data to be the individual network of the household heads, who is the 
respondent in most cases. We consider that relations of other household members were not taken into account.  
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5.2.2 Determinants of ethnic similarity within risk sharing networks 
We then estimate the determinants of ethnic similarity. Results of the tobit estimates are reported 
in Table 6.31 Contrary to network size, household head characteristics do not affect significantly 
the degree of ethnic similarity within risk sharing networks:  the level of ethnic similarity within 
the risk sharing networks is not affected by head characteristics such as age, household size, 
education or gender. Farmers tend to have more homogenous networks than heads with other 
occupations.  
We find a positive and significant effect of the ethnic variable, indicating that the Kinh are more 
likely to network with other Kinh people than the non-Kinh to form links with people sharing 
the same ethnic group. This result is not changed after controlling for household wealth, which 
does not significantly explain ethnic homophily (column (2)), or after controlling for a potential 
censoring bias in the dependent variable (column (3)). We test and control for such bias by 
introducing a dummy variable indicating whether the household indicated having more than 
three contacts whom to ask help in case of need, and another variable reporting the total number 
of potential helpers. None of these variables have significant coefficients, unless in the commune 
fixed effect models. 
Differences in geography do not seem to be a source of difference between Kinh and non Kinh 
risk sharing networks (column (4)). The introduction of variables capturing this factor does only 
slightly affect the coefficient on the ethnic variable, but this last remains strongly significant and 
positive.  
The model displayed in column (5) includes the share of household head’s co-ethnics in the 
commune among regressors. Its coefficient is positive, significant and of high magnitude. 
Furthermore, it captures part of the ethnic effect, whose coefficient is almost halved, yet still 
positive and significant. This result indicates that baseline homophily is at play in the formation 
of risk sharing networks: the more co-ethnics one has in the commune, the more he or she has 
in his or her network. Kinh risk sharing networks are thus homogenous partly because they live 
in communes with a higher share of co-ethnics.32 The coefficients obtained after interacting the 
share of co-ethnics with the Kinh dummy variable (column (6)) indicates that the effect of the 
relative ethnic size is positive for both non-Kinh and Kinh households, but much stronger for 
the later. The Kinh variable alone, however, is negative, but non-significant.  
We observe that this mechanism does not capture all of the differences between ethnic groups, 
and the positive and significant coefficient of the ethnic variable indicate some inbreeding 
mechanism, i.e. a selection of co-ethnics in the risk sharing network that is based on preferences. 
The Kinh appear to be more selective than other groups. The decomposition of the ethnic 
variable between different ethnic groups as shown in Table E in the Appendix (column (3)) 
shows that Kinh are indeed more selective than the Thai and the Tay, but do not differ 
significantly from the Hmong or other ethnic groups on average.  
                                                          
31 We display here the tobit estimates that appear to be the best specifications given the distribution of the 
dependent variable. The variable of the share of same ethnic members is indeed highly skewed with a value equal to 
1 in 95% of cases. OLS results are available upon request to the authors. 
32 We tested in models whose results are not shown here, the linearity of this effect, by introducing the square of the 
‘share’ variable, or by introducing it as categorical variable taking difference levels (less than a 25%, from 25% to 
50%; from 50 to 75% from 75% to 99%, and from 99% to 100%). The objective was to test whether there is a 
specific effect of being a minority vs. a majority, or if there is a specific effect for homogenous communes. Results 
show that the degree of ethnic homophily increases with the size of the share, proportionally to this share, and that 
the relation between both is linear. 
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Taken all together these results indicate that Kinh are more likely than others to link up with 
people from their ethnic group, particularly when they live in communes where their ethnic 
group represents a significant share of the population. In addition, baseline homophily or 
demographics of ethnic groups is not enough to explain the likelihood to form link with co-
ethnics. Inbreeding homophily is at play and is stronger for Kinh people: they are more likely to 
network with co-ethnics once the demographics of the ethnic groups is controlled for; and the 
more in majority they are, the more inbreeding homophily they experience.   
Finally, we find that ethnic similarity in risk sharing networks is negatively influenced by the level 
of ethnic polarization, often used to test for the potential conflicts that may emerge when several 
groups of similar size coexist within a same commune. We would expect if such conflictual 
situation existed in sampled communes, that a higher ethnic polarization would pull population 
apart, and accentuate segregation within networks. However, the negative and significant sign of 
the polarization index variable shows that quite the opposite occurs: the more the commune is 
polarized, the lower the inbreeding homophily. In fact, among 23 communes where the 
polarization index is higher than 0.9, we find 21 communes where the Kinh share a comparable 
size with another ethnic group such as Thai, Tay, Ede or Co Ho. These groups are amongst the 
well-off minority groups with relatively high level of education (MRDI, 2014), thus, it is possible 
that the social distance between these groups and the Kinh is shortened, facilitating ethnic 
integration.  
Last, we estimate the model with commune-fixed effects controlling for all observable and 
unobservable characteristics at this level. The ethnic dummy coefficient remains positive and 
significant but is of lower magnitude, and the share of co-ethnics also remains high, positive and 
significant. This result confirms a baseline homophily mechanism, as well as a tendency for 
inbreeding homophily among the Kinh who have higher preference than others to remain in 
ethnically homogenous networks.  
5.2.3 Determinants of geographic similarity within risk sharing networks 
Another particularly important feature of a risk sharing network lies in its geographic dispersion. 
A high proportion of the shocks faced by populations in rural areas are related to climate, and 
affect whole populations within a given areas. Thus, one’s capacity to rely on someone located 
outside its immediate environment, when such a shock occurs will affect its ability to face it. The 
literature from the new economics of migration has well shown for instance that the departure of 
some family members to further places is partly driven by the necessity to insure the rest of the 
family. Also, a recent study by Jaimovich (2014) highlights the importance of external economic 
links which help to connect missing markets in the isolated communities. 
We look here at the determinants of geographic proximity of risk sharing network members, 
measured by the share of the network members who live in the same village as the household 
head. Results of the tobit estimates are reported in Table 7. We find that more educated and 
richer households are more likely to have connections outside the village. In the same way, 
farmers are more likely to have village neighbours as network members. Neither the censor 
variable nor the size of the network has a significant effect, indicating that the censoring effect is 
not at play when it comes to geographic similarity. Regarding geographical environment, we find 
that living in a more developed area helps people to form network across village boundaries. 
The Kinh networks are more geographically spread than those of the non-Kinh, as indicated in 
descriptive statistic and in the first estimation (column (1)). Risk sharing network from ethnic 
minority people are more likely to be confined within village boundaries, making ethnic 
minorities highly vulnerable to aggregated shocks. This result confirms what Fischer et al. (2010) 
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find based on case studies of ethnic minority people in North Vietnam. They show that the 
majority of help flows remain within the village. The rare cases where they go beyond the village 
boundary, the help flows come from the women’s village of origin.  
However, the Kinh dummy becomes insignificant once we control for wealth (columns (2)-(8)). 
Similar to network size, the advantage of Kinh people in forming distant links is highly 
correlated with wealth. Likewise, we do not find any effect of communes’ ethnic composition on 
the geographic proximity of risk sharing networks. Here again, there is no evidence that a high 
ethnic polarization would pull individuals apart and push them to remain within their village, but 
also no evidence that it helps to create more connections outside one’s village. 
A limitation in this study is that we have no information on the ethnic composition at the village-
level. It may well be that even in very heterogeneous communes, villages remain completely 
homogenous ethnically. However, the fact that there is a positive effect of polarization on the 
ethnic diversity within networks, but a non-significant effect on the geographic similarity, is an 
indication that when there is ethnic diversity at the commune level, there is also, to some extent, 
diversity within the villages. 
In the last model, with commune fixed effect, our results still hold, indicating that the ability to 
form geographically distant links is mostly correlated with education and wealth, rather than 
being a majority or minority. Similar results are found by distinguishing ethnic minorities groups 
(Appendix Table E).33 Kinh households have a more efficient risk sharing network  in that aspect 
because they are usually endowed with a higher education level and they are richer than ethnic 
minorities. Thus, despite being more numerous and spread in the whole territory, Kinh people 
are not more able to form and maintain links out of the village than other ethnic groups once 
their socio-economic characteristics are taken into account.  Baseline and inbreeding homophily 
are therefore not determinant mechanisms of geographic similarity in risk sharing network. 
5.2.4 Determinants of occupational similarity  
Last, we look at the occupational similarity within risk sharing networks. As pointed out in 
section 4, one essential feature of risk sharing network is its ability to protect one from the 
adverse effects of covariant shocks. While idiosyncratic risks can more easily be covered by 
homogenous networks, the insurance against covariant shocks requires being able to rely on 
someone that is not exposed to the same risks when such shock occurs. Occupational similarity 
is in this perspective an important characteristic of risk sharing networks, particularly in rural 
areas where incomes and consumption fluctuate strongly within a year, and where covariant 
shocks dominate. Occupational similarity is defined by the proportion of people in the risk 
sharing network having the same occupation than the household’s head.34 Estimation strategy is 
the same than for geographic similarity, except that we control from column (5) by the 
occupational diversity in the commune. Indeed, the diversity of occupations in one risk sharing 
network should highly depend on the local labour market and the diversity of occupations found 
in the commune. In order to isolate the effect of the distribution of ethnic groups and their 
social distance from the differences in local labour markets, we built an index of occupational 
diversity in the communes using 2009 census data on occupation of all adults in the commune in 
the last seven days. This index has to be interpreted as the probability that two people taken 
                                                          
33 Only a small difference is found between Kinh and Hmong, Hmong people being significantly less likely than 
Kinh to form link out of the village, everything else being equal. 
34 Because this measure is based on the name generators, the proportion is calculated among the three first contacts 
mentioned by the household head.  
128 
 
randomly in a commune have different occupations.35 Therefore, the higher the index, the larger 
the spectrum of occupations within the commune.  
Table 8 provides the results from the tobit regressions of the occupational similarity equations. 
We find that Kinh variable is negative and significant in all specifications. Kinh individuals have 
more occupational diversity within their risk sharing networks than individuals from other ethnic 
groups, everything else being equal. This result cannot be explained by lower cost for Kinh 
people to meet with distant people, who are potentially more diverse than neighbours: the 
coefficient of Kinh variable is almost unchanged when proxies for the remoteness of the 
commune are introduced (column (4)).  
Kinh people do not have more diversity in their network than non-Kinh because they live in 
communes where the labour market is more diversified: the effect of Kinh variable decreases 
only slightly when occupational diversity within the commune is controlled for (column (5)). 
Thus, an ethnic minority farmer is less likely than a Kinh farmer to form link with someone who 
is not farmer, even if non-farm activity is as frequent in his/her community than in the Kinh 
one, and even if both of them live in a remote commune. In addition, Kinh people are more 
likely to have occupational diversity with their network than minority people, even when ethnic 
minority groups are considered separately (Appendix Table E). 
We find a positive and significant association between occupational similarity of the network and 
the share of co-ethnics in the commune (column (6)). But more importantly, controlling by the 
demography of ethnic groups increases the effect of being Kinh. It suggests that differences 
between Kinh and non-Kinh change depending on whether they are in majority or in minority in 
the commune, as confirmed by the interaction of the Kinh dummy with the share of co-ethnics 
in the community (column (7)). Kinh people distinguish themselves more when they are in 
minority: when belonging to a minority within the commune, the Kinh are more able than the 
non-Kinh to diversify their networks. Reversely, a Kinh in majority is not so much different (but 
still he/she is) from a non-Kinh in majority in that aspect. Besides, introducing the index of 
polarization almost does not change the effect of the ethnic variable. 
Three interpretations can be drawn from these results. First, Kinh are more likely to have diverse 
network in terms of occupation because they are more able to form and maintain links out of the 
village, and ties out of the village are supposed to connect more frequently with people having 
different occupation. However, results on geographic similarity go against this first 
interpretation. They show that Kinh people are not more able to form and maintain links out of 
the village than other ethnic groups once their socio-economic characteristics are taken into 
account. Thus, according to this interpretation, Kinh variables should not be significant once 
socio-economic characteristics are taken into account.  
The second interpretation is that Kinh people are more likely to occupy elite positions, and as 
such to play the role of structural hole (Burt, 1995). In other words, they are more likely to have 
positional advantages in the commune by connecting individuals or groups of individuals that are 
connected only through their intermediary. They are therefore connected with more diverse 
people whatever their ethnic group. But this interpretation can hold true only if socio-economic 
                                                          
35 More precisely, this index is built as a fragmentation index calculated as below:                    
Where     is the proportion of people with occupation i in a commune c and N is the total of number of occupation 
in the commune. Occupation is defined here as the 2-digit code of the 2007 Vietnam standard industrial 
classification. 
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characteristics introduced in the model do not capture elite position. However, we believe that 
variables measuring education, the value of assets, and the dummy indicating whether the head is 
a farmer account for this positional effect. Thus if it was the main effect, these variables should 
absorb most of the Kinh variable effect in the regression. 
A third interpretation is that Kinh people occupy a larger spectrum of occupations than non-
Kinh people, and in addition, that they are more likely to link with other Kinh, excluding ethnic 
minorities from their network. Consequently, the people with whom ethnic minorities can form 
link have a reduced set of occupations. We have shown that Kinh are more likely to link with 
other Kinh through inbreeding homophily process (section 5.2.2), and that ethnic minorities 
have restrained opportunities to link with Kinh people. In order to see whether  occupational 
diversity within a commune is higher among Kinh than among other ethnic groups, we calculate 
the index of occupational diversity among Kinh people in a commune and compare it with the 
index of occupational diversity among other ethnic groups. We find that considering only Kinh 
people within a rural commune and selecting randomly two of them, the probability that they 
have different occupation is 0.524 (sd 0.243). Doing the same simulation for non-Kinh people, 
the probability is significantly lower, at 0.167 (sd 0.211). The probabilities are almost the same 
when we consider only mixed communes with both Kinh and non-Kinh. Therefore, we 
conclude to a higher occupational diversity among Kinh people at the commune level compared 
to ethnic minorities.  
Other interpretations related to unobserved commune characteristics should be excluded as the 
ethnic variable is still significant when commune fixed effects are introduced (column (11)). 
From these results, we conclude that inbreeding homophily combined with higher diversity in 
occupations within Kinh people seems to be an important driver of differences between majority 
and minority ethnic groups regarding occupational similarity of risk sharing network. 
As far as other independent variables are concerned, we find that occupational similarity within 
networks is weaker for the more educated individuals, and for richer households whatever the 
specification of the model. The negative wealth effect on occupational similarity is expected, as 
we suppose that building and maintaining bridging connections requires more resources than 
building and maintaining connection with similar people. Occupational similarity is much higher 
however for farmers. This is not surprising as farming is the main occupation of about 70 per 
cent of household heads in the sample. The probability for a farmer to link up with another 
farmer is therefore higher than for any other person with another occupation to link up with 
someone with the same occupation. The effect disappears as far as the index of occupational 
diversity in the commune is introduced. Surprisingly, being male is associated with more similar 
network in terms of occupation. Finally, we find that heads with greater network size exhibit a 
higher level of occupational similarity in their networks. This is likely to come from the 
censoring bias that affects network composition variables of household heads with large 
networks. The positive and significant effect is thus explained by the fact that individuals with 
many connections tend to cite first contacts with the same occupation than other contacts 
(Appendix 3). It could well be indeed, that because they share the same occupation, they are in 
closer and more frequent contact, and are therefore more directly thought of when the question 
of contacts is asked. 
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Table 5. Determinants of network size – Log of number of potential helpers 
  
Log of potential helpers 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  
OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  
Household head characteristics               
Age of HH head -0.003 (0.00) -0.006** (0.00) -0.006** (0.00) -0.006** (0.00) -0.006** (0.00) -0.006** (0.00) -0.004 (0.00) 
(Age of head)2 0.000 (0.00) 0.000** (0.00) 0.000** (0.00) 0.000** (0.00) 0.000** (0.00) 0.000** (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 
Head is male 0.060*** (0.02) 0.048*** (0.02) 0.049*** (0.02) 0.049*** (0.02) 0.049*** (0.02) 0.048*** (0.02) 0.051*** (0.02) 
Head completed primary school 0.062*** (0.02) 0.041* (0.02) 0.039* (0.02) 0.039* (0.02) 0.038* (0.02) 0.039* (0.02) 0.033 (0.02) 
Head completed lower secondary  0.099*** (0.02) 0.064*** (0.02) 0.061** (0.02) 0.061** (0.02) 0.061** (0.02) 0.062** (0.03) 0.058** (0.02) 
Head completed upper secondary 0.150*** (0.03) 0.106*** (0.03) 0.103*** (0.03) 0.103*** (0.03) 0.103*** (0.03) 0.103*** (0.03) 0.095*** (0.03) 
Head is farmer -0.012 (0.02) -0.007 (0.02) -0.006 (0.02) -0.006 (0.02) -0.006 (0.02) -0.005 (0.02) 0.002 (0.02) 
HH size 0.005 (0.00) -0.005 (0.004) -0.005 (0.00) -0.004 (0.00) -0.004 (0.00) -0.004 (0.00) -0.002 (0.00) 
Head or Spouse is village native  0.019 (0.03) 0.021 (0.03) 0.015 (0.03) 0.016 (0.03) 0.017 (0.03) 0.016 (0.03) 0.000 (0.03) 
Asset value (log)   0.029*** (0.00) 0.029*** (0.00) 0.029*** (0.00) 0.029*** (0.00) 0.029*** (0.00) 0.025*** (0.00) 
Geography               
Elevation     0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00)   
Difference between min and max of elevation     -0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00)   
Distance to nearest city (in 2000)     -0.000** (0.00) -0.000** (0.00) -0.000** (0.00) -0.000** (0.00)   
Night light from 1996 to 2000     -0.004 (0.00) -0.003 (0.00) -0.003 (0.00) -0.004 (0.01)   
Ethnicity               
Kinh 0.067* (0.04) 0.052 (0.04) 0.040 (0.036) 0.048 (0.04) 0.050 (0.07) 0.051 (0.04) 0.097** (0.04) 
Kinh x share of co-ethnic         -0.004 (0.11)     
Share of co-ethnic in commune       -0.028 (0.04) -0.027 (0.06) -0.048 (0.05) -0.010 (0.06) 
Ethnic polarization index           -0.044 (0.05)   
Constant 0.913*** (0.11) 0.775*** (0.11) 0.857*** (0.117) 0.863*** (0.12) 0.863*** (0.12) 0.905*** (0.13) 0.674*** (0.10) 
Observations 11175  11175  11175  11175  11175  11175  11175  
R-squared 0.102  0.107  0.107  0.107  0.107  0.107  0.147  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All equation includes time and district fixed effects, the last column includes commune fixed effects.      Source: Authors’ 
calculations based on the 2008-2016 VARHS. 
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Table 6. Determinants of ethnic similarity within risk sharing network – Share of co-ethnics among networks’ members 
 Ethnic similarity (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  
 Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  
Household head characteristics                 
Age of HH head -0.017 (0.04) -0.021 (0.04) -0.020 (0.04) -0.025 (0.04) -0.034 (0.04) -0.031 (0.04) -0.036 (0.04) -0.038 (0.04) 
(Age of head)2 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 
Head is male 0.248 (0.22) 0.216 (0.22) 0.200 (0.22) 0.207 (0.22) 0.127 (0.22) 0.116 (0.23) 0.104 (0.22) 0.149 (0.22) 
Head completed primary school -0.063 (0.30) -0.101 (0.30) -0.109 (0.30) -0.143 (0.30) -0.130 (0.31) -0.099 (0.31) -0.139 (0.31) -0.052 (0.28) 
Head completed lower secondary -0.137 (0.31) -0.210 (0.32) -0.213 (0.32) -0.247 (0.32) -0.215 (0.33) -0.194 (0.33) -0.207 (0.33) -0.054 (0.30) 
Head completed upper secondary -0.057 (0.37) -0.152 (0.37) -0.162 (0.38) -0.214 (0.38) -0.179 (0.39) -0.123 (0.38) -0.153 (0.39) -0.091 (0.34) 
Head is farmer 0.324* (0.17) 0.334* (0.17) 0.336* (0.17) 0.372** (0.17) 0.278* (0.17) 0.272 (0.17) 0.290* (0.17) 0.163 (0.19) 
Head or Spouse is village native 0.266 (0.31) 0.281 (0.31) 0.287 (0.31) 0.186 (0.32) -0.019 (0.31) -0.021 (0.31) -0.033 (0.31) 0.035 (0.27) 
HH size -0.060 (0.05) -0.074 (0.05) -0.076 (0.05) -0.086* (0.05) -0.090* (0.05) -0.090* (0.05) -0.089* (0.05) -0.123** (0.05) 
Asset value (log)   0.059 (0.04) 0.053 (0.04) 0.054 (0.04) 0.069* (0.04) 0.070* (0.04) 0.068* (0.04) 0.066* (0.04) 
Censor     0.434 (0.32) 0.421 (0.32) 0.508 (0.31) 0.508 (0.31) 0.499 (0.31) 0.562** (0.28) 
Network size (log)     -0.070 (0.23) -0.078 (0.23) -0.113 (0.23) -0.104 (0.23) -0.107 (0.23) -0.125 (0.22) 
Geography                 
Elevation       0.002 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00)   
Difference between min and max of elv.       0.000 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00)   
Distance to nearest city (in 2000)       -0.004*** (0.00) -0.005*** (0.00) -0.004*** (0.00) -0.005*** (0.00)   
Night light from 1996 to 2000       0.081 (0.06) 0.065 (0.06) 0.036 (0.06) 0.044 (0.06)   
Ethnicity                 
Kinh 1.966*** (0.53) 1.952*** (0.52) 1.914*** (0.52) 1.738*** (0.52) 0.911** (0.463) -0.511 (0.66) 0.920** (0.46) 0.770* (0.40) 
1.    Kinh x share           2.896*** (1.11)     
Share of co-ethnic in commune         2.736*** (0.476) 1.688*** (0.59) 2.420*** (0.50) 2.987*** (0.59) 
Ethnic polarization index             -1.094** (0.48)   
Constant 5.998*** (1.44) 5.687*** (1.46) 5.738*** (1.44) 6.163*** (1.52) 5.890*** (1.600) 5.992*** (1.64) 6.985*** (1.71) 6.633*** (1.74) 
Observations 10487  10487  10487  10487  10487  10487  10487  10487  
Pseudo R2 0.154  0.154  0.155  0.158  0.171  0.173  0.172  0.242  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All equation includes time and district fixed effects, the last column includes commune fixed effects. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2008-2016 VARHS. 
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Table 7. Determinants of geographical similarity in risk sharing network – Share of networks’ members living in the same village 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  
Geographical similarity Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  
Household head characteristics                 
Age of HH head -0.014 (0.01) -0.007 (0.01) -0.007 (0.01) -0.008 (0.01) -0.008 (0.01) -0.008 (0.01) -0.007 (0.01) -0.004 (0.01) 
(Age of head)2 0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) 
Head is male 0.123* (0.07) 0.156** (0.07) 0.155** (0.07) 0.152** (0.07) 0.153** (0.07) 0.153** (0.07) 0.155** (0.07) 0.139** (0.06) 
Head completed primary school -0.144 (0.11) -0.086 (0.11) -0.088 (0.11) -0.086 (0.11) -0.087 (0.12) -0.086 (0.11) -0.088 (0.11) -0.065 (0.10) 
Head completed lower secondary -0.316*** (0.11) -0.216* (0.11) -0.218* (0.11) -0.215* (0.11) -0.216* (0.11) -0.216* (0.11) -0.219* (0.11) -0.173* (0.10) 
Head completed upper secondary -0.630*** (0.13) -0.498*** (0.13) -0.502*** (0.13) -0.501*** (0.13) -0.502*** (0.13) -0.502*** (0.13) -0.505*** (0.13) -0.438*** (0.11) 
Head is farmer 0.181*** (0.06) 0.168*** (0.06) 0.169*** (0.06) 0.166*** (0.06) 0.167*** (0.06) 0.167*** (0.06) 0.166*** (0.06) 0.161*** (0.06) 
Head or Spouse is village native 0.176** (0.09) 0.168* (0.09) 0.167* (0.09) 0.164* (0.09) 0.168* (0.09) 0.168* (0.09) 0.168* (0.09) 0.225** (0.10) 
HH size 0.003 (0.02) 0.032* (0.02) 0.032* (0.02) 0.031* (0.02) 0.031* (0.02) 0.031* (0.02) 0.031* (0.02) 0.027* (0.02) 
Asset value (log)   -0.091*** (0.02) -0.092*** (0.02) -0.091*** (0.02) -0.091*** (0.02) -0.091*** (0.02) -0.091*** (0.02) -0.098*** (0.02) 
Censor     -0.040 (0.09) -0.037 (0.09) -0.038 (0.09) -0.038 (0.09) -0.037 (0.09) -0.006 (0.08) 
Network size (log)     0.050 (0.07) 0.047 (0.07) 0.048 (0.07) 0.048 (0.07) 0.047 (0.07) 0.021 (0.07) 
Geography                 
Elevation       0.001 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.001* (0.00)   
Difference between min and max of elv.       -0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00)   
Distance to nearest city (in 2000)       -0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00)   
Night light from 1996 to 2000       -0.027* (0.02) -0.027* (0.02) -0.027* (0.02) -0.025* (0.02)   
Number of villages       0.003 (0.00) 0.003 (0.00) 0.002 (0.00) 0.002 (0.00)   
Ethnicity                 
Kinh -0.260* (0.14) -0.219 (0.14) -0.220 (0.14) -0.202 (0.14) -0.176 (0.16) -0.204 (0.29) -0.190 (0.16) -0.151 (0.194) 
1.    Kinh x share           0.055 (0.44)     
Share of co-ethnic in commune         -0.093 (0.18) -0.116 (0.25) 0.009 (0.20) -0.190 (0.254) 
Ethnic polarization index             0.216 (0.21)   
Constant 3.272*** (0.40) 3.756*** (0.42) 3.720*** (0.43) 3.798*** (0.46) 3.821*** (0.46) 3.825*** (0.46) 3.625*** (0.51) 3.510*** (0.58) 
Observations 10487  10487  10487  10487  10487  10487  10487  10487  
Pseudo R2 0.0408  0.0430  0.0430  0.0434  0.0434  0.0434  0.0435  0.0712  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All equation includes time and district fixed effects, the last column includes commune fixed effects. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2008-2016 VARHS. 
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Table 8. Determinants of occupational similarity – Share of networks’ members having the same occupation 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  
Occupational similarity Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  
Household head characteristics                   
Age of HH head 0.032* (0.02) 0.041** (0.02) 0.042** (0.02) 0.041** (0.02) 0.022 (0.02) 0.019 (0.02) 0.020 (0.02) 0.019 (0.02) 0.017 (0.02) 
(Age of head)2 -0.001*** (0.00) -0.001*** (0.00) -0.001*** (0.00) -0.001*** (0.00) -0.000** (0.00) -0.000** (0.00) -0.000** (0.00) -0.000** (0.00) -0.000** (0.00) 
Head is male 0.414*** (0.09) 0.454*** (0.09) 0.441*** (0.09) 0.430*** (0.09) 0.414*** (0.09) 0.405*** (0.09) 0.405*** (0.09) 0.402*** (0.09) 0.399*** (0.09) 
Head completed primary school -0.094 (0.15) -0.025 (0.15) -0.034 (0.15) -0.014 (0.15) -0.005 (0.15) 0.005 (0.15) 0.012 (0.15) 0.006 (0.15) -0.029 (0.13) 
Head completed lower secondary -0.382** (0.15) -0.257* (0.16) -0.271* (0.16) -0.249 (0.16) -0.236 (0.15) -0.222 (0.15) -0.213 (0.15) -0.217 (0.15) -0.215 (0.14) 
Head completed upper secondary -1.066*** (0.17) -0.902*** (0.17) -0.930*** (0.17) -0.909*** (0.17) -0.875*** (0.16) -0.863*** (0.16) -0.853*** (0.16) -0.858*** (0.16) -0.792*** (0.15) 
Head is farmer 0.679*** (0.09) 0.664*** (0.09) 0.671*** (0.09) 0.662*** (0.09) 0.013 (0.12) 0.009 (0.12) 0.009 (0.12) 0.011 (0.12) -0.008 (0.11) 
Head or Spouse is village native -0.052 (0.13) -0.063 (0.13) -0.065 (0.13) -0.055 (0.13) -0.020 (0.13) -0.055 (0.13) -0.055 (0.13) -0.056 (0.13) -0.039 (0.12) 
HH size 0.112*** (0.02) 0.148*** (0.02) 0.149*** (0.02) 0.147*** (0.02) 0.149*** (0.02) 0.149*** (0.02) 0.149*** (0.02) 0.149*** (0.02) 0.147*** (0.02) 
Asset value (log)   -0.112*** (0.02) -0.121*** (0.02) -0.118*** (0.021) -0.111*** (0.02) -0.109*** (0.02) -0.110*** (0.02) -0.110*** (0.02) -0.113*** (0.02) 
Censor     0.379*** (0.13) 0.378*** (0.13) 0.352*** (0.13) 0.359*** (0.13) 0.359*** (0.13) 0.359*** (0.13) 0.373*** (0.11) 
Network size (log)     0.071 (0.10) 0.072 (0.10) 0.093 (0.10) 0.092 (0.10) 0.092 (0.10) 0.091 (0.10) 0.081 (0.09) 
Geography                   
Elevation       0.001* (0.00) 0.001* (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00)   
Difference between min and max of elv.       -0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00)   
Distance to nearest city (in 2000)       -0.000 (0.00) -0.001 (0.00) -0.001 (0.00) -0.001 (0.00) -0.001 (0.00)   
Night light from 1996 to 2000       -0.052** (0.03) -0.019 (0.03) -0.022 (0.03) -0.027 (0.03) -0.026 (0.03)   
Occupation distribution in the commune                   
Share of people having the same occup.         1.206*** (0.16) 1.198*** (0.16) 1.194*** (0.16) 1.198*** (0.16) 1.121*** (0.15) 
Occupation diversity index         -0.699** (0.31) -0.726** (0.30) -0.779** (0.31) -0.718** (0.30)   
Ethnicity                   
Kinh -0.855*** (0.21) -0.795*** (0.21) -0.825*** (0.21) -0.782*** (0.22) -0.707*** (0.21) -0.943*** (0.21) -1.505*** (0.35) -0.919*** (0.22) -0.626*** (0.22) 
Kinh x share             1.093** (0.55)     
Share of co-ethnic in commune           0.887*** (0.24) 0.428 (0.35) 0.698** (0.28) 0.867*** (0.32) 
Ethnic polarization index               -0.397 (0.26)   
Constant 1.367** (0.57) 1.937*** (0.58) 1.837*** (0.59) 1.994*** (0.66) 2.819*** (0.71) 2.621*** (0.73) 2.742*** (0.73) 2.994*** (0.78) 2.292** (1.12) 
Observations 10487  10487  10487  10487  10487  10487  10487  10487  10487  
Pseudo R2 0.0898  0.0914  0.0939  0.0945  0.0990  0.0998  0.100  0.1000  0.125  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All equation includes time and district fixed effects, the last column includes commune fixed effects.          
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2008-2016 VARHS
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6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have examined the differences in the risk sharing networks of Vietnam’s ethnic 
minorities and majority, as a way to approach the question of the persistence of the ethnic gap in 
Vietnam. Exploiting a very rich rural household data set collected between 2008 and 2016 in 
several provinces of Vietnam, the paper first highlights important dissimilarities between Kinh 
and non-Kinh households in the size of these networks, as well as in their composition. The 
networks of the first group are on average larger, ethnically more homogenous, but more diverse 
in terms of occupation and geographic location than those of other ethnic groups. Thus 
households from the Kinh majority appear better equipped than ethnic minorities to face 
covariant shocks. This result is all the more important where vulnerability test shows that rural 
households in Vietnam are exposed to a wide range of covariant shocks, and that ethnic 
minorities are particularly vulnerable to these shocks. 
We go further in analysing these network differences by exploring various mechanisms likely to 
drive these gaps. We combine survey data with census and geo-referenced data that provide 
detailed contextual information on the geography and the demography of sampled communes. 
We focus on mechanisms that are directly or indirectly linked to ethnicity and are likely to 
explain observed differences. Among the indirect factors, we consider household endowments, 
wealth, and geography; while direct mechanisms refer to effects of demography (or baseline 
homophily), and preference effects (or inbreeding homophily). Multivariate regressions 
explaining different features of risk sharing networks are estimated to disentangle these effects.   
First, we find evidence that the gaps between Kinh and non-Kinh risk sharing networks are at 
least partly driven by the social distance that exists between ethnic groups in Vietnam, 
particularly between the Kinh and the non-Kinh. Indeed, households from the first group are 
found to have higher preferences for inbreeding homophily, i.e. for networks only composed of 
co-ethnics, compared to other groups, even in mixed communes. By forming such networks, 
they exclude ethnic minorities from their networks which are larger, more diverse geographically, 
and in terms of occupation. We also find evidence that the greater occupational diversity 
observed in Kinh networks is a consequence of this inbreeding behaviour, as Kinh occupy more 
diverse positions than the non Kinh in all types of communes. Results indicate furthermore that 
the Kinh have higher preferences for larger networks than other groups.  
Along with these results that relate to household preferences, our findings indicate that the 
differences in the social networks of the two groups also hinge on the demographic differences 
between ethnic groups, and on the fact that the Kinh are by far more numerous than other 
groups. Consequently, they have higher opportunities to link up with other co-ethnics. This 
demographic effect however does not explain why Kinh networks are larger, and geographically 
more widely spread. 
Differences in these two features (size and geographic dispersion) between Kinh and non Kinh 
are mostly explained by indirect effects, as the gap is absorbed by differences in other variables, 
such as education, wealth or by geographic conditions. Finally, in the case of network size, we 
find that some unobserved commune features, which are possibly related to some institutional 
characteristics (social cohesion for instance), are both correlated with households network size 
and ethnicity and partly explain the gap.  
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These findings must be added to those of the literature exploring the causes of Vietnam’s 
persistent ethnic gaps. Most of these papers highlight the existence of inequalities in the 
endowments between ethnic groups with a strong emphasis on geographical factor, but also 
show differences in the returns to these endowments between Kinh and non Kinh. According to 
the literature, the ethnic gap will not be solved through redistributive policies alone and the 
inequalities need to be explored more profoundly.  
Our contribution to this literature is first to show that the differences between Kinh and non 
Kinh risk sharing networks could be an important source of inequality in rural areas where risk is 
pervasive. Our paper is in line with and goes beyond the suggested evidences of ethnic 
segmentation in social networks (Singhal and Beck, 2015). Indeed, the lower efficiency of ethnic 
minorities’ risk sharing networks for dealing with covariant shocks, combined with their greater 
vulnerability, is likely to explain why their returns to endowments are lower. Finally, we find that 
differences in networks cannot be explained by differences in endowments, geography or 
demography alone, but that they are partly rooted in the cultural and social distances that exist 
between the Kinh and other ethnic groups. This suggests that, unless those distances are 
reduced, ethnic inequalities in Vietnam are likely to persist. 
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Appendix  
Appendix 1  
Table A. Descriptive statistics of households  
Variable Kinh 
(n=8858) 
Non-Kinh 
(n=2317) 
Difference 
(T-test) 
 Kinh 
(n=5819) 
Non-Kinh 
(=2159) 
Difference 
(T-test) 
 In all 428 communes 
 
 In 306 mixed communes with Kinh 
 
Age of head 54.24 47.48 6.76***  53.94 47.50 6.44*** 
Male headed 0.75 0.89 -0.14***  0.76 0.89 -0.14*** 
Household size 3.99 5.15 -1.16***  3.96 5.12 -1.17*** 
Head or spouse born in the village 0.83 0.87 -0.05***  0.79 0.87 -0.08*** 
Farming (agriculture. forestry and aquaculture) 0.63 0.83 -0.19***  0.63 0.82 -0.19*** 
Cannot read/write or never go to school 0.06 0.30 -0.23***  0.05 0.29 -0.24*** 
Completed lower primary 0.21 0.26 -0.05***  0.20 0.26 -0.06*** 
Completed lower secondary 0.47 0.34 0.13***  0.48 0.35 0.13*** 
Completed upper secondary 0.25 0.10 0.15***  0.27 0.10 0.17*** 
Log of durable assets 9.61 8.87 0.74***  9.70 8.90 0.81*** 
Share of co-ethnics in the commune 0.95 0.52 0.43*** 
 
 0.92 
 
0.50 
 
0.42*** 
Share of people having the same occupation in the commune 0.35 0.66 -0.31***  0.35 0.65 0.30*** 
Note: Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2008-2016 VARHS. 
 
Table B. Definition of shocks 
Variable Definition 
Covariant shock A dummy variable indicating if the household has suffered a least one spatially 
covariant natural or economic shock. 
Natural shock A dummy indicating if the household was exposed to any of the following events: 
floods, landslides, typhoons, storms, droughts, pest infestation, crop disease and 
avian flu 
Economic shock A dummy indicating if the household was exposed to any of the following events: 
changes in crop prices, key input prices, prices of food or other essential 
commodities   
Idiosyncratic shock A dummy indicating if the household suffered any of the following events: illness, 
injury or death of a family member; unemployment, unsuccessful investment; loss of 
land; crime/robbery/theft; divorce, family disputes. 
Source: VARHS questionnaire. 
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Appendix 2 Vulnerability estimation 
There are different ways of measuring vulnerability, depending on how vulnerability is defined: 
vulnerability as expected poverty (VEP), vulnerability as expected utility (VEU), and vulnerability 
as exposure to risk (VER). A rich discussion has emphasized the advantages and disadvantages 
of each method (Hoddinott and Quisumbing, 2003; Ligon and Schechter, 2004; Gaiha and Imai, 
2008). We use the concept of vulnerability as low expected utility proposed by Ligon and 
Schechter (2003) in which, vulnerability is decomposed into different types of risks which suits 
our purpose of this study.   
Vulnerability is defined as the difference between household’s utility obtained from some 
certainty equivalent consumption and the expected utility of consumption.                       
The certainty equivalent consumption (z) is similar to the choice of a “poverty line”, such that if 
the consumption expenditure of a household is lower than this level, the household is considered 
vulnerable and vice versa. The vulnerability is then decomposed into two terms:                                          
The first term measures poverty, which is the difference between utility of certainty equivalent 
consumption and utility from expected consumption (   ) of household i. The second term 
measures the risk faced by household i; which is further decomposed into aggregate risk and 
idiosyncratic risks as follows: 
                                               (Poverty)                                 (Aggregate risk)                                  (Idiosyncratic risk) 
Of which,         is the expected value of consumption, conditional on a vector of aggregate 
variables  . To estimate risk, Ligon and Schechter (2003) use the variation over time, thus, t is 
introduced into the equation such that     is the consumption of household i at time t;     is a 
vector of household i’s idiosyncratic variables and    is a vector of aggregate variables. 
Accordingly, the vulnerability function36 is:                                                               (Poverty)                                                   (Aggregate risk)                                            (Idiosyncratic risk)                                                   (Unexplained risk & measurement 
error) 
                                                          
36 See Ligon and Schechter (2003) for a detailed description of vulnerability estimation 
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It is noted that the utility function applied in Ligon and Schechter’s has the form of                   . Of which,   is the household’s relative risk aversion and it is chosen at 2 in 
estimation, based on the empirical studies. They also normalize c, thus, the average of 
consumption for all households across all periods (z) equals 1. The parameters of                
can be estimated by linear equation:                           
In which,    is the time invariant household’s characteristics;   captures the time effects across 
all households; and   is the effect of household’s characteristics and/or other observable factors 
on consumption.  
We estimate the vulnerability using food consumption expenditures because the data does not 
include non-food consumption. Then, vulnerability is decomposed into poverty, aggregate risk, 
idiosyncratic risk and unexplained risk. Within the idiosyncratic risk; we consider the variance in 
household’s income and changes in number of workers in each family as the sources of 
idiosyncratic shocks, of which, the changes in number of worker are orthogonalized to changes 
in income. The confidence interval is bootstrapped for each component. Lastly, we also use the 
same weight scales for adult equivalent consumption as used by Townsend (1994); Ligon and 
Schechter (2003). In which, adult male is assigned a weight of 1 and adult female a weight of 0.9 
(adult means sixteen or older). Children aged 0 to 4 count as 0.32, aged 5 to 9 as 0.52 and aged 
10 to 15 as 0.67. 
Table C. Correlates and decomposition of vulnerability in food consumption 
 
 Vulnerability Poverty Aggregate risk Idiosyncratic risk Unexplained risk 
 
0.785*** 
[ 0.734,  0.85] 
0.278*** 
[0.262,   0.295] 
0.040*** 
[0.035,  0.047] 
0.005*** 
[0.004,  0.008] 
0.462*** 
[0.421,   0.516] 
Variable Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef 
Age 
 
-0.003 
(0.019) 
 
0.002 
(0.008) 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
-0.005 
(0.014) 
Age sq. 0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Head is male+ 0.060 
(0.071) 
0.031 
(0.036) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.028 
(0.047) 
HH size 0.104*** 
(0.040) 
0.074*** 
(0.017) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.027 
 (0.028) 
Head completed primary school+ -0.206 
(0.187) 
-0.144** 
(0.062) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.060 
(0.151) 
Head completed lower secondary+ -0.577*** 
(0.175) 
-0.344*** 
(0.069) 
-0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.224* 
(0.13) 
Head completed upper secondary+ -0.891*** 
(0.192) 
-0.536*** 
(0.073) 
-0.017*** 
(0.003) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.346** 
(0.147) 
Head or Spouse are village native+ -0.033 
(0.197) 
0.040 
(0.061) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.073 
(0.155) 
Head is Kinh+ -0.754*** 
(0.260) 
-0.429*** 
(0.141) 
-0.014*** 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(-0.002) 
-0.311** 
(0.137) 
Farming is the main source of income + 0.223** 
(0.095) 
0.153*** 
(0.049) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.064 
(0.06) 
Irrigated land area -0.000** 
(0.000) 
-0.000** 
0.000 
-0.000** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
#workers -0.103** 
(0.044) 
-0.043** 
(0.018) 
-0.001** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.060** 
(0.032) 
      
Commune dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.581 0.6795 0.680 0.081 0.469 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are bootstrapped standard errors and those in brackets are 95% confidence intervals. 
Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the VARHS 2008-2016. 
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Appendix 3 Censored network bias 
 
Regarding the limitation issue of using censored network, we compare the difference between 
the size of the risk sharing network between the censored question (up to three most important 
contacts) and question without upper bound. We find that on average, people list 2 contacts 
when they are asked to list a maximum of 3 and 4.3 contacts if there is no limitation (with a 
standard deviation of 5.5). Since the number of contacts varies considerably when there is no 
limit, we drop the outliers which are higher than the mean by three standard deviations; those 
outliers account for 1.5 per cent of the observations. Without the outliers, the size of uncensored 
network is 3.8 with the maximum of 21. Then, we take the difference (in log) between the 
censored and uncensored network and run an OLS regression to examine the correlates of 
household’s characteristics with this gap. It is seen that around 60 per cent of the observations 
give the same number of contacts regardless of the questions and the mean of the difference is 
1.8 with a standard deviation of 3.3. Regression results show that male-headed households, 
households with higher educated heads, and better off households have bigger network than the 
censored one. The gap is also positively correlated with Kinh households. When we add controls 
for structure of the network in the regression, we find that households with high proportion of 
same co-ethnic or occupational similarity contacts seem to have bigger size than their censored 
answer. Thus, it could imply that if they described their network based on the uncensored one, 
they could have had a less homophily structure. This finding corresponds to our discussion 
above that we might underestimate the diversity in Kinh’s network because Kinh households 
seem to have bigger networks than three and out of the three contacts, they might ask for help 
from more diverse sources than what we find in their structure limited within the most three 
important contacts.  
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Table D. Correlates of network size bias 
Dependent variable: log of network size difference 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS OLS OLS OLS 
      
Age of HH head -0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
(Age of head)2 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Head is male 0.068*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.064*** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
HH size 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Head completed primary school 0.027 0.032 0.031 0.032 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Head completed lower secondary  0.045* 0.042 0.042 0.045 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Head completed upper secondary 0.118*** 0.128*** 0.129*** 0.140*** 
 (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Head is farmer -0.014 -0.023 -0.023 -0.032 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
Head or Spouse is village native -0.023 -0.031 -0.031 -0.030 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Kinh 0.114** 0.097* 0.108** 0.115** 
 (0.048) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) 
Asset value (log) 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.036*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Proportion of co-ethnic in the network  0.132***   
  (0.051)   
Proportion of within-village contacts in the network   0.026  
   (0.020)  
Proportion of same occupation contacts in the network    0.115*** 
    (0.019) 
Constant -0.272* -0.442** -0.337** -0.389** 
 (0.152) (0.175) (0.166) (0.167) 
Commune FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observation 1112 10453 10453 10453 
R-squared 0.137 0.142 0.142 0.145 
Note: Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2008-2016 VARHS. 
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Appendix 4 Table E. Determinants of risk sharing network’s size and similarity by ethnicity disaggregation 
 Depedent variable Network size Ethnic similarity Geographical proximity Occupational similarity 
 
OLS 
(1) 
 
OLS 
(2) 
 
Tobit 
(3) 
 
Tobit 
(4) 
 
Tobit 
(5) 
 
Tobit 
(6) 
 
Tobit 
(7) 
 
Tobit 
(8) 
 
Age of HH head -0.006** (0.00) -0.006** (0.00) -0.034 (0.04) -0.036 (0.04) -0.007 (0.01) -0.008 (0.01) 0.019 (0.02) 0.018 (0.02) 
(Age of head)2 0.000** (0.00) 0.000** (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) -0.000** (0.00) -0.000** (0.00) 
Head is male 0.049*** (0.02) 0.048*** (0.02) 0.105 (0.22) 0.108 (0.22) 0.154** (0.07) 0.156** (0.07) 0.402*** (0.09) 0.404*** (0.09) 
Head completed primary school 0.035 (0.02) 0.035 (0.02) -0.090 (0.31) -0.039 (0.31) -0.084 (0.10) -0.093 (0.10) -0.009 (0.15) -0.005 (0.15) 
Head completed lower secondary 0.057** (0.02) 0.057** (0.02) -0.143 (0.32) -0.075 (0.32) -0.214* (0.11) -0.216* (0.11) -0.232 (0.15) -0.223 (0.15) 
Head completed upper secondary 0.099*** (0.03) 0.099*** (0.03) -0.115 (0.38) -0.040 (0.37) -0.501*** (0.13) -0.508*** (0.18) -0.872*** (0.16) -0.867*** (0.16) 
Head is farmer -0.005 (0.02) -0.004 (0.02) 0.270 (0.17) 0.267 (0.17) 0.165*** (0.06) 0.166*** (0.06) 0.008 (0.12) 0.014 (0.12) 
Head or Spouse is village native 0.017 (0.03) 0.016 (0.03) -0.084 (0.30) -0.073 (0.30) 0.173* (0.09) 0.176* (0.09) -0.052 (0.13) -0.058 (0.13) 
HH size -0.004 (0.00) -0.004 (0.00) -0.097** (0.05) -0.104** (0.05) 0.031* (0.02) 0.029* (0.08) 0.151*** (0.02) 0.150*** (0.02) 
Asset value (log) 0.029*** (0.00) 0.029*** (0.00) 0.072* (0.04) 0.074* (0.09) -0.091*** (0.02) -0.091*** (0.02) -0.111*** (0.02) -0.110*** (0.02) 
Censor     0.525* (0.31) 0.512* (0.31) -0.037 (0.09) -0.039 (0.09) 0.358*** (0.13) 0.353*** (0.13) 
Network size (log)     -0.109 (0.23) -0.085 (0.29) 0.047 (0.07) 0.048 (0.07) 0.091 (0.10) 0.095 (0.10) 
Elevation 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.001* (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 
Difference between min and max of elv. -0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 
Distance to nearest city (in 2000) -0.000* (0.00) -0.000** (0.00) -0.005*** (0.00) -0.005*** (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) -0.001 (0.00) -0.001 (0.00) 
Night light from 1996 to 2000 -0.004 (0.05) -0.004 (0.01) 0.045 (0.06) 0.022 (0.06) -0.025* (0.02) -0.026* (0.02) -0.027 (0.03) -0.029 (0.03) 
Number of villages         0.002 (0.00) 0.003 (0.00)     
Share of people having the same occupation             1.206*** (0.16) 1.195*** (0.16) 
Occupation diversity index             -0.711** (0.301) -0.733** (0.30) 
Share of co-ethnic in commune -0.045 (0.05) -0.113 (0.10) 2.460*** (0.51) 4.295*** (0.97) 0.070 (0.19) 0.160 (0.42) 0.788*** (0.295) 1.210** (0.50) 
Ethnic polarization index -0.047 (0.05) -0.069 (0.05) -1.188** (0.49) -0.726 (0.52) 0.251 (0.22) 0.248 (0.24) -0.365 (0.265) -0.251 (0.29) 
2.Thai -0.034 (0.05) -0.083 (0.09) -1.282* (0.68) 0.499 (1.14) 0.047 (0.28) 0.926* (0.50) 0.832*** (0.312) 1.723*** (0.48) 
3.Tay 0.050 (0.07) -0.012 (0.10) -1.737*** (0.66) -0.888 (0.93) 0.394* (0.21) 0.194 (0.44) 1.469*** (0.392) 1.394** (0.56) 
4.Hmong -0.089 (0.06) -0.013 (0.11) -1.208 (0.79) -2.204* (1.17) 0.259 (0.36) -0.891 (0.59) 0.692* (0.384) 0.429 (0.60) 
5.Others -0.076* (0.04) -0.140* (0.08) -0.530 (0.49) 1.137 (0.78) 0.196 (0.17) 0.334 (0.36) 0.849*** (0.245) 1.233*** (0.43) 
2.Thai x share   0.088 (0.14)   -3.322** (1.63)   -1.318** (0.65)   -1.509** (0.70) 
3.Tay x share   0.189 (0.2)   -0.458 (1.85)   1.194 (1.36)   1.787 (1.39) 
4.Hmong x share   -0.104 (0.15)   2.349 (1.63)   1.836** (0.78)   0.308 (0.98) 
5.Others x share   0.130 (0.14)   -3.547*** (1.34)   -0.305 (0.53)   -0.746 (0.72) 
Constant 0.914*** (0.135) 0.975*** (0.16) 8.454*** (1.98) 7.016*** (2.05) 3.299*** (0.54) 3.259*** (0.66) 1.778** (0.766) 1.389 (0.85) 
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Observations 11175  11175  10487  10487  10487  10487  10487  10487  
R2/ Pseudo R2 0.108  0.108  0.174  0.178  0.0436  0.0445  0.100  0.100  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All equation includes time and district fixed effects 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2008-2016 VARH
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